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

THE HON. GEORGE E. FOSTER.

CANADIAN ADDRESSES

BY THE

HON. GEORGE E. FOSTER

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INTRODUCTION

TO form an adequate idea of what Canada is and what she may become, it is essential to visualize her setting and environment. She is a country of immense extent, larger than the United States, and exceeded in superficial area only by Russia and China. The two great oceans of the world wash her eastern and western sides, creating thousands of miles of sea-coast with innumerable harbours, inlets, fiords, and bays which give easy and safe access inland.

Between these oceans, for a distance of nearly 4,000 miles, stretches a diversified succession of hills, valleys, forest land, vast plains, and lofty mountain ranges. From the southern boundary, based on the United States, this long band of territory extends with varying breadths of habitable and cultivable lands northward to the Arctic, where it is lost in the snows and ice and wide

frozen seas. Making due allowance for mountainous and barren or frozen lands there remains an extent of easily habitable territory sufficient to sustain a population of from 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 under healthy conditions and with all necessary ease and comfort.

Canada's internal water system is unique and projected on a gigantic scale. The Gulf and River St. Lawrence drain the longest fresh water area in the world, consisting of Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, the head of which is 2,000 miles distant from the Atlantic. This chain, with the assistance of connecting canals, forms a continuous waterway, and reaches well nigh to the centre of Canada. Hudson's Bay, navigable four months in the year, sweeps far into the higher middle West, and many large and innumerable small lakes lie interspersed in every part of the country, stocked with food fishes and bordered with wooded areas.

The St. John River and its affluents in New Brunswick, the Saguenay, the St. Francis, the St. Maurice and St. Lawrence in Quebec ; the Ottawa, the Thames, and the Grande in Ontario ; the Red, the Winnipeg, and Assini-

boine in Manitoba ; the Bow, the Belly, and the wide-forked Saskatchewan in the West Prairies ; the Yukon, the Peace, and the lordly Mackenzie in the North ; and the Naas, the Columbia, the Thompson, and the Fraser in British Columbia, with numberless smaller but important streams, flush and nourish and beautify the whole face of the country and make it easily one of the best watered regions of the world. Derived from springs, generous rains, and gradually melting snows, they are singularly free from torrential or seasonal destructiveness, and for the same reason are equable and never failing in supply.

Lying largely in the Temperate Zone, Canada is free from ravages of earthquakes and violent atmospheric convulsions, free too from devastating epidemics and natural pests. The climate is varied, running to extremes of cold in winter and high degrees of heat in summer, but on the whole is eminently healthy and suitable for the rearing of a vigorous and robust race. The seasons are sharply defined ; each has its own variety and charm, and the year is free from the long monotony of tropical and sub-tropical climes.

Nor has nature been niggardly of her gifts in other respects. Minerals abound of all kinds, useful and precious, with coal and iron in abundance, and although as yet merely a fraction of the country has been explored, last year (1913) the production reached a value of $133,000,000. Canada is already the third silver producing country in the world.

Her forest reserves are immense and the variety of useful woods large. Last year's production reached a value of $182,000,000, and with the wise system of conservation now being established there is no reason why new growth should not replace yearly cutting, and the balance thus be preserved for future generations.

No country is so richly provided with food fishes. Every lake and river teems with useful and edible varieties, the coolness of the waters and the protection afforded by the wooded and uninhabitable lands being valuable factors in quality and preservation. The numerous rivers ascending from the sea make ideal spawning grounds, and the invigorating influences and rich feeding grounds of the sea-coast and banks materially contribute

to maintain the supply. The catch of food fishes in Canadian waters in 1913 was valued at $35,000,000. A complete system of Government reproduction and protection tends to prevent depletion and increase the supply.

But most important of all to the nation is her great endowment of arable lands. Last year the field crops raised reached a value of $600,000,000, and the grain harvested in the three Prairie Provinces alone amounted to 500,000,000 bushels, of which wheat accounted for 209,000,000 bushels. And yet only a fringe of Canada's agricultural lands has been put under cultivation. As year by year population increases and additional acreage is reclaimed from the wild, and better methods of farming are carried out, the yield will grow and grow and the title to the granary of the world will be literally established.

Nor is it unimportant to note that the wide stretches of uninhabited forest and wood lands, and uninhabitable north lands and remote sea-coasts and islands, fit Canada for becoming a vast and inexhaustible shelter and preserve for wild animal, bird, and fish life, where the ravages of the hunter can be reduced to a

minimum and the *ferae naturae* may find refuge and breeding spaces.

As to Canada's environment. It needs but a moment's thought to impress one with the important part played in a country's development by its environment. Canada is, I think, particularly fortunate in this respect. Eastward she faces upon the Atlantic, the most travelled of oceans, the daily pathway, at comparatively easy distances, for the commerce and travel and communication of the well-peopled continents of Europe and North America. Complementary conditions of primary production and manufactures, of old and new civilizations, of free and congested spaces, act as powerful stimulants to an interchange which tends to continued increase. In this interchange Canada has a large share now with almost illimitable opportunity for enlargement. She possesses the shorter sea distances, has excellent harbours, and a growing commercial marine.

Westward she faces the Pacific, whose waters wash the coast-lines of more than half the world's population, and whose sea-borne

commerce—at present very important—will constantly and rapidly increase as these old civilizations develop and expand under modern methods. The Panama Canal will open new routes between Europe and Eastern North America and the western portions of the continent. Abundance of coal, excellent harbours, and great productive natural resources will enable Canada to participate largely in the new activities of the Pacific.

Southward 100,000,000 of the most enterprising and productive people stimulate with their progressive spirit and teach by their experience and assist by their interchanges of capital and skill. The overflow of energy and example from a great and rich country like the United States is invaluable, and its juxtaposition a source of constant inspiration and immense advantage. In all these respects Canada's environment is a particularly happy one ; she lies close to the great marts of the world, in the midst of its greatest activities and upon its much-travelled highways.

Nor have story and heroic adventure failed to invest this country with stirring charm.

The intrepid mariner has been in evidence and attached his name to islands and bays and rivers and lands, snatched by his skill and daring from the ever diminishing unknown. No story has outrivalled the voyages of early missionaries and explorers in their adventurous journeys up the rivers and lakes of the new country, which opened to settlers and hunters the eastern and northern lands in the face of perils and hardships innumerable. There still lingers over many a fort and battlefield the halo of martial deeds done in the long wars for supremacy between French and English, and between Canadians and the revolutionaries from the seceded colonies to the south—a halo softened and consecrated by the enduring peace and perfect amity which has succeeded to the long years of honourable strife.

On this stage and with this environment a remarkable development has already taken place, and mostly since Canada's birth as a dominion in 1867. The scattered fringes of settlement on the Atlantic seaboard and along the River St. Lawrence, and Lakes Ontario and Erie, have been consolidated and

joined to the Pacific fringe by the addition of the whole vast territory lying between the Great Lakes and the summit of the Rockies. This area has been opened up, surveyed, and organized into three great provinces, dotted with villages, towns; and cities, and made the homes of millions of enterprising and progressive people. Schools, churches, colleges, and universities have followed, and all the comforts and conveniences of modern life. To-day three trans-continental railways, with intersecting and parallel branches, furnish transport from ocean to ocean and between all the centres of population and production. Industrial life has grown apace, production in all lines has taken immense strides, and interprovincial and external trade made remarkable progress. The stream of immigration has steadily and rapidly increased, and last year 410,000 new settlers came to find homes within her borders. The bonds of national life have immeasurably strengthened, and the imperial tie has strengthened with it. The horizon of the people has widened, confidence in their destiny has grown into a belief, and hope in the future is widespread

and dominant. In this confidence and hope 8,000,000 Canadians to-day take up and pursue with unabated vigour their great work of development and nation building.

Canada has to face three problems—its own internal development, its attitude toward outside peoples in respect to settlement within its boundaries, and its relations to the Empire at large. As to the first, its policy has grown gradually, taken on year by year a firmer consistency, and may at the present time be considered as pretty definitely settled. It has gained, and will undoubtedly maintain, complete autonomy of government and administration. It is now and must continue to be practically supreme within its territorial boundaries. Government follows the line of a sane and reasonable democracy, tempered with the restraints and checks of its monarchical traditions. This latter does not greatly obtrude in forms, but it permeates with its influences and preserves from excess by its conservative tendencies. Manhood suffrage practically prevails, and woman suffrage is gradually emerging through the lesser gates of the municipal to the

crowning power of national exercise. The protective principle, never since Confederation entirely absent from fiscal legislation, became dominant in 1879, and has since so continued. Joined therewith later was the principle of preferential treatment of British Empire products, which now includes practically all the imperial possessions except Newfoundland and Australia. These will readily be included as soon as they find it possible to reciprocate in like degree. Protection is not high or oppressive, and is not likely ever to be raised beyond the point necessary to place Canadian producers in a position not to exclude, but to compete fairly with the nations more favoured by circumstances, skill, and capital.

To develop its own rich natural resources, to train its people to produce and make as far as possible the products necessary for their sustenance and comfort, and bring what it does not consume to the condition of greatest value before exporting it, to conserve wisely its destructible resources and to augment intensively the virtue and durability of its producing capabilities, and to do this

without entangling itself by commercial or other alliances with foreign countries, sums up in brief its doctrine of internal national development.

Canada's attitude towards outside peoples is one of hearty and genuine friendliness. To our great neighbour on the South, the United States of America, this particularly applies. Though there have been minor questions that have caused friction, these have been mainly territorial—boundaries and fisheries. Most, if not all, of them have been settled, and the horizon is now clear. But Canada has been and continues to be extremely jealous of her national rights and sensitive to the least encroachment upon them, either theoretical or actual. The aspiration for national development on Canadian and British lines is so deep and prevalent that maybe it induces over-sensitiveness in respect to a people so close to us, so populous and powerful, so enterprising and aggressive. As we grow larger we shall feel it less, and as both peoples learn to know each other better and respect each other's national ideals, it will entirely pass away and leave but the rivalry of com-

peting and interlacing civilization to attain the best.

As to settlers, Canada prefers the people of Northern Europe, British first and allied stock next, with, of course, open house to the comers from the United States. Under regulations as to health and morals all are welcomed to our wide areas and the opportunities of our new country. The peoples of Southern Europe are next in preference. The genius and spirit of their institutions are different from ours in important respects; they do not fit so easily into our political and social system, and are harder to assimilate, but the best of them make good citizens, and most of them perform valuable service in the upbuilding of our national fabric.

With the Oriental it is different. For the great Asiatic civilizations we have the utmost respect, we acknowledge their greatness and admire their learning and art; but there are reasons why we think it not only best but absolutely necessary to restrict to a minimum access of their immense populations. Climatically, Canada is not suitable to their best development. Economically, their coming

injects an element which confuses and deteriorates the basis of wages and living. Ethically, assimilation and co-action are practically impossible. Politically, their coming in large numbers tends to interminable difficulties.

For these reasons, what is called "The Oriental Question" has assumed some importance, and tends to become one of increasing gravity. Some of these great peoples are our fellow subjects, one is the ally of the Mother Country, and another the most ancient and populous of olden empires. To temper theory with practice, to study susceptibilities and pursue sane methods, and whilst doing this to keep mutual respect and strive to arrive at peaceful methods of solution, will tax, but need not dismay, the best resources of statesmanship.

But in the final analysis, it must be understood that Canada will claim absolute control over her own gateways, and the final voice in deciding who shall be admitted to her home and her nationhood.

As to Canada's relation to the Empire, few words are here necessary. Her past record is fair guarantee for the future. She was

born within the Empire, cradled upon her lap, and has grown up within her encircling arms. She desires to remain a part of the Empire and to develop within the sphere of Empire influence—not passively, but actively; not negatively, but positively. As her 3,000,000 have grown to 8,000,000 with greater assumption of power and influence, aspiration and ambition, so will her 8,000,000 soon become twice and thrice that number. With growth in numbers will not all these feelings grow apace? These will seek their natural outlet in action, and this action, if not thwarted, must overgrow the national and become imperial.

And so must the old Constitution enlarge, the old system expand, and the old order change. What holds good of Canada will in measure hold good of the present overseas dominions and the overseas dominions yet to be. In trade, in defence, in organization we must grow imperially, and so conserve and extend the benefits and glories of British and imperial civilization. This prospect may confuse timid hearts, but is a very trumpet-call to the brave and far-sighted. It is, above

all, the call that to-day is needed to summon us from the mists and bogs of petty party strifes and faltering factional disputes, to the clear heights of real and true Empire organization and development.

One final word. There is especial need just now for long vision and the fine courage of statesmanship, and the warm fires of national imagination. Let us summon them all to our aid. We should not be thinking overmuch of what we are now, but more of what we may be fifty or a hundred years hence. Let us climb the heights and take the long forward look.

Fifty years from now Canada will be inhabited by 50,000,000, with her cultivated lands enlarged to half their capabilities, and all her other national resources developed in proportion. Can we picture to ourselves the accumulated driving force of this one adjunct of the Empire? We should think of it, get it into our minds, lay it upon our hearts, ask and try to answer the wonderful question, "What then?" Pose the same question for the other overseas possessions.

Are present conditions, systems, constitu-

tions to satisfy then or long before then? Should not the best thought of the best thinkers of all our Empire be at work already to prepare the way for success, to remove the obstacles and defeat the possibility of failure? For if success is possible, it will be such a success; so also if failure is possible, what a failure!

Our greatest enemies are drift and *laissez faire*. Let us enthrone organization—Empire organization and development; broad-based and effective. Let us rekindle the ancient fires of patriotic service, reincarnate the ancient virtues of courage and sacrifice, and begin at once the great crusade for the regeneration and firm establishment of an Imperial Britain.

GEORGE E. FOSTER.

Ottawa, Canada.
January 26th, 1914.

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CANADIAN ADDRESSES

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THE CALL OF THE STATE*

THE call of the State comes to none with greater force and aptness than to our colleges and universities, and to those who enjoy their advantages. By virtue of the franchises, protection, and material assistance of the State these institutions exist, and to their cultural processes are entrusted each year a small but potential minority of the State's citizens. The colleges and universities repay in part the obligations thus created by maintaining a high theoretical and practical standard of efficiency in the arts and sciences they teach, by furnishing the future citizens that pass under their influences with the best possible equipment of intellectual and moral power, and the highest ideals of scientific and professional

* Reprinted from "Acta Victoriana," the organ of the Union Literary Society of Victoria University, Toronto, January, 1907.

pursuits. Thus the altar fires of high truth and noble learning are kept continually burning within the State, and each year beholds a select and gifted proportion of its sons pass out from their glow to become, each in his chosen sphere, a cultured factor in the State's general development.

But all is not yet done that should be done. If these select ones aim only at making themselves approved clerics, good doctors, excellent engineers, first-class captains of industry, and such like, the State, whilst being enriched in its individual, social, and professional life, may yet be cheated of its just due.

For the State is an organized entity, and needs more, and calls for more, than this. Medical skill and its application results in vast improvements in the health and sanitation of both individual and community, technical and scientific knowledge in its application raises the quality and efficiency of all our industrial processes, and like results may be attained in every field of life, yet all the while the State may be suffering in health and retarded in development and actually

retrograding in its ideals, its policies, and its administration. The State must have its eliminated truths, its correct ideals, its wise policies, and its improved processes of development and administration entirely over and above those of individuals and guilds. Unless these exist and are being continually tested, improved, and purified as the great current of world life sweeps onward, deterioration in the State may easily go hand in hand with individual and social improvement, till national decay results in national death.

The point I wish to enforce is this: that regnant and persistent, as of the highest and most essential moment, we must keep and strengthen the idea that no man's work ends with his profession or calling, that his whole duty is by no means done when he has completed his professional or servile work. A man is to be a good doctor, or engineer, or teacher, or workman, but he is to be more than that. He is to be withal a good citizen of the State in which he lives, and to do it willing and loyal service, in no neutral or passive way, but in a sense of real, practical, self-sacrificing duty thereto.

Ours is a democracy, and in a democracy the result depends on the average efficiency and activity of its units. This average is susceptible of great enhancement by the superior equipment and motive power of the widely distributed units which pass out from our higher institutions of learning.

Herein, then, lies the opportunity of the university and college, and the urgent responsibility as well. Nor will they discharge their full obligations to the State, until by appropriate stimulus they fire every student's imagination, and fill his heart with an intense and dominant patriotism, which will lead him to recognize the claims of his country to a part of his best service, and impel him conscientiously to bestow that service, and until they furnish him with a generous knowledge of the principles and methods of state service. How to die in defence of country we all know; how to live for it we all more need to know. And if the sacred cohorts of chosen youth that yearly graduate from the colleges and universities of Canada could go forth to their country's service fired with high enthusiasm and armed with correct

methods, it would not be long before the public life of Canada would be lifted into great vitality and splendid effort. The call of the State is urgent, persistent, almost piteous; whence better can it recruit its reserves, and where more naturally should it meet with more generous response?

Who to-day are doing the work of the State? Roughly we may divide the workmen of the State—its special guild—into two classes, the legislative and the executive. The legislative work is done by one Federal and seven Provincial bodies.* These comprise in all about 600 men. In so far as general policy and lines and methods of administration are concerned, they are all embodied in enactment and regulation by this handful of the population of Canada. But dominant in these are eight cabinets or ministries, composed of some threescore men, who under the party system, each one in its own legislature, overshadow and practically direct the work of the 600 legislators. Theoretically these are committees or servants of the 600 representatives of the Canadian

* Since 1907 two new Provinces have been added, which would increase the above numbers.

democracy, but it is a moot question if in reality and in practice they are not, during their time of office, its actual masters.

Under these legislators, and subject to their directions, are the multiplied grades of executive workers, each having its scope and limits, who carry out the vast network of activities included in the country's services. Our judges sit and decree justice, our great Departments administer State affairs on sea and land, construct our works, supervise and regulate our great productivities and utilities, and expend our moneys, working through and by the tens of thousands of officials and employees, who carry out instructions to the minutest detail.

To this little band of legislators and this not much larger band of public servants is entrusted the momentous work of the State. The security for property and life, the order and peace of the community, the trend of trade and development, in fact all the national interests of a great people, depend on the wisdom, the integrity, the efficiency and the industry of this small working service of the State. For good or ill, for better or

worse, we find here the head, heart, and arms of the State.

A single moment of serious thought teaches us, too, what depends on the equipment of this service—its ideals, its methods—and of the intimate relations it holds to the vast mass of our citizenship. Theoretically a creature and committee of the mass, it has its own separate existence, activities, and ideals. Of what supreme importance, therefore, that it be formed of the best, equipped with the best, dominated by the best!

But it so happens in practice that for this, the country's service, the least special preparation has been thought necessary or has been provided. For the teacher infinite pains of selection, of training, of classification, thorough knowledge and the highest standards. For the physician all that special colleges and the accumulated knowledge and experience of the healing art can give. For the engineer severe courses and years of close practical training. But for the legislator? Picked up from the farm, the store, the office; here to-day, away to-morrow; dependent on the accidents and incidents of party

combination and popular favour; the majority untrained and unread; stealing time from a calling they understand to do intermittent duty in a sphere which requires the best possible equipment of mind and heart: where is his school of training, his study and testing of the standards? Were it not that in practice it so happens that some few better endowed or more thoroughly equipped retain in the parties a position of comparative permanency, develop, in the practical work of years, standards and traditions tending to efficiency and skill in statesmanship and continuity in policy, we should be much worse off than we are. Every year the work of the State is becoming more complex and difficult, and calls for special gifts and trained thinkers and observers.

From the colleges and universities Canada rightfully asks a contribution of their best; and to the well-equipped and strong-souled who answer she offers wonderful opportunities for glorious careers in hard and self-sacrificing service in her behalf.

Lives have been freely given and glory has been grandly gained upon the tented field

in every age of the Empire's varied history, and who does not thrill as the roll of her heroes is called? But no service has been so useful, and none more truly glorious than that rendered by the men of the State, warriors of peace who followed and nobly fulfilled the call of duty in the great field of legislative and executive work. And where is there a more urgent call for such than here in Canada to-day? Unto you, young men, we call, because you are strong.

THE NEW NORTH*

IT is a long call from the shadow of the Rockies, in the far Canadian West, to the Chagres River and the Panama Canal, and I had not the least idea, when I was accorded the honour of an invitation by the Canadian Club to visit them in this family reunion to-night, that I should have a trip to the Panama Canal thrown in. But I am delighted that it has been thrown in, without money and without price. My vague ideas about the Panama Canal have been brightened and cleared, and I could give points to the Parliament at Ottawa now on that canal at any time.

My friend, Mr. Oliver, and myself are on different sides of politics. He is on the wrong side and I am on the right side. And we fight it out that way up in Canada. But when

* A speech delivered at the Annual Banquet of the Canadian Club, New York, 1909.

we get down to New York I stand at the back of Frank Oliver.

I thought I saw a little shadow of scepticism flit across the faces of some of the audience when the Minister was telling you of the wonderful extent and vast possibilities of the North-West. It was true, every word that he said. He did not say quite as much as he might have said; but I am bound to back him up, no matter what he said.

I am honoured to meet the old Canadians —still Canadian in heart and Canadian in sentiment—who drifted out of the old land ten, fifteen, twenty, some thirty years ago, and came down to make their fortunes in this vast commercial metropolis. I am bound to say, as I mingle with you, and look into your faces and hear you talk, that the memory of the old land has not yet faded out. And I have thought to-night, this afternoon, and on various occasions, that if I were only inspired like Peter the Hermit, some of these times I would come down, even to Gotham, and I would preach a crusade among the 40,000 Canadians who are said to live in this great city, and ask them, for the sake of

home and duty, to make preparations to come back and help us build up that great country. I wonder if I should find a response. I am sure that I should. Whether the response would go to the extent of action or not would be a different thing; but in your hearts you would feel, and, feeling, a great many of you would wish that your ties and your circumstances were not such that you could not come up to the call of duty and go back, and have a hand in the game. At least I think that of you.

When the Chairman asked me to put a heading to what I was going to say to-night, in a time of great pressure, or great carelessness, I do not know which, I simply wrote down "The New North" and sent it on. I thought it might as well be that as anything. I surely ought to have as many privileges as a clergyman, who names his text and then preaches on whatever he likes. So I thought it did not matter much.

But, after all, there is a little in that caption; there is, in fact, a good deal in it. The old Canada that you men left years ago has changed a great deal since you left it. For

you, in the multiplicity of your business arrangements, your many and varied duties, have not been able to keep full and strict account of Canadian progress and Canadian development. If you were to go back to Canada and travel through the old places and the new places, you would find out that the old country was indeed a new country.

It is true that the two great oceans still lave its eastern and western shores; it is true that the mighty Rockies are still there, and that there lie cradled in their arms over a thousand miles of our inland territory; it is true that the mighty St. Lawrence and the mighty Mackenzie, and the other great rivers, flow as they flowed before; the same old names to the great divisions, with a great many new ones added; the same wide prairies, baring their bosoms to the winter winds and the summer suns; the same blue Laurentian hills on the east, and the same mighty Rockies, with their cairns of eternal snows towards the west. These have not changed. But yet, when you pass in them, amongst them and through them, something has happened since you were there; the old

country has become a new country: and it would strike you in that way.

The energizing development of a quarter of a century has placed its marks on coast, and lake, and river, and prairie; and everywhere the change is visible. To-day Atlantic 15,000-ton steamers tie up at the docks of Montreal, nearly fifteen hundred miles in from the entrance of the Gulf. To-day transcontinental railways steam out of the great eastern ports, traverse the hills of the east, run along the almost immeasurable prairies, crawl in and out of the Rockies, as they climb them or tunnel them, and go on to the wide ports in the Pacific. To-day, all through that country, trade, industry, art, sciences, all the enterprizes and all the indicia of a great and growing civilization are at their ceaseless, steady, progressive work. So, I say, if you came back to-day you would come back to a New North! so different from the Old North of your boyhood days that you would think yourself almost in another country.

And I am glad to say that the same old skies, clear in their bright blue by day, and

bespread with stars in the night, hang above it; and the same beauty of vegetation and foliage deck its broad acres in their seasonable time, and the same wealth is in her keeping, and wider, vastly wider opportunities for development, for business, for trade, and for progress, are opening up on every side.

It is a New North! Take the figures of our trade and read them, and put them beside the figures of our trade when you left Canada thirty years ago. Take our industrial life, then at its commencement, and place it, in its insignificance, against the varied industrial life of to-day. Take our rural population, spread along the St. Lawrence and the lake sides in thin settlements in your days, down through the maritime provinces, and follow them up. Through the great open West the rural population has spread. Towns and villages and mighty cities have risen, all the results of the progress and work which have been going on in the meantime. It is Canadian energy, it is Canadian brawn, it is Canadian enterprise, it is Canadian hope, and Canadian resource, ready to overcome every

difficulty that is making itself felt in that, the last Great West, and the mighty New North of this continent.

Not only have there been changes in that respect, but there have been changes in other respects. Our relationships have changed—our relationships internal and our relationships external. In your time, and in my boyhood days, when we spoke of our country, I meant New Brunswick, and you meant Nova Scotia, or you meant Prince Edward Island and another Quebec, and so on all the way through the old Provinces. All that has changed. "Our Country" now is the whole country of Canada—limited by two great oceans, East and West, limited by your imaginary line, as you call it, along the south, limited to the north by the cold, silent, mysterious regions which will long remain for adventurous explorers and hunters of the big game of the world. Hither some future Roosevelt, when rhinoceroses have all died, and elephants have vanished from Africa, will come to use his brawn and his metal, after he has conquered the wilds of Africa and of the United States.

So our relationships with ourselves have changed. That brings me to the next step. Our relationships have changed externally. In our boyhood days what did we ever think of Japan or of China, or of the countries of Europe as having relationships with us? But the moment we broadened out the Provinces into the great country of Canada, and removed our limits to the east and west oceans, to your south line, then our neighbours became the people of independent states and mighty nations. We have come out in famous society, as a young lady makes her début and becomes an acknowledged member of a great social class, in her circle and her set; so in Canada we have come out from the period of short clothes and awkwardness, and we have ventured into the circle of international relationship. We have gone thus far, and to-day, whether we wish it or not, we Canadians have to shoulder the responsibilities, and to meet all the difficulties that are entailed when a nation's borders are enlarged, and instead of having to do with the people of her own family, she has to do with the great families of the earth.

I make the statement in my own country; I make it here, that there never was a country in the world which had such a great stage set for it as the people of Canada to-day. Look at that stage! Here, on the Atlantic side, an ocean rich with the finest food fishes of the world, with its coal mines opening their mouths at the very wharfs to which steamers come! Over on the Pacific ocean, ports equally as great, and the mighty Pacific between us and our nearest neighbours. There are two great oceans, with their ports, ready for commerce, with coal ready for the propulsive power that is necessary to carry on that commerce; and in between, the mighty inland waters, navigable in great part, where our commerce, in common with the commerce of the United States, is borne to and fro. To the south of us a people of 80,000,000 souls, strong to-day, mighty in their development, almost more than mighty in the immense results which they have produced, and which from year to year draw upon the resources they have left.

That is the people with whom we dare to compete. We are adventurous enough to

think we can ; we are brave enough to try the competition. We do not believe there is a man in the United States of America but would admire a people who are willing to launch out upon that friendly competition.

My friends here say it is only an imaginary line between the United States and Canada. Those imaginary lines are pretty substantial sometimes. On the other side are institutions different from your own, political methods different from your own, life ideals to a certain extent different from your own, based upon different conditions, looking in somewhat different directions. And though the imaginary line is always, and I hope will always remain, but an imaginary line, over which and through which the admiration, and respect, and love, and commerce, and intercourse of the two peoples will find as little check as possible, it is a line of steel and adamant when you come to look upon it in a national sense, a line which is not to be passed by reason of developing nationalities. What I mean to say is, that the line is no imaginary line in so far as dividing countries, which, though they will always dwell together

in peace and harmony, have to a certain extent their own ideals, and will work them out in their own way. And is it not better it should be so? Work out your republican and democratic ideas in your own country, and give the world the benefit of them; we will work out our kingly and monarchical democracy in the North, and the country and the world at large will ultimately be the better for both. It is all right for you to think yours is the better; give us the same privilege to think that ours is the better of the two. We will put them to the test, and a hundred years hence we will see which has stood the test of time better, and neither of us will quarrel, now or then, about results.

I want to say a little as to our broadened relations. Over on the Pacific Ocean we have as our nearest neighbours the Japanese and the Chinese—350,000,000 people, some of them already fully awake, others partly waked up, and all of them waking up. That is a problem for us, just as it is a problem for you. We have to meet it in the same way as you have to meet it—in an altogether national way. That sobers

us; that throws responsibilities on our shoulders; that brings us up with a jerk, out of merely parochial politics, and makes us think higher, and better, and wider thoughts; and so it works towards the development and strengthening of the race.

Some of you people in the United States did not think that your country should ever go outside of its own borders; and there were not a few who believed in an imperial advancement and enlargement; but whatever your beliefs were, you went out on that line, you have given hostages now to the world. Your future is planted in the far Pacific Ocean, you have interests in the West Indies —you have become a great world power. And I for one bless the day when the United States, with her ideals, and her power, and her opportunities, threw herself into the great world's work, and became responsible with the other great nations of the world, as guarantors for the best tendencies and the best ideals in working out the world's future.

I will not enlarge upon this. I mention it merely to give the idea of the widening,

broadening enlargement that has taken place since you, twenty-five or thirty years ago, left the old land, and came to this more southern clime.

Well, we are a New North in commercial ideals in comparison to what we were. When you left thirty years ago the commercial ideals of Canada were somewhat hazy, and, broadly speaking—and I am out of my own country and cannot be contradicted, as I have given so much support to my friend here that he dare not go back on me now in what I say—broadly speaking, in the olden time there was a free trade party in Canada, struggling manfully, with some necessary revenue to be raised by tariff; however, we may call it a *de facto* free trade party. That is, the old idea was: Canada has fish, let her haul them out and sell them; Canada has wheat and raises it, let her pack it up and sell it to the outside world; Canada has forests, let her cut down her trees and sell her lumber outside; she has minerals, let her dig them up and sell them in the raw. That was the old idea; export your raw materials, import your manufactured goods; export at the

lowest value, bring in at the highest value. Things have changed. In the gradual procession of years that old free trade party, even with a 17 or 15 per cent. tariff, has absolutely passed away from the Dominion of Canada, and now there is a protective policy. What Canada believes in now, without respect to party, is—what it disagrees in may be as to the degree; but what it agrees on, without respect to party—speaking in the broad and largest sense, is this: Employment at home for the labour of the people of home. We believe in manufacturing the raw up to the finished state before we sell it to other people who want it. We believe in bringing in from abroad the raw, and manufacturing it among our own people for our own wants. That is, we believe that no country can progress and be great unless she build up a broad, and wide, and varied industrial life whereby her people can be kept by employment within their own bounds, and enrich themselves by making up the raw materials into more or less finished goods before they sell them to the outside world that wants them. That

is, we believe in those principles; we believe in those methods, and the only difference is as to the amount of protection that we must put around our country to bring that object within the scope of actual fulfilment.

We are not a high protective party on the Canadian side. Take your own tariff, the Dingley Bill, and foot it up, and what do you find? Almost an even 50 per cent. duty upon all your imported dutiable goods. That is what your tariff comes to. Take the Canadian, and it is less than 27 per cent. So you see the protective duty of Canada upon dutiable goods is not very much more than one-half of what the United States puts in its tariff upon dutiable goods that come into that country. You are a high protective people, and we, on the other side, are, as I said, a very much lower protective people than are yourselves.

Now, it is not my business to poke my nose into the affairs of the people of the United States. I am just giving you an idea of how we have travelled along. We have got out of the period of free trade. We had a little mess among ourselves about Com-

mercial Union, and we got out of that. We had a long and fruitless system of pilgrimages to Washington, asking for reciprocity in certain modified forms, and we were not met with the glad hand altogether, and we got out of that. To-day the people of Canada are content to go on and develop themselves in the way in which I have stated, with a decided sentiment towards preferences with the other members of the great Empire to which we belong, preference to their commodities and goods against the commodities and goods of all the peoples in the world.

The members of a family should be good to each other; and we Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans, people of the old Motherland, are all members of the same family. Mother and daughters we have been content to call ourselves. To-day the daughters are grown up, and growing up, and the old mother is still strong, and, in trade matters, mighty and imperial still. To-day in the British Empire itself, in all its parts, there opens to our view an avenue of imperial trade for the benefit and for the development of the great Empire in all its parts. The idea

is growing and we believe it to be practicable, and I believe that the future—and not very many years distant either—holds within its lap the fruition of a trade compact, or arrangement, between all the component parts of the British Empire and the Mother Country herself, which shall be of immense advantage towards the development and strengthening of the broad Empire as a whole.

These are, in brief, our commercial ideals. Let me for a moment speak to you of our national ideals, because we have national ideals as well. I have, I think, warrant to say that we have lost the wobbling gait of childhood. You know how they used to wobble when you lived over in Canada, thirty years ago. When we looked out into the future it was dim, and misty, and hazy. We did not see quite where we were going. Well, there has been progress, and there are some things that are wiped off the slate. Separatism and annexation have gone, and gone for ever. Like a nightmare they haunted us for some time. It has entirely passed away. There were, in my boyhood days, advocates of annexation. There were numbers in our country who

thought that the little strip of Canada along the 49th parallel of latitude could not well hold its own against the mighty powers and capacities of the great country to the south of us. And there were many who debated, and more who silently thought, too, that the time would come, and in no distant future, when we on the north should form a part of the United States of America, and become annexed to you. Was there something of the same opinion south of the line? Did your publicists, and your politicians, and your business men rather think that in a little time, and not very long, Canada would ripen and fall off the tree, and make one with the people on the south of the 49th parallel of latitude? Well, in Canada that has all passed away. I would rather undertake to find the needle in a haystack than to find an annexationist in Canada at the present moment.

Separatism has gone; annexation has gone. There is another thing that we have discussed—that is, independence. We have had said to us, "Why not cut the apron strings; why not set up for yourselves; why not develop a republic, or a nation, as you

please, on the north side of the line ? " And many have thought seriously about that. But, and I think I am as near the truth with reference to this as I am with reference to the other things that I have spoken of, to-day independence, in that sense, is not a live question in the Dominion of Canada ; nor do I believe it can show any considerable influence or any considerable number of adherents.

What then is the national ideal ? Do we pay tribute to Great Britain ? Not a dollar ; not a cent. Are we under the dominion of Great Britain as to how we shall frame our acts ? Practically no more than we are under that of the United States of America, or the Czar of Russia. Are we in every respect independent from the old Mother Country ? Absolutely independent for all practical purposes, and to all practical ends ; as independent as we are of the United States of America.

We do not lack for liberty. We are not menaced by oppression. None of our rights or privileges are interfered with. We are absolutely and perfectly free to do as we like, and to make our own legislation as we please. But, over and above all, there is in Canada

to-day—and, I believe, in every offshoot of the great Mother Country to-day, wherever it lies—a deep feeling that our destiny is not to drop off from the parent country into separate, independent nationalities; but that our destiny is, gradually, without forcing, without friction, in a perfectly natural way, to build up out of the Mother Country and the overseas dominions one grand, united British Imperial Power which shall take in all; whose flag shall wave over all; and with all a common fame, common aims, and common institutions shall prevail. That, I think, is a noble future; that, I think, wakens the highest and best aspirations of our people; that, I believe, is the end and aim towards which we are gradually and surely tending.

Someone asked me to-day, "Why don't you hurry it up?" Such things cannot be hurried. You cannot hurry an oak tree. Plant the acorn: there your power ends. It is God's wind, God's rain, and the natural forces that will develop the oak from the acorn. And you cannot, systematically, machine-like, turn out nations and empires. They grow, just as all things in nature grow.

Years ago I had my rough-and-ready plans by which the Empire could be welded together; so had many others. They have been thrown away. The heart being right, the general sentiment being that way, we have travelled on, by co-operation, into a system of intimate partnership, and that, I think, is the end to which we shall arrive.

You people on this side of the line, mainly and largely of English descent—you whose civilization, whose laws, whose liberties, were founded upon the great constitutional principles that were nourished in the British Empire, and which have been spread world-wide—you are pursuing your national destiny. And with those two great countries, the United States of America pursuing its ideals and the British Empire and its overseas possessions pursuing their ideals, there is no inertia in the future that seems irresistible; with these two great civilizations working along their lines, spreading their principles and their ideals, there is no doubt that in the future they will be the two great world powers, which shall make for peace, for order, and for prosperity, the wide world over.

Canadians in the City of New York, cherish your old home! It will never fade from your hearts. The memories of childhood days photograph themselves upon us, and become part of our fibre, our blood, and our bone, and it is impossible to get away from them. You who have come to New York, or have gone to Boston or Chicago, we are proud of you in Canada, because when we see you and when we talk with your neighbours we get this unvarying testimony that "the Canadians have made good in this country to which they have come." Proud of you we are, on that account; be equally proud of us, that we are trying to make good on our side of the line. And wherever we may be, on one side or the other, I know what these Canadian clubs are doing to spread the name, and the fame, and the virtues of Canada on this side of the line. In that respect they are doing a great work for both these countries.

I want to thank you all again for the invitation that you were kind enough to send me, and for the privilege of coming and making your acquaintance, and making these

few remarks to you. I wish you all prosperity in your new home, a home which is now becoming to many of you an old home. But remember this: if ever you feel like coming back, there is a lamp in the window always kept burning; there is a latch-string always hanging outside; and the old Canadian home, whenever you choose to come back to it, will always give you a warm welcome, a warm welcome, indeed! And if you do not come back, may you prosper, and prosper, and continue to prosper in your new—in your chosen home. We love you, though you have gone out from us. We know that you respect us who have not left the old home, but who have stood by her there and are endeavouring to do our work as we see it.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCES *

THE object I have in view is to make a short review of the work of the several conferences, the first of which was instituted in 1887. When we come to think of it, the initial step which was taken in 1887 has proved to be a very important one, and the developments have been far in excess of what the Conveners of that conference could possibly have had in mind. It is one of the characteristics of the British constitution and system that many things grow up and become, without force of statute, very important and operative parts of the general administration of the affairs of the empire, and this is one which probably

* Speech delivered in the House of Commons, Ottawa, November 24th, 1909, on the motion for a copy of correspondence and papers, and any information possessed by the Government relating to the formation and work of the secretariat decided upon by the Imperial Conference of 1907.

illustrates that feature of the British system as well as any other.

The conference of 1887 was probably born of two ideas; the first was the necessity for a closer and more intimate union between all the parts of the British dominions, and the second was the dissatisfaction which had been felt at the formal and distant and tedious system of communication between the various colonies and the Motherland, and the almost entire absence of any method of communication between the different colonies themselves. Correspondence undertaken several thousand miles away from the department to which you are writing is cold and formal and at the best inefficient. For years it had been felt that there was necessity for closer personal touch and more of the personal element in inter-communication. Anyone knows that two gentlemen sitting down and talking over a question can come to a conclusion in shorter time and in a more satisfactory way than they can through the medium of long distance correspondence.

The conference of 1887 was called by Mr. Stanhope, but before it met he was succeeded

by Sir Henry Holland, who, as Colonial Secretary, presided at the conference which lasted from April 4 to May 9. Ministers or delegates from all of the self-governing colonies were present, as well as Lord Salisbury and some other British ministers. In addition, prominent men from the different Crown colonies were invited to attend and to listen to the proceedings. It is characteristic of the extreme sensitiveness and delicacy and of the great wisdom which characterized so many of these innovations, that at this conference every step was avoided that could possibly lead to anything like a feeling of constraint or restraint, or anything that could be said to be binding and absolute in its nature. It was therefore laid down at the beginning that the discussions should be perfectly free and that no resolution should be moved, it being supposed that the freest exchange of opinions would take place from the feeling that those present were not being bound by resolution. It was distinctly stated that the conference should be entirely consultative and should have no executive functions of any kind.

It is interesting to note the questions which were brought before that first conference—organization for defence, postal and telegraph communications, the sugar bounties and trade questions as affecting the different members of the Empire, British trust fund investments in colonial stocks, and the stamp duties upon the transfer of inscribed stocks. The most important subjects were organization for defence and postal and telegraphic communications. The results obtained at this conference may be summed up briefly. The question of defence was largely with regard to naval defence, and the colonies chiefly concerned were the colonies in the southern Pacific and what may be called the Chinese waters, and the Cape of Good Hope. What was done as a result of that conference, afterwards ratified by the respective legislatures, was the strengthening and enlargement of the squadron for the Australasian colonies which was to be confined to Australian waters. New Zealand made a contribution of £20,000, and the Australasian colonies a contribution of £106,000. The squadron was to consist of five fast cruisers and two

torpedo gunboats. A desultory exchange of views took place with reference to the protection of some of the outstanding portions of the Empire.

There was a very lengthy exchange of ideas with reference to postal and telegraphic communication based upon the cheapening of postage rates between the different parts of the Empire and the establishment of better telegraphic facilities. In this discussion the representatives of Canada, Sir Alexander Campbell and Sir Sandford Fleming, dealt very thoroughly with the Canadian Pacific Railway which had then been opened across this continent, and pressed upon the members of the conference and the British Government the importance of that great undertaking, showing that a new Empire route had been opened up. That led the way to impressing upon the members of the conference the advisability of a new line of telegraphic communication from Britain across the Atlantic over Canada and then across the Pacific. This first discussion of that question in 1887 ultimately bore its fruit in much later years, but it did bear its fruit.

Although under the understanding of the conference there were to be no resolutions passed, yet so vivid was the interest created in the conference by the statements made by the Canadian delegates on the lines I have mentioned, that the conference broke through its rule in that respect, and two resolutions, while not formally put, were assented to unanimously by the conference, and I think it well that they should be read and go on record :

First, that the connection recently formed through Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific, by railway and telegraph, opens a new alternative line of imperial communication over the high seas and through British possessions, which promises to be of great value alike in naval, military, commercial, and political aspects.

Second, that the connection of Canada with Australia by direct submarine telegraph across the Pacific is a project of high importance to the Empire ; and every doubt as to its practicability should without delay be set at rest by a thorough and exhaustive survey.

Before the conference finished its delib-

erations, very strong representations were made as to the advisability of having the British Government undertake a survey of the under-sea service across the Pacific in order to develop as far as possible the facts with reference to the ultimate construction of the cable.

On trade matters there was the beginning of the discussions which have been continued and have grown in every succeeding conference. The question of sugar bounties in particular was taken up and their continuance was deprecated. The trade discussion was commenced by Sir Samuel Griffith, of Australia, in a very temperate and moderate speech, which, as we read it now, would be called very tentative indeed. The shadow of the long extended and at that time unattacked free trade régime in Great Britain brooded over the whole discussion. The horizon was comparatively narrow and the vision did not extend very far ; but the discussion was notable for an expression of opinion on the advisability of something being done by which, within the British Empire, the kith and kin of the Empire would have

privileges and advantages in the matter of trade not given to the foreigner and outsider. Mr. Hofmeyer, who later visited Canada and took part in a conference there, also discussed his pet idea, which was that over and above all tariffs which were imposed in Great Britain or in the colonies there should be a small percentage added—2 per cent. he himself proposed—which should be collected from foreign imports, and should be ear-marked as a fund to be used for the naval defence of the Empire. He made calculations upon the existing trade at that time, and showed that 2 per cent. would yield about £7,000,000 annually, and he argued for this on two grounds: first, that it would tend to strengthen the bonds of the Empire, and, secondly, that it would give a much needed fund, and one which could be very wisely used for strengthening the general defence of the Empire. The discussions at the first conference were, as I have said, very tentative. The horizon did not reach very far, and their vision was somewhat weak; but it was a beginning, out of which have succeeded the several conferences which have since taken place.

The second conference was held in the Dominion of Canada, at the city of Ottawa, in 1894. This conference was a little different from its predecessor, in that it was called by the Government of Canada and not by the British Government. It was called mainly for the purpose of discussing trade matters and intercolonial communications, both by steamship and by cable, between the colonies of the Empire; and the British Government gave it sanction and prestige by sending the Earl of Jersey, who attended the conference, and who made a very able and sympathetic report of it to the Home Government, which is preserved in our blue-books. The Huddart steamship contract had been made, Mr. Mackenzie Bowell had visited the Australian colonies on the mission on which the Government sent him, and a great deal of interest was manifested in the conference, especially with reference to Australia and Canada. The Cape of Good Hope was invited, and sent as its representatives Mr. Devilliers and Mr. Hofmeyer.

The discussions of the conference of 1894 were much wider and fuller, and certainly

had a wider and stronger vision, than those of the preceding conference. The question of defence was naturally not taken up, owing to the circumstance that the British Government had not called the conference, and it was not seemly or fitting for the colonies themselves to discuss that question. What was debated with a great deal of freedom, and, as the Earl of Jersey himself said, with a great deal of strength and vigour, were the lines of communication and the development of trade. As a result of these discussions, in a conference which lasted from June 28 until July 9, several resolutions were passed. This marks also a distinct step forward from the preceding and initiatory conference. The conference felt that it ought to have the courage of its opinions, and it put the results of its deliberations into the form of resolutions, thus giving point and force to its discussions. The resolutions that were passed were on these lines: that provision be made for imperial legislation enabling the dependencies of the Empire to enter into agreements of commercial reciprocity, including power to make preferential tariffs with Great Britain and

with one another, and that any provision of existing treaties preventing the above from taking place ought to be removed. Another resolution was passed strongly advocating imperial trade preference between Great Britain and the colonies, with the addition that until Great Britain should find it possible for her to take part in preferential treatment with the colonies, the colonies themselves should press the matter to a conclusion as between each other. The Belgian and German treaties and the most favoured nation clauses came in for a very thorough review, and these resolutions I have quoted were for the purpose of clearing away as far as possible the obstacles which existed in the way of preferential arrangements.

With reference to communications, strong action was taken on two matters. One was an arrangement for fast lines of steamships on the Pacific between British Columbia and the East, especially Australasia and New Zealand, and the principle of co-operation was invoked, namely, that as the scheme was for the benefit of the Empire, it should be supported by the constituent parts of

the Empire between which these steamship lines were to ply. Strong action was taken with reference to a Pacific cable, and a resolution passed asking the British Government to have a survey made, subject to the condition that the expense of the survey should be shared mutually between the British Government and the Governments of Canada and Australasia; and in order to keep this resolution alive, another was added authorizing the Canadian Government to press this to a conclusion. I may say that this resolution followed on the assent of the Earl of Jersey to the British Government undertaking the survey and paying a portion of the cost. Canada assented through her representatives, as did the representatives of the Australasian colony. These, then, were the results of the conference of 1894, a conference which was characterized by great unanimity, great interest, and a more hopeful feeling that the period of discussion would quickly merge into a period of more or less full developments along the lines that were then discussed.

The conference of 1897 was called by Mr.

Joseph Chamberlain on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Her Majesty's accession. It met in June, and continued for some days. The usual representatives were present. The Secretary of State presented a memorandum dealing with three matters, political and defence relations, commercial relations, and incidentally with the Pacific cable. The resolutions provided for "an early denunciation of any treaties now hampering the commercial relations of Great Britain and the colonies."

This had special reference to the Belgian and German treaties which have since been denounced. The premiers undertook to confer with their colleagues as to a preference on products which might be imported from the United Kingdom. With reference to political relations, a resolution was passed affirming that the present political situation and relations were satisfactory, from which Mr. Seddon and Mr. Braddon dissented. Another resolution was passed affirming "that it is desirable whenever practicable to group into federal union colonies which are geographically united."

That has borne fruit in the subsequent union of different colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia. A third resolution affirmed that it was desirable to have periodical conferences at which matters of common interest should be discussed. The memorandum goes on to state that, although a resolution was passed as to the present relations being satisfactory, it was the decided feeling of the conference that these could not last very much longer, that they could not continue indefinitely, that some means was desirable of giving the colonies a voice in the control and direction of questions of imperial interest, those more especially affecting the colonies. It was also agreed that such control or such voice in control would bring its corresponding obligations of assistance and of help. With reference to defence, the Australian squadron was continued with some changes, and a resolution was passed in that sense. The premiers agreed on their return to examine into the practicability and possibility of interchange of military units between the Mother Country and the colonies. Penny postage was found to be impracticable on

account of the revenue necessities of several of the colonies. The Pacific cable was discussed but little in that conference, the representatives feeling that they should make themselves better acquainted with the reports which had been obtained, and examine them before coming to any conclusions.

The next conference held was that of 1902. It was held in London and was called on the 23rd of January of that year, and the meetings extended from June until August. The occasion of the calling of the conference of 1887—the first one—was a ceremonious one. It was called on the fiftieth anniversary of Her Majesty's accession. The occasion of the calling of the conference of 1902 was also a ceremonial one, that of the King's coronation. Advantage was taken of that event to bring representatives of the different overseas countries in communication with the British Government. All the overseas dominions were represented and many very able men brought together. I think myself that the ceremonial part of the proceedings rather interfered with the business outcome, but at the same time opportunity was afforded for extended discussion.

We have not, however, any report of the discussion, inasmuch as at the beginning of the conference of 1902 it was decided that the resolutions arrived at and a summary only of the proceedings should be given, and that is all that has yet, as I understand, been brought down to the British Parliament or that we have cognizance of. I am, however, assured that a full report of the discussions of the conference of 1902 was kept and is on record, and I cannot help thinking that it would be well if those discussions were put into the form of a return and brought down. And I notice that in 1902 or 1907—I forget which, probably 1907—the Prime Minister gave it as his opinion that it would be well to have these brought down. It is advisable, I think, that our representatives from the different colonies and from the Empire who met together on this great occasion should have the benefit—for I think it is a benefit—of having their views, their reasoned and matured views, preserved ; and it is of even more importance that we who did not have the pleasure of listening to those discussions should have the benefit of reading the views of these prominent and representative men.

The matters which were taken up and dealt with in the opening address of Mr. Chamberlain were divided into three parts: the political relations of the Empire, its commercial relations, and its naval and military defence. We come back again to these primary and basic questions, which, from 1887 up, have formed the subject of discussion in these conferences. The Colonial Secretary, in his memorandum, gave a slight sketch of his views or the views of the Government—some of them views of the Government and others his own personal views—with reference to these three great divisions. He took for granted the general feeling that existed for the unity and preservation of the Empire and for the strengthening of that Empire by all possible, reasonable bonds. He was, however, careful to state that no particular course was pressed by the home Government. It is noteworthy all through this conference, the extreme courtesy and delicacy with which the home Government approached this question. Whilst having strong views, they were careful not to offend the susceptibilities of the outlying dominions,

and did not press any line of action upon the colonies. They invited them to a grave and serious discussion and consideration of these questions, and then left the way perfectly open for these different colonial representatives to take such action as they might deem wise in the premises.

Mr. Chamberlain gave expression to the sentiment of the heavy load that the British Government was carrying for naval and military defence. He acknowledged in fitting terms the help which had been given by all the different outlying colonies in the Boer war, through which the country had lately passed. With reference to the trade within the Empire, he acknowledged what had been done by Canada in granting a preference. He was inclined to question whether that preference had been as favourable in its outcome as had been expected, and ended with a question as to whether or not the different colonies could go any further in the way of preferential trade concessions than they had already gone.

The conference then entered upon its discussions. The first question that was

taken up was that of naval defence. Mr. Seddon, who represented New Zealand, opened the discussion by placing before the conference a very able series of communications and a state paper by Sir John Forrest, who was Minister for Defence in the Australian Commonwealth. On Mr. Seddon's motion these papers were presented to the conference and a discussion took place upon them. In the paper of Sir John Forrest, which seems to me to be a very able and frank paper, the whole question of naval defence as regards the Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand was taken up and discussed. Some fault was found as to the ineffective training of their own naval cadets or naval reserve which the different states of the Commonwealth had previously arranged for and which had been taken over by the Commonwealth of Australia. On the principle of defence, some statements are made which I think are worthy of being placed on record. In regard to defence he says :

" We must altogether get rid of the idea that we have different interests from those of the rest of the Empire, and we must look at

the matter from a broad, common standpoint. If the British nation is at war, so are we; if it gains victories or suffers disasters, so do we; and therefore it is of the same vital interest to us as to the rest of the Empire that our supremacy on the ocean shall be maintained. There is only one sea to be supreme over, and we want one fleet to be mistress over that sea. We are bound also to consider and to realize that we belong to a nation which for centuries has been mistress of the sea, and that the position we occupy in Australia to-day in being in all British territory, and having always enjoyed peace and security, is absolutely attributable to the protection given to us by the British flag. We are accustomed to travel about the world for the purpose of trade or in pursuit of pleasure, and to feel when we visit foreign countries that our lives and property are secure, and in specially safe keeping. We then realize fully the great privilege and advantage of being a British subject, and feel proud when we see the flag of our Motherland everywhere in evidence, ready, willing, and able to protect us. Our aim and object should be to make

the Royal Navy the Empire Navy, supported by the whole of the self-governing portions of the Empire, and not solely supported by the people of the British Isles, as is practically the case at the present time. It is, I think, our plain duty to take a part in the additional obligations cast upon the Mother Country by the expansion of the Empire and the extra burdens cast upon her in maintaining our naval supremacy. If a proposal were adopted that the Empire should have one fleet maintained by the whole nation, every part contributing to its support on some plan to be mutually arranged, probably on that of the comparative trade of each country, and not necessarily on a uniform basis of contribution, what a splendid idea would be consummated, and what a bulwark for peace throughout the world would be established! Besides which, we would be doing our duty to the Mother Country, which has been so generous to us during all our early years."

That is a fair expression of the spirit and sentiment which animated the Commonwealth at that time, as expressed in the statement laid before the conference by Sir John Forrest, its

Minister of Defence. The First Lord of the Admiralty read a paper which was presented to the conference. The general line of his paper was that in the study of defence it is the best defence which is in a position to become aggressive when an emergency arises ; that there was need not only of money but of man contribution ; he would like to see each colony represented in the fleet with vessels and with men from the colony. He thought the allocation in peace time would be easy, but all through his memorandum he stood unflinchingly for one control, absolute in case of war and emergency. Some discussion took place, but not very much, at this stage, and it was then decided that the conference should separate and that each colony should have its own conference with the Admiralty, and that then a report should be made to the conference as to what had been agreed upon. This was in accord with the policy that the greatest freedom should be allowed to each colony to meet the situation as it thought it best could, in view of its own peculiar conditions. The following is a summary of the result of these individual conferences :

New Zealand, which up to that time had been making a contribution of £20,000 a year, agreed to raise its contribution to £40,000.

Cape Colony, which up to that time had been giving £30,000 a year, raised its contribution to £50,000 and placed no condition upon the expenditure of the money.

Australasia raised its contribution to £200,000 and imposed the condition of an Australian squadron and also the establishment or maintenance of a branch of the Royal Navy Reserve.

Natal, which up to that time had given £12,000 per annum, raised its contribution to £35,000, and attached no conditions.

Newfoundland, which had been giving £3,000, raised its contribution to £4,800, with the stipulation that a naval reserve of not less than 600 men having been established in part should be continued and maintained.

The attitude of these different colonies is shown in each of these contributions. The ratification of these proposals and of these understandings took place immediately as between the British Government and the

Colonial Governments, and they were afterwards fully endorsed by the different legislatures and were carried out. With reference to Canada, the report of the First Lord of the Admiralty is that:

"Sir Wilfrid Laurier informed me that the Government were contemplating the formation of a local naval force in the waters of Canada, but were not able to make any offer of assistance analogous to those enumerated above."

A certain part of Lord Selborne's statement seems to be worth repeating. It is the expression of the Admiralty at that date, and of their views. Ending up his memorandum, which was acknowledged by all to be a particularly able one, he says:

"The British Empire owes its existence to the sea, and it can only continue to exist if all parts of it regard the sea as their material source of existence and strength. It is therefore desirable that our fellow subjects in the dominions beyond the seas should appreciate the importance of naval questions. If they will undertake a larger share of the naval burden, well and good, but I regard it as of even more importance that they should

cultivate the maritime spirit, that their populations should become maritime as ours is, and that they should become convinced of the truth of the proposition that there is no possibility of the localization of naval force, and that the problem of the British Empire is in no sense one of local defence.

"The sea is all one, and the British navy therefore must be all one; and its solitary task in war must be to seek out the ships of the enemy wherever they are to be found, and to destroy them. At whatever spot, in whatever sea these ships are found and destroyed, there the whole Empire will be simultaneously defended in its territory, its trade, and its interests. If, on the contrary, the idea should unfortunately pervade that the problem is one of local defence, and that each part of the Empire can be content to have its allotment of ships for the purpose of the separate protection of an individual spot, the only possible result would be that an enemy who had discarded this heresy, and combined his fleets, will attack in detail and destroy those separated British squadrons which, united, could have defied defeat."

The Canadian Ministers presented a memorandum which I will also quote, and which shows the position that was taken by Canada at that conference. It is found in the appendix, page 73, of the return for 1902:

"The Canadian Ministers regret that they have been unable to assent to the suggestions made by Lord Selborne respecting a navy, and by Mr. St. John Brodrick respecting the army. The Ministers desire to point out that their objections arise, not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from the principle of colonial government. Canada values highly the measure of local independence which has been granted her from time to time by the imperial authorities, and which has been so productive of beneficial results, both as respects the material progress of the country and the strengthening of the ties that bind it to the Motherland. But while, for these reasons, the Canadian Ministers are obliged to withhold their assent to the propositions of the Admiralty and the War Office, they fully appreciate the duty of the Dominion,

as it advances in population and wealth, to make more liberal outlay for these necessary preparations of self-defence which every country has to assume and bear."

Then follows a recapitulation, through four or five paragraphs, of what Canada has done in expenditure upon her militia and the militia pension law, and cites as a proof of the availability and effectiveness of that system that :

"At the time of the Boer war 1,000 men in the first contingent were drawn from every section of Canada embraced within 4,000 miles of territory, and were organized, fully equipped, and embarked within a period of fourteen days ; and a second contingent composed of 1,200 men was shortly afterwards similarly organized, equipped, and embarked within the space of three weeks."

It ends up with this, which is of course the more important part of the memorandum :

"At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval system of defence as well. On the sea-coast of Canada there is a

large number of men admirably qualified to form a naval reserve, and it is hoped that at an early date a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need."

Both with reference to the military and with reference to the naval side, this memorandum confines the effort and good-will of Canada's representatives entirely to the lines of self-defence, the defence of Canada alone.

" In conclusion, the Ministers repeat that, while the Canadian Government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed, they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purpose of defence in proportion to the increasing population and wealth of the country. They are willing that these expenditures should be so directed as to relieve the taxpayer of the Mother Country from some of the burdens which she now bears ; and have the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the imperial authorities, and under the advice of the experienced

imperial officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local self-government, which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of imperial unity."

This, I think, sets forth the position of the different participants in that conference upon the question of naval defence. With reference to military defence, no definite conclusion was reached at this conference. The Secretary of State for War and Mr. Seddon suggested an imperial reserve—that is, a special body of troops ear-marked for imperial service, and held ready in the different colonies for emergencies when they arose. Cape Colony and Natal agreed to that principle; Canada and Australia thought it best to raise the standard of the training of the general body of the forces, leaving it for the colonies to determine the nature and the extent of the assistance when an emergency arose; and both argued that in that way you would avoid any jealousy that might arise from there being two kinds of militia, so to speak: one a special reserve marked for a special purpose, and the other thrown alongside of them, the general militia of the

colony. In that respect I am not at all saying that I do not think the position taken by Australia and Canada was a proper position. I do not propose to comment on this here, but simply to make the review.

Resolutions were passed with reference to Government contracts, that is, favouring the colonies, the parts of the Empire itself, in giving Government contracts for the militia and military, and with reference to the nomination of cadetships; and the number of cadetships was, at that time, I think, somewhat enlarged so as to open up a career to young men from the colonies. There was also a general agreement as to the bringing, as far as possible, the organization of the militia down to a common principle and a common system, so that the same general provisions, equipment, and all that kind of thing might be standardized, as it were, throughout the different parts of the Empire. Thus, if ever a time came that the forces of the Empire were to be massed together for a supreme effort, there would be no disparity, and the different parts of the work in every direction could be carried on with the greatest possible

effectiveness. So much with reference to defence matters at that conference.

Taking up the political relations, we find the following were the results: It was resolved that there should be quadrennial conferences, and that if, within a period of four years, any special occasion arose, subsidiary conferences, if necessary, might be called. It was also resolved that the views of the colonies affected upon foreign treaties be obtained before ratification of these treaties by Great Britain. An agreement was also reached between the different parties to the conference on an imperial court of appeals. With regard to commercial arrangements and relations, there was a longer discussion and there was some definite advance made. A general debate showed differences of opinion and conditions, and here again the step was taken of having the conference dissolve itself into a system of conferences between individual colonies and the President of the Board of Trade.

On the reassembling of these conferences the following were announced as the results: Canada, having given a 33⅓ per cent.

preference, expressed its willingness to make an additional concession in one or all of three ways—either by reducing the duties to Great Britain on her imports into this country, or by raising the duties on imports from foreign countries, or by imposing duties on foreign free imports. Australia promised a preference on imports from Great Britain, but was not able to define at that conference exactly what it would be. New Zealand promised a 10 per cent. reduction all round on manufactured goods imported into New Zealand, or an equivalent on the same lines as were stated with reference to Canada, upon either one or all of the three plans. Natal promised a 25 per cent. preference on all dutiable goods, with the exception of some that were specially rated. Then there was a general resolution passed which is somewhat important. That general resolution recognized (a) the principle of mutual preferential trade, (b) that free trade is impossible within the Empire, (c) that the colonies should give a substantial preference to Great Britain's products, (d) that Great Britain should give preferential treatment to the colonies, and (e) that the premiers

present undertook to bring the matters before their legislatures on their return, and to submit to their respective Governments measures to carry out the conclusions that were arrived at. That especially had reference to the legislatures carrying out, when they were assembled and received the reports from the premiers who were present at this conference, what the premiers all promised and which I have just detailed.

Canada contended that Great Britain should give an exemption on Canadian food products from the recent duties imposed on certain food products coming into Great Britain. These are known as the war duties, and it was contended that in right Canada should have that because of the preference she had given; and the representatives of Canada stated that they were willing to make further concessions if the British Government would grant that. For a wider preference they would go still further, and presented a resolution affirming the principle of preferential trade, the advisability of its adoption by the colonies generally, and that Great Britain should reciprocate. That is the resolution

which I have just analyzed. Then they made the statement that if that principle were not acceptable to the colonies and the Mother Country Canada would hold herself free to choose her own course thereafter.

With reference to other questions, there were discussions upon mail services, and shipping subsidies, patent protection, purchase of ocean cables, merchant shipping laws, stamp duties, wireless telegraphs, metric system, newspaper postage, naturalization and professional employment in South Africa. All of these were discussed. This in brief is the result of the conference of 1902.

The next conference that was held, and the last one, was that of 1907. That was in session from April 15 until May 14. The Earl of Elgin was in the chair. The colonies were all represented, I think, without any exception ; India also was represented for the first time at a colonial conference, and the Prime Minister and other Ministers of His Majesty's Government were present and took part in the various discussions. The resolutions that were come to as a result of the conference are in brief these : a resolution for

establishing, as it were, the permanency of the imperial conference, that it should be held every four years, that it should be a conference consisting of the Prime Ministers of the outside dominions, of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, with other Ministers attending the Prime Ministers and taking part in the discussions upon the various questions, more particularly those which were technical to the different departments, but that each colony or portion of the Empire should have one vote, each premier could be assisted by two of his colleagues at any discussion, and that no more than two persons from any one component part should take part in the discussion.

What was particularly important at this conference was the formation of a secretarial staff, or secretariat, as it was called. This was thought necessary to fill a long-felt want. The trouble with the old conference was that, once the conference had ended and the resolutions had been passed, there did not seem to be any machinery to keep these resolutions alive, and, as regards a coming conference, there did not appear to be any machinery to prepare, collate, and gather

information. It was so arranged that this information should be presented not after the conference met, when the delegates and representatives would be so busy that it would be almost impossible for them to digest the information, but that it should be prepared at a sufficiently early period and put in the hands of the representatives, so that reasoned judgments and opinions could be given upon the digestion and consideration of that information.

Very strong ground was taken by Mr. Deakin, Sir Joseph Ward, and the representatives of Cape Colony and Natal. The Canadian representation did not see quite the same necessity for a secretariat, but Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared he had an open mind. The Australian delegates were in favour of a secretariat which would be responsible to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and attached to his office as head of the conference, this secretariat to be the creation of the conference itself and to be paid by the conference. Sir Joseph Ward and the Canadian representatives took the ground that there must be a responsible head and that the Colonial

Secretary was the proper head, and that argument triumphed when the Prime Minister stated that it was impossible for him to take on this added burden, and when Lord Elgin proposed to take charge of it in his own department, to separate absolutely the Crown colonies from the self-governing colonies and to secure a secretarial staff whose whole duty it would be to look after the affairs of the conference and perform the duties of the secretariat which had been urged as necessary.

That proposal was unanimously agreed to. There was a strong feeling in the conference that such a link was absolutely necessary in order to join conference to conference, to maintain continuity, and to contribute to the effectiveness of the work of each succeeding conference. There was some difference of opinion as to the name the conference should go by; it had been suggested by Australia that it should be called the Imperial Council, but on the suggestion of Sir Wilfrid Laurier it was unanimously decided to call it the Imperial Conference. There, however, was no difference of opinion as to its still being maintained as consultative only and not

having in any way legislative or executive authority.

On the question of military defence two memoranda were submitted from the naval and military point of view. The members of the conference may not have agreed with everything in these two memoranda, but that they were able state papers there was a complete unanimity of opinion. In the memorandum upon military defence two ideas were brought out—that there should be a business management of the militia, that the Militia Department should have brains as well as body, and that therefore the prime requisite of any perfect system was an imperial staff whose duty it would be to study strategic war organization, the conditions of defence in every part of the Empire, and to give their complete attention to that subject. That is the plan that largely contributed to the success of Germany; that is the plan which every great military power now puts into execution. The imperial staff, which was to be an advisory board and nothing more, should, in the opinion of Mr. Haldane, the author of the memorandum, be made really

imperial, and should take in every portion of the British Empire which has a militia organization, and by way of advice, and of counsel, and of interchange of officers and of information, arrive at the best conclusion as to what should be done for the Empire as a whole. The memorandum contemplated that if it were possible there should be two lines of defence the Empire through. As Great Britain herself has an army which is kept ready to strike whilst she has also defensive forces, her militia, or at present her territorial army at home, it would be well, if it could possibly be done, to have the same carried out in every one of the self-governing colonies ; but Mr. Haldane expressed the difficulty he found in carrying that out in Great Britain itself, the territorial army there being a volunteer force, and the militia in the British dominions being also, for the most part, a volunteer force.

However, the main idea that was promulgated in Mr. Haldane's memorandum was the necessity of having this imperial staff, which was acceded to unanimously by the conference. It was suggested that it would be well, if possible, to have a portion of the

forces in every overseas dominion, as well as in Great Britain, ear-marked for outside service when emergencies arose. That, however, was abandoned, as I have said. What was really contemplated by Mr. Haldane was this striking force in Great Britain, a second line of defence in Great Britain, and a second line of defence in every one of the self-governing dominions. These were the broad principles on which this memorandum was based, and they received, I think, the unanimous assent of the conference. Three principles were laid down in that memorandum : (a) the obligation upon all members of the Empire that each unit should provide for its local security ; (b) the necessity of arrangement for mutual assistance in cases of supreme need ; and (c) the necessity of the maintenance of sea-supremacy. It was argued in the memorandum, and ably argued, that as far as possible the methods, the equipment, the arms, the ammunition, the units of force, all these technicalities of administration should be in all parts of the Empire standardized. The resolution which was come to by the conference was as follows :

"That this conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognizes and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a general staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collate and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire."

Leaving the military side of the question, and coming to the naval side, we find an interesting discussion and interesting conclusions that were come to. Lord Tweedmouth was the exponent of the British Government on naval defence. What he

declared in the main was that they wanted the overseas dominions to help them to make more complete the naval defence of the Empire. He held strongly to the necessity of the Admiralty having the management, and without constraint, in the time of war. He was glad to get contributions in money, or, if not in money, in kind, and he welcomed the latter almost as heartily as the former. Unity of command and direction of the fleet, however, he maintained must be kept. He was in favour of help being given by the colonies in the way of smaller defence vessels for squadrons, in the way of docks, in the fitting up of establishments for receiving and repairing warships, in the initiation and maintenance of coaling vessels. All these are of great advantage in the defence of the Empire, and if these are provided by the colonies, very substantial aid will be given in the general purpose of imperial defence.

I will give the following extract from Lord Tweedmouth's memorandum:

"We welcome you, and we ask you to take some leading part in making more complete than it is at present the naval defence of the

Empire. I wish to recognize all that our cousins over the sea have done in consequence of decisions of former conferences. I know that you gave to the Government and to the Admiralty, with a free and unstinting hand, the help that you thought you could manage to give. Gentlemen, I have only one reservation to make, and in making it I ask that, as we have proved ourselves successful in the past, you should put your trust in us now. The only reservation that the Admiralty desire to make is that they claim to have the charge of these strategical questions which are necessarily involved in naval defence, to hold the command of the naval forces of the country, and to arrange the distribution of ships in the best possible manner to resist attack and to defend the Empire at large, whether it be our own islands or the dominions beyond the seas. We thoroughly recognize that we are responsible for that defence. We want you to help us in that defence! We want you to give us all the assistance you can, but we do not come to you as beggars; we gladly take all that you can give us, but at the same time, if you are not inclined to give

us the help that we hope to have from you, we acknowledge our absolute obligation to defend the King's dominions across the seas to the best of our ability."

Upon this a discussion arose, participated in by the representatives of all the portions of the Empire represented at the conference. Mr. Deakin, speaking for Australia, which is now contributing largely in money to the defence under certain conditions, made the statement that this contribution was not altogether satisfactory—that, as he read the spirit of his people, it was felt that something more must be done. The squadron furnished by Australia was at first to be confined to Australian waters, but afterwards could be extended to Chinese waters. The feeling to which Mr. Deakin gave expression was that although no very formidable fleet might break the first line of defence, it might be possible that marauders—two or three cruisers fitted out for a sharp descent—might break the lines and find the harbours of Australia entirely defenceless. So he thought something should be done by Australia at once towards putting her harbours into a state of

defence and, if possible at reasonable cost, that they should go further and patrol the more valuable portions of the coast. Sir Joseph Ward, who represented New Zealand, came out straight for contribution and contribution alone. His dominion was too small to build a fleet, and they preferred to give what they had to give to the British Admiralty to expend as the British Admiralty thought fit.

When Canada's turn came Mr. Brodeur* spoke, and as what he said is somewhat important, I shall refer to it a little in detail. He said:

"In view of the remarks made by Mr. Deakin and Sir Joseph Ward, it will not be necessary for me to state to-day the position which Canada intends to take in regard to this question of naval defence. Our situation is a different one from that of the other colonies, and should be treated as such. I think, however, it would only be fair that I should state to-day that the position of Canada has not been properly represented as far as naval defence is concerned. I see by a document which has been laid before us

* Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

that we are supposed not to have spent any money at all upon naval defence. That document shows what has been spent by the United Kingdom, by Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape, Natal, and when it comes to speak of Canada it is simply stated that the naval expenditure is none. I may say at the outset that in view of the treaty which was made in 1818 between the imperial Government and the Government of the United States, it was formally stipulated that the Americans should have the right to come in and fish on our shores, and that they should have the right also to come into our harbours when they are looking after their fishing. Outside of that, they have a right also, in virtue of that treaty, to go to some parts of Canada to fish on the same footing as the Canadian British subject. This particular situation, which was created in Canada by the treaty, induced the British Admiralty to look after the defence, or after the protection of Canada against the poaching of these American fishermen. That duty was performed and that protection was given to our own people during many years by the

British Admiralty, but for some time, especially since 1885, absolutely nothing has been done by the British authorities."

He then goes on to say that after that time Canada provided her own protection vessels and protected her own fisheries and spent a more or less large sum, amounting to about $3,147,990 up to date; that she was called on to provide other vessels to protect the service; and that such expenditure should count as naval expenditure. He then called attention to the situation on the Great Lakes. He said:

"We have to-day on the lakes a boat which is an armed boat, which is looking specially after the protection of our fisheries against the American fishermen, not only for the carrying out of the local regulations, but mostly, and I may say almost exclusively, for preventing the Americans from coming and fishing in our waters. We have on the Great Lakes (large seas, properly speaking) American states bordering these great lakes, and they are having navies of their own now. I think that three states bordering on the three great lakes, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, are spending not less than $15,000,000 themselves

for keeping up a navy on these lakes, and are drilling their men on the shore of the lakes. Besides, they have some ships which are not on—because it would be against the conclusions of the treaty—but built in order to be prepared in case of emergency. As far as Canada is concerned, one of the first duties we shall have to look after is our protection in connection with the Great Lakes. I may say that the wars we have had since 1763, since Canada has become part of the British Empire, came from the United States. We had an invasion in 1775, we had an invasion in 1812, and we had the Fenian raids in the 'sixties. All those invasions came from the United States. So we have to look specially to protect ourselves in that direction, and I may say we have been doing it as far as the Great Lakes are concerned—not to a very large extent, it is true, but to the extent of spending a sum of money which is quite important for a country of the size of ours."

Then he speaks of the naval militia which, to a certain extent, has been formed, and that the cruiser *Canada* is manned by Canadian seamen and that men are drilling

on her every day. He also speaks of the wireless telegraph stations and the amount of money spent on them. He mentions that Canada has taken over the hydrographic survey as well, that she is going to take over the Halifax and the Esquimalt dockyard, which will then be at the cost of Canada instead of Great Britain, and he ends by saying:

"And so I think it will be only fair that in the statements published giving the money spent for naval expenditures, the amount spent by the Canadian Government in connection with those different services I have just mentioned should be included in such naval expenditures. I do not think for a moment it will be necessary for me to discuss the question further, because I understand the discussion will be taken up on some other day."

That shows fairly well the position taken by Canada with reference to the contribution towards the navy. After still further discussion, Lord Tweedmouth, in a short reply, stated among other things that he made no reflection on Canada, that Canada was perfectly free to come to any resolution.

"We hope to have their help, but still they are quite right to look after their own interests, in the full security that so far as the British Government can be of use to them in their defence in time of need, they may depend in any circumstances on our giving that aid with the greatest joy and without any sort of drawback whatever."

In this respect the same method was taken as in the others. Individual conferences took place between the different colonies and the First Lord of the Admiralty, and as a result the following was reported:

"Australia continues her contributions of £200,000 per year, New Zealand hers of £40,000, Cape Colony £50,000, Natal £35,000, and Newfoundland £3,000."

The subject of naval defence was again taken up, and Canada, in the person of Mr. Brodeur, again spoke. He said:

"I have nothing to say except to thank heartily Lord Tweedmouth for having been good enough to recognize what Canada has been doing in regard to its defence. As I mentioned the last time we discussed this question at the conference, I think the

situation of Canada has not been properly represented. I am very glad to see Lord Tweedmouth has actually acknowledged and recognized that we have been doing a great deal and are still doing a great deal by taking over the naval stations at Esquimalt and Halifax. There was a discussion in previous years to the effect that we should contribute something directly to the British navy. I may say, with regard to that, that there is only one mind in Canada on that question, and if it were necessary I should be able to quote the remarks made lately in an article published by Sir Charles Tupper, who is certainly one of the men best qualified to speak in Canada upon the question. I think perhaps I might mention what he said in regard to that. He said: 'It is known that from the outset I have felt the interests of Canada and the true interests of the Empire to be opposed to the demand for colonial contributions to the imperial navy,' and 'I maintain that Canada has discharged that duty in the manner most conducive to imperial interests.' So it shows that both sides of politics in Canada agree with the

policy which had been going on for some years there. He adds, also, in that article, that 'Canada protects her fisheries by her own cruisers, and when the Imperial Government expressed a wish to be relieved of the expense of maintaining the strategic points at the harbours of Halifax and Esquimalt the Canadian Government at once relieved them of that large expenditure, amounting to £185,000 per annum.' Negotiations are now going on for taking over the naval stations there. I do not know exactly what will be the amount by which the Admiralty will be relieved, but I think it is a somewhat large amount.

" Since the matter has been brought before this conference I may say that parliament has voted a large sum of money for the purpose of purchasing another cruiser and putting that cruiser on the Pacific coast for the protection of our fisheries.

" We are very glad to see that Lord Tweedmouth has recognized that in this matter it should be left almost entirely to the colonies. I may say, in conclusion, that we will be very glad to work in co-operation with the imperial

authorities, and under the advice of an imperial officer, so far as it is consistent with self-government."

That is the whole presentation of the case as far as Canada was concerned, in relation to imperial defence. But towards the latter part of the conference Mr. Smartt, who was the colleague of Dr. Jameson, moved the following resolution :

"That this conference, recognizing the vast importance of the services rendered by the navy to the defence of the Empire and the protection of its trade, and the paramount importance of continuing to maintain the navy in the highest possible state of efficiency, considers it to be the duty of the dominions beyond the seas to make such contribution towards the upkeep of the navy as may be determined by their local legislatures, the contribution to take the form of a grant of money, the establishment of local naval defence, or such other services, in such manner as may be decided upon after consultation with the Admiralty and as would best accord with their varying circumstances."

To that resolution he spoke briefly and

gave his reasons for moving it. For the account of the discussion that followed I will quote the report.

"Sir Wilfrid Laurier: I am sorry to say, so far as Canada is concerned, we cannot agree to the resolution. We took the ground many years ago that we had enough to do in that respect in our country before committing ourselves to a general claim. The Government of Canada has done a great deal in that respect. Our action was not understood, but I was glad to see that the First Lord of the Admiralty admitted we had done much more than he was aware of. It is impossible, in my humble opinion, to have a uniform policy on this matter; the disproportion is too great between the Mother Country and the colonies. We have too much to do otherwise. In the Mother Country, you must remember, they have no expenses to incur with regard to public works; whereas, in most of the colonies, certainly in Canada, we have to tax ourselves to the utmost of our resources in the development of our country, and we could not contribute or undertake to do more than we are doing in that way. For

my part, if the motion were pressed to a conclusion, I should have to vote against it.

Dr. Smartt: But the public works to which you refer are of a reproductive character which are vital to the interests of your Dominion.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier: Some of our railways have never paid a cent of interest or expenses.

Dr. Smartt: Still, it is developing and opening up the country to an enormous extent. All the colonies are building developing railways of a character which may not be revenue-producing for years. I thought the wording of this resolution would have specially met your views, because towards the upkeep of the navy it may take the form either of a grant of money or the establishment of a local defence force or other services. I understand Canada suggested strongly the other day that some of their other services were in the nature of local defence.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier: I have said all I have to say on the subject.

Dr. Smartt: I should like very much to hear the opinions of the representatives of the other portions of the Empire.

Mr. Deakin: I have no hesitation in entering into the discussion if desired; but if we are not going to pass the resolution, is it worth while?

Dr. Smartt: I think it is a great pity we do not pass something. We have done so much in the way of pious affirmation, that I am anxious we should do something of a practical character.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier: It can be passed if there is a majority. For my part I must vote against it.

Sir Joseph Ward: To do any good we would require to be unanimous about it.

Dr. Smartt: Yes, I suppose so.

Mr. Winston Churchill: It is not much good to have a resolution at all if we cannot be unanimous.

The Chairman: I think we had better not proceed any further just now.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier: We, of the different dominions beyond the seas, have tried to be unanimous up to the present time. I am sorry to say this is a question upon which we could not be unanimous. Therefore, Dr. Smartt can move it if he chooses or withdraw

it, but if he presses it I should have to vote against it.

Dr. Smartt: I am absolutely in the hands of the conference. I do not want to press a resolution that is not likely to meet with the general approval of practically everybody on the conference, especially a resolution of this particular character. We might, perhaps, let it stand over until the next sitting. Between this and Tuesday I may be able to modify it in some way to meet Sir Wilfrid's view."

Nothing further was done, and that represents the situation as far as naval defence is concerned.

Other questions of more or less importance were discussed, but I am not going to refer to any except the trade question. With reference to the trade question, I will give the summary in the resolutions which were passed after a debate. The debate was an extended and a very able one, and all views were placed fully before the conference. The result was that the resolutions of 1902 were reaffirmed. Those resolutions it is not necessary at this point to recapitulate. The ground

that was taken was ground that had been strongly affirmed in 1902, and the conference did not see that they could go beyond that, although several members of the conference were strongly of the opinion that a forward step by resolution, if it could possibly be agreed upon, ought to be made. A resolution was passed providing:

"That all doubts should be removed as to the rights of the self-governing dependencies to make reciprocal and preferential fiscal agreements with each other and with the United Kingdom, and further, that such rights should not be fettered by imperial treaties or conventions without their concurrence."

Among other subjects taken up were international penny postage and imperial cable communication, and then, towards the latter part of the conference, the All Red Route resolution, which we have already had discussed in parliament and to which I need not further refer. Such, in brief, were the results of the conference of 1907.

Now to conclude: We have had conferences commenced in the way I have shown, begun in 1887, continued in 1894, 1897, 1902,

and 1907; and this latest conference of which, as it is fresh before us, I should say nothing at the present time. No one will doubt, I think, that these conferences have grown in public commendation, and they have grown in their sphere of action, grown in their usefulness, grown in the greater knowledge which public men of the Empire have been able to form of the different questions affecting other than their own countries, grown in that personal contact and sympathy which arises therefrom, and the mutually good understanding which takes place as a result of those conferences, which is by no means the least important of the benefits that have been conferred; until to-day they have taken a character of absolute permanency, with their own secretarial staff, the link being found for their continuity and their action.

They constitute, in fact, the only imperial parliament that we have, and a regal and worthy imperial parliament it is, in its way—consultative simply and solely, advisory one with the other, without any functions, legislative or executive, but still a parliament composed of the Empire's strongest and best

men from its different portions, collected on the basis of popular selection, and so supposed to be representative in the very highest degree.

It is this quadrennial parliament, which may meet more frequently, which has grown up almost without our noticing it, that has gradually taken to itself power and influence without any legislative or executive character, but influencing the very centre, and from the very centre the very outside of the limits of the Empire, a parliament which draws the great men, the chief men of the Empire, together at stated times for the development of their plans, the consideration of their sentiments. Therefore it must have a tremendous effect in coming to wise decisions, in avoiding complications which otherwise would be sure to take place, and in leading in a general sense the Empire along the lines of certitude and of reasonable safety.

It may be, though I hope not, that we shall never have any more representative Empire Parliament. In the meantime, I for one am content with this, and I hope that in the future, as in the past, the same able contingents may form the delegates and repre-

sentatives to these conferences, that the same unanimity and wisdom may characterize their discussions and their conclusions. History not long in the future will write many pages about this new addition to the British constitution and the British system; and this history will not be ended with the first pages that are written. I for my part look to it, however it may expand, gradually or more rapidly, as the one present medium of the exposition of the best and strongest sentiments that prevail in the Empire.

IMPERIAL PREFERENCE*

THERE is a slight flavour of politics about this club, but I will make this address on a non-political basis —as far as I possibly can.

I may, however, have to touch upon a few questions which I consider of very great moment, and I may have to traverse to a very slight extent some of the views of gentlemen in public life, who are not of my own way of thinking. But if I do so, you will please consider that it is not done from a party or partisan basis. I will try to do as little of that as I possibly can. I am not going to trouble you with many, if any, figures. I suppose the reason you have invited me to address you is primarily that I have had the

* A speech delivered before the Sir John A. Macdonald Club, Montreal, December 15, 1903, shortly after Mr. Foster's return from Great Britain, where he had made a series of thirty-eight addresses in aid of the Chamberlain movement.

extremely great pleasure, and profit as well, of being a spectator, a more or less interested spectator, and to some extent a participator, in a great movement which at the present time is going on in the Motherland. And it is, I suppose, because I have had that pleasure and privilege that I have been asked to give to the audience which honours me with their attention to-night, a little idea, in narrative form, of what that movement is, its strength and its scope.

And probably some thought I would undertake the prophetic rôle, and tell you just exactly what was to be the outcome of it. Well, I am not going to undertake the rôle of a prophet. When I had the pleasure of appearing before an audience on the other side of the water I made it quite plain to them that I had no mandate from the Government of Canada, and that I had no authority signed and sealed from the people of Canada in my pocket; that I stood before them as a citizen of the Empire, born to free rights in the Dominion of Canada, and that my opinion, whatever it was worth, must be taken as the opinion of one who had a certain opportunity,

from years of experience in Canada, to make himself acquainted with the feelings and conditions of his country, and that these were my only warrant for appearing before them.

To-night, in the same way, to this audience, I say that I have no expressed declaration from the people of Great Britain as to what they think of this great question, and what they are going to do with it. All I can do is to give you, as briefly as I can, my views as a spectator, and in part as a participator in it, which I was for some four or five weeks. I had not the pleasure of being present at the initial stage of that great movement which was begun by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. However talented Mr. Chamberlain is, it would not have been possible for him, with all his talents and all his experience, in the course of two or three months of agitation of a proposition pressed by him upon the British people, to have brought it to so definite and so important a place in the discussion, and in the thoughts of the 42,000,000 people who inhabit the British Isles. We must go further back to find its initial stage, and we must believe that, however great any

leader is, it is impossible for him to create the harvest. He may prepare the soil, and he may sow the seed, and he may, no doubt, reap the harvest, but the harvest itself must be brought about by the co-operation of other influences. When we find Mr. Chamberlain taking up the position of leader on this great question, and making such rapid progress that in a few months it has become the universal subject of discussion in the Press and on the public platform, we must believe that the soil had been prepared to a great extent beforehand; that the sentiment of the people must have been forming, though perhaps not given expression to, and that what has been in the minds of all some potent tongue now voices and expresses—the great idea which they have long harboured.

I was prepared, when I left this side of the water and went over to the other, to find that the newspaper writers and the cablegrams had made the most of the agitation, and that I should not find it so deep or so widespread as I did. I must frankly say that after having gone there and remained there, and participated, to a certain extent, I found that I had

no adequate idea of the importance that the question had attained. It is the one great subject which engrosses the mind of the public men of Great Britain, which fills the newspapers, which inspires the magazines with articles for and against, which takes up the attention of the business man when he meets with his brother business man, which is talked of on the railways, in the clubs, at the hotels and in the home circle. Whatever else may be said, this you may take as absolutely true, that the question has come before the British people in a form which is claiming their deep and earnest thought, and which is forcing them absolutely to a conclusion, one way or the other.

As to the reasons which have brought this subject of tariff reform, in the line of preferential trade, so prominently and so strongly before the minds of the people of Great Britain, will you bear with me while I set before you a few of the influences which have produced the great changes that have taken place, not only within the Empire at large, but within the British Islands themselves?

In the fifty years which about measures the history of free trade in Great Britain, from the time of Cobden's successful advocacy of it, what changes have taken place, not only in Great Britain itself, but in the whole wide world! You have but to ask the question and think for a moment, to come to the conclusion that the changes have been great and important indeed. From the sphere of the professional man to those of the mechanic and the artisan, through all the constructive departments and activities of life, nothing is done to-day by the same methods and on the same lines as it was done fifty years ago, or even twenty-five years ago. Everything has been altered. Why, even the creed of the Presbyterian Church has been changed. Any man who would attempt now to carry on production by the methods that prevailed even twenty-five years ago would be out of it in a very short time. It has come to this, that the methods of activities within the Empire, within the British Isles, and outside of them, have rapidly changed. If there have been changes in all the activities and departments of life, is it unreasonable for us

to think that possibly it may be well to make a change in such a thing as a tariff, which was applied originally to business conditions which have themselves entirely changed?

Many changes, too, have taken place outside of the British Isles. Fifty years ago Britain had a monopoly of transportation by land and sea. Fifty years ago the great producing areas of America were simply coming to the point of being developed. Fifty years ago the transportation system was comparatively crude, and there has been, in the matter of carrying capacity, a complete revolution. Fifty years ago, when Cobden's free trade theories were accepted, Great Britain was in the position where the individual competed with the foreigner as an individual, where a corporation in Great Britain competed with a foreign corporation; when the foreign individual or corporation did not have standing behind them the State, as it stands to-day; when the foreign competitor was not aided by the State in any degree whatsoever. But since that time the national idea has come into the field, and has profoundly altered the system of trade. It may

have been bad or good, that development, but there it is. It is a condition, and not a theory, and all the ideal advantages claimed for the free trade principles of fifty years ago have not resulted in converting a single foreign power to free trade; but the national bond, the national support of industry, has become steadily stronger, the foreign state helping the foreign individual and corporation as against the British individual and British corporation. That is a condition of things that has been working upon the minds of the people of Great Britain. Deep down in the minds of many it has been working, though they scarcely knew it. But when voice was given to it they roused themselves, and found that these were the thoughts they had long been thinking, and that now some one was expressing them.

It is a sound principle that whatever tends to the national development should have the support of the State. When the individual or the corporation have undertaken to develop the resources of the nation wise assistance should be given.

Take the history of the last thirty or forty

or fifty years. In that period is there anything more striking in the development of the world than that the day of little principalities and powers has passed? That it is coming to be the day of great aggregations and powerful empires? How long, at the rate at which this is going on now, will it be before there will be in the world but five or six great powers? I do not know, and you do not know. But to-day you see that influence and that tendency. There is Russia, stretching across northern Europe, across northern Asia, coming to the very verge of the Pacific Ocean, assuming a strong and commanding position in Asia and in Europe. How long will it be before Russia comprises, within her empire, all that northern strip of Europe, and down to the Black Sea and Constantinople? No more Balkan States, no small states in Asia. They may lie within the control of that mighty empire. She may have a power and a strength almost irresistible. Over on this side of the water you find the great dominating power of the United States. Pass into Europe and you find great powers, the German power, the French power and the British power.

The Englishman, the Scotchman, the Irishman, the colonist, who is also a subject of the Empire, in reading its history and looking over its extent, finds cause to congratulate himself on its resources and its strength, and the ideals of civilization which the British Empire will advance in the future as it has upheld in the past. Let it be our task to bind together its scattered parts, and make of it a united and solid Empire. That is a very great cause, a cause for which we should all strive—and this matter of fiscal reform is something which will bind closer together and which will make for the development of the spirit and idea of common nationhood.

It is interesting to observe how parties are grouped in Great Britain on this question. But I shall not dwell too long upon that. First, there is the Liberal party. I think you may say with reference to the leaders of that party, they are a unit against the proposition for tariff reform, and against the proposition for mutual preferential trade between Great Britain and her colonies—that is, the leaders of the party, and, I believe, the organization of the party. But it is also true that in that

great party there are influential members, influential adherents who believe with Mr. Chamberlain, and who are working in thorough and complete accord with him. Then we have the Government party, led, of course, by Mr. Balfour. He has gone so far as to lay down the policy of the Government at the present time. And what is it? It is a negation of the theory of free trade. He believes that the Government of Great Britain should, by legislation, be given the power of negotiation and retaliation; that it should have the power of negotiation and legislation in the matter of tariffs. But he says that so far as the tariff for preferential purposes is concerned they have no mandate from the people of Great Britain, and cannot go further in that direction. He is not prepared to put a tax on food.

Then there are the free fooders—an odd name. There is no such thing as free food, I imagine, in the British Empire. The only free fooders I know anything about are the people of the South Sea Islands, who lie under the bread-fruit tree, and open their mouths and have their food drop in. What

they really mean is that they do not want any taxes on some kinds of food. They do not want any taxes on foreign grains and foreign food-stuffs coming into the country. There are about thirty of these in the House of Commons, who are former adherents of the Government party. They will go so far as to support the Government on Mr. Balfour's idea, but not so far as to support Mr. Chamberlain's proposition.

On the other hand, there are the tariff reformers, made up, as I believe, of the great bulk of the Unionist rank and file, and led by Mr. Chamberlain, who is the one great fiscal leader who stands out before the British people.

Having come thus far, let me go back a little. There is another factor in this tariff reform movement in Great Britain. So far, I have spoken only of Great Britain itself. Let me speak a word now of the colonies. The colonies, led by Canada, have adopted preferential tariffs. Up to the present time we have in Canada 33⅓ per cent. tariff preference given to British products. We have in New Zealand a preference of from 20 to 50 per cent. given. We have in South Africa

a preference of 25 per cent., and in Australia a preference promised by the Premier which we believe will be carried out in legislation. Thus, you see, leaving out the question of how it came to be so, at the present time all the colonies have accepted the principle of preference, and all but Australia have embodied that principle in the tariffs which they have passed, and which are now operative. That arose out of the successful intercolonial conference, the conference of premiers and delegates from the colonies and Great Britain, which met at Ottawa in 1894, which met afterwards on several occasions, and which was last held in London in 1902.

Resolutions were passed at the last colonial conference which embodied the idea of drawing the Mother Country and the colonies closer together by means of a mutual trade arrangement. The colonies had given a preference to Great Britain, and they asked that Great Britain should give them a preference in return. Mr. Chamberlain was Colonial Secretary and the representative of the British Government at the conference which came to these conclusions. What did he do then?

He went to his colleagues and said to them: "This is the position of affairs. All our colonies have given us a preference, and all our colonies have asked us to give a preference in return. What answer shall we make to them? What answer shall we make in accordance with the mutual interests of the different and widely extended parts of the Empire, in order that we may strengthen that Empire, and secure progress and prosperity?"

I am not a member of the British Cabinet, but, knowing Mr. Chamberlain well, I can imagine how strongly he put this proposition before his colleagues. I can imagine the earnest way in which he pressed this conclusion, and we know that when the Cabinet could not see its way to go further than to express the idea that free trade was insufficient, and that they should be armed with the power to negotiate and the power to retaliate, Mr. Chamberlain pressed for the solution that was asked for by the colonial premiers, and when his colleagues replied: "We have no mandate from the people, we cannot go that far," Mr. Chamberlain simply said: "My heart is in this; it represents

the work of some of the best years of my life. I believe it is absolutely essential to the best interests of this Empire. I will go out from the Government, I will give up the position of trust and of honour that I have, and though I am sixty-seven years of age I will devote the remaining years of my life to the advocacy of this proposition before the British people, and I will do my best to have it adopted by the British people."

It would be difficult for any person to read in this action of Mr. Chamberlain's anything but what was to his credit as a statesman and a man. His colleagues had said that they had no mandate from the people, and Mr. Chamberlain declared that he would go and ask for the mandate. He would take that risk. He knew that if he failed he would be failing in the last great effort of his life, but if he won he would have the consciousness of having kept faith with the colonies.

And now for a little definition. Do not let us as sober-minded colonists read into this what is not there. Do not let us set up something very different, and then fight the bogey that we ourselves have put up. For the

sake of all that is best let us get down to the simple definition of what this means. Some one says: "This is Imperialism, and I am opposed to Imperialism." You may call it Imperialism or any other name, but by whatever name you call it do not give it any attributes that it does not contain. Let me tell you what is the mind of those who are taking part in this campaign at the present time in Great Britain.

Their idea is one simple thing. It is to make a trade and traffic arrangement. That is the proposition. Only that and nothing more. Are we opposed to making a trade and traffic arrangement with the Mother Country, and with our sister colonies, that would be of benefit to ourselves?

Someone objects that it is Imperialism that Mr. Chamberlain is advancing. It must not be put quite that way. It is Imperial preferential trade, which the colonies so far as they can have put into actual operation, and to which they are trying to convert the senior partner of this great firm. But someone says it is a scheme for suppressing the smaller nationalities in the British Empire.

All you have to do is to consider the history of Great Britain for the last 800 years, and you will come to the conclusion that nowhere is there greater freedom for the smaller nationalities than within this free Empire.

Look at what the history of that Empire has been in India, and in Australia, and in our own country, and tell me what small nationalities you can find whose rights have not been held inviolably sacred. But they say also that it is going to shear us of our liberties. It is a trade arrangement alone which you are called to consider, and which cannot go into force unless you agree to it. Can that shear you of any liberties that you want to keep? Surely not. It will shear you of no fiscal liberty, no political power that you have to-day. That is foreign to the spirit of the conference resolutions. It is foreign to the idea of those who presented those resolutions on your behalf in Great Britain before a great tribunal of public opinion. Mr. Chamberlain himself has shown that he recognizes fully that the colonies are absolutely mistresses of their own homes. It is not proposed, and you cannot find any suggestion of a proposal, to

take away any of the fiscal liberties of the colonies. Even at this very day, if the colony of Canada were to say to the British Government: "We want to be entirely free; we want to set up our own house," the British Government would simply say: "We are sorry, but if you will go, our blessing and God's guidance go with you."

It is said also that this is a deep scheme to make the colonies give contributions of money for the defence of the Empire. Where do you find that in the resolutions? Who can take a contribution out of Parliament and away from the people of Canada unless the latter will it? Who can lay a contribution on one of these colonies unless they give it of their own free consent? Let us be fair. We must not suppose, because we are opposed to contributions for defence, that such contributions are not after all a very common-sense project if we have anything that is worth defending. Look at this magnificent young nation, at her 3,500 miles from sea to sea, with hundreds of millions of acres of the best land in the world; with the bowels of the rich earth full of mineral resources that we are

just beginning to realize. Look at our happy homes and our priceless heritage, and then say whether these are worth defending. It is only a question of how we shall defend them. Some one in authority has said that we do not want any fleet in Canada. I cannot say that of a country which on its Atlantic side has thousands of miles of rich seaboard, with valuable fisheries, and ports and harbours innumerable, with coal supplies right at the mouth of the ocean which might tempt any marauding neighbour. On the Pacific coast there are riches of coal and fisheries, hardly less valuable, and I cannot see why anyone who believes in the permanence of his country, who believes that it is worth defending, can say that we, as a maritime people, have no need of a navy.

If there is anyone in Canada, Upper Canada or Lower Canada, who says : " Yes, we are willing to fight for the defence of this Canada of ours, but we want to spend the money ourselves," that is a fair subject for debate. But there is in this Canada of ours no difference of opinion that if we are going to stay in the business and keep our house

we have to spend something to keep it in a condition of defence.

Whether it is better and cheaper that this should be done by co-operation with the Mother Country, which has the strongest navy in the world, or whether it would be the better plan to have our own navy to act along with the Mother Country, is a fair question for consideration. Let each have and give his own opinion, and in the proper course of time we shall come to a conclusion one way or another. But in the meantime do not let us read into this proposal a contribution for defence either in money or in lives. There is no conscription in the British Empire. Men who fight for the British Empire do it as free men and voluntarily. When we went to the help of the South African British homes we did it voluntarily. Those who did not care to go were not pressed. Those who wanted to go did go—some of them, for they did not all get a chance. And if at any time trouble and trial come to our Canadian homes, men from the veldts of South Africa and the vast island continent of Australia will just as willingly come to our aid.

Others think that it means that there shall be an Imperial Council or an Imperial Parliament. That is a thing that rests entirely outside of this question. Mr. Chamberlain some three years ago proposed an imperial defensive council, but when he found the colonies did not agree with him he looked for something upon which we could agree. This is what we now are discussing. It is no Imperial Council, it enacts no contributions necessarily for defence, causes no impairment of our political liberty. It is simply a trade arrangement on a mutual basis.

As to the proposition that Canada should make her own treaties, I would criticize my own grandfather if he brought forward such a proposition as that. Either it means something or nothing. If it means nothing, it is beneath the dignity of public men in this country. If it means anything, it means to cut the link that makes Great Britain and this country one common empire and one common nationality. It is absolutely impossible for a country to have the treaty-making power unless it also possesses the treaty-compelling power. Great Britain is the most generous

nation in the world, but Canada would never get from her the power of making her own treaties without at the same time becoming a separate nationality and renouncing allegiance to the country which as sovereign possesses that power. That would mean independence. It would mean that Canada should turn her back on the Mother Country and her sister colonies and turn her face towards the country to the south. What claims upon Canada has the country to the south ?

They have been called a hostile people by a very celebrated and veteran public man in this country. I am not willing to go as far as that, but I will say that the Americans have not shown towards Canada a very generous or considerate spirit. I agree with the statements made the other day in Toronto by Premier Ross, when he entered his protest against any entangling alliance with the United States of America. No man values more highly than I the friendship between Canada and the people to the south, but at the same time it is no use living in a fool's paradise. Once Canada had a reciprocity

treaty with the United States, the only fair treaty it ever had with that country. About the time that treaty was doing this country a real service, clip went the shears and away went the treaty. For years the people of Canada clung to the hope that the people of the United States would in a little while restore that treaty. Year after year the people of Canada pleaded for it, and year after year they were disappointed. On one occasion when a delegation went to Washington Mr. Blaine said if Canada would give a preference on raw materials and certain manufactures as against Great Britain that then the matter might be considered. I informed him that the proposition was not open to discussion and that Canada would not discriminate against Great Britain.

Then it was that the people of this country set their faces in another direction, and since then their progress has been rapid. What would be the risk of a reciprocity treaty for ten years or for five years with the United States? Would it not be that the moment the current of trade had been turned in that direction and connections were established

they might come down upon us and abrogate the treaty? Where would Canada be then? She would be where she would not want to be, and where at present she has no intention of being. What could Canada export to the United States under reciprocity? Is it grain? There is no deficiency of grain in the United States. On the contrary there is a mighty surplus, as there is of all farm products. The natural market for Canada's farm products is in Great Britain, where there is a deficit in the food supply, which will increase as the population grows larger.

If you would see how Canada might be treated if she were independent, look at Hawaii and the Spanish West India Islands, the Philippines and Panama. To-day more than 50 per cent. of the people in the Yukon are American citizens. How easy it would be to get up a little revolution in the Yukon and send a petition to the people of the United States for recognition and defence. Then the recognition would come and Canada would be defenceless against her mighty neighbour. Such a position would be absolutely intolerable. Independence for Canada means the

shadow of an overmastering power in whose heart of hearts is embodied the idea that it is her destiny to possess the whole of the North American continent. It has been even said by that impartial jurist of repute, Senator Lodge, that the time may soon come when the last European flag on the North American continent shall be sent back to its home. We Canadians have adopted one of those flags. We have lived under it and enjoyed the widest freedom, and as long as Canadians can help to keep that flag on this North American continent there it shall wave.

THE CLAIMS OF THE NATION ON THE INDIVIDUAL *

IT is a significant and a pleasing fact that in this International Convention of the Baptist Young People's Union an hour should be set apart in which the claims of the nation can be discussed. We have listened to a number of excellent addresses, no small part of whose excellence was due to the importance of the topics discussed. We have heard of the claims of the home, of society, of the Church, and of the wider evangelization upon young people.

Surely it can be urged that the nation which nurtures and protects the home, the Church, and society has claims none the less but all the more compelling.

We must realize that national life is not a mere academic phrase, a pleasing abstraction,

* An address delivered to the Young People's Union at the International Baptist Convention held at Saratoga, U.S., August, 1910.

a theme fit only for July firsts and fourths in my country and yours. National life is real and significant. It is an entity composite but well defined, and has its own mental, moral, and æsthetic characteristics. It is as though some mysterious alchemist gathered elements from every phase of physical and individual life, distilled them in his own alembic, and presented in the national life the ultimate and highest development. It absorbs from land and sea, lake and river, valley and mountain their choicest colour and substance; from individual human life its finest qualities of adventure, courage, passion, endurance, love, and hope; culls from the treasures of song and speech, of tradition and history, from art, science, and literature, and weaves all into its wondrous fabric.

From the cradle to the grave this national entity pervades our lives, influences our thought, and models our ideals. What inspiration it generates, what service it evokes, to what sacrifice it incites, how it bursts asunder the narrow bonds of selfishness, and what freedom, breadth, and nobility it gives to individual life and action, the history of the

world everywhere and in every age bears eloquent testimony.

National life is becoming every day more varied and complex and, so to speak, scientific. As the sphere of the individual enlarges and widens, as classes and conditions become more diversified, and the theories and activities of Government change and multiply, national life assumes additional functions, grows in force, in power, and in intensity, and touches the unit at a hundred points to one of the olden times.

Slaves, vassals, and serfs have been freed from the chains that bound them. The masses have become differentiated into classes, elevated, individualized, and enfranchised. In a word, absolutism and autocracy have given place to democracy. Kings and nobles have diminished in number and power, and the commons have developed from a herd into a vast multitude of individualized units, whom no man can number, and whose efficiency and power have immeasurably increased.

The problems of national life have multiplied, their complexity has increased, and for

their solution greater constructive and executive ability are required in each succeeding generation.

What has this national life to do with us, or we with it? Much every way. It touches and influences us at every point from infancy to old age. It largely determines the environments of our life. We breathe its atmosphere, imbibe its spirit, are inspired by its ideals. It frames our schools, fashions our society, influences our morals, permeates our churches, and saturates every phase of life with its tendencies. And we—what have we to do with it? Why, we are it. The right which was once held solely by a king, or by an autocracy, has been divided, and his due portion distributed to each elector of a nation. If the democracy thus created is to be successful and ultimately triumphant, it can only be by each unit becoming efficient and remaining active and interested.

This, then, is the high office and duty to which each constituent of your country and mine is called, this the trust placed in our hands. We—each one of us—are now the

nation builders and the nation maintainers. In this titanic work of nation building we are the workmen. Are we worthy, capable, honest workmen, and are we—each one of us —doing our work?

One stands almost aghast if he but properly contemplates the meaning of it all.

Behold our resources—incalculable, inexhaustible, of every kind and quality. See the stores of accumulated wealth and abundance, and of accumulated forces ready to our hands! Think of the immense possibilities for good or ill, success or failure! What a legacy! What a responsibility! For all this wealth of resources and store of accumulated force and power is handed over to us, not to be dissipated by us, not as our own to do with as we like, but as a sacred and awful trust, to be carried on by us, used and employed reasonably by us, improved and then handed over by us in trust for the nation in the generation which succeeds us. If unholy hands perished when they touched thoughtlessly the ark of the covenant, what should be the quality of the priesthood of democracy who are to receive and conduct

this precious trust of centuries to be improved and continued to the centuries to come ?

You are members of that priesthood ; what are your qualifications, your training, your plans, your ideals ?

We need first a clear and constant sense of individual responsibility. Indifference is the bane of public service, the canker that eats out the life of citizenship, and the chief reliance of the public wrong-doer. The feeling is widespread that we have no particular interest in being wide awake and active—that, in short, how the city, the state, or the nation is being managed is nothing to us. We would not say this if we were questioned, but, all the same, too many of us act it every day in our lives.

We delegate this duty of government and direction to the city alderman, the member of the legislature, the congressman, and the senator. " Let them look after matters, that is what we have sent them to do," and straightway we turn to our own private affairs, forgetting that we are responsible for governing and directing, and alas ! forgetting even to see to it that our delegates perform their work.

We must re-enforce this idea of individual responsibility—that on us is the burden of government, that it is an imperative duty not to be shirked, that we must pay dearly ourselves if we neglect it, and what is worse by far, that the next generation, for whom we hold the country in trust, will have to bear the burden of every new ill we allow to enter, and of every old ill we allow to remain.

We need next clear ideas of citizenship and its duty.

We talk much, and sometimes vainglori-ously, of our wonderful resources, the oppor-tunities and possibilities for wealth getting and life enjoyment in the nations to which we belong. But we are prone to forget the other side. Each right guaranteed has its corresponding duty, each opportunity its twin responsibility. These did not always exist, we ourselves have not secured or created them. By the sweat and blood of our fore-fathers were they bought, from these they have been transmitted to us, by us they must be maintained and enlarged, and in turn handed on to our successors. In no other way has there been or can there be continued national life.

With the nation's assets we cannot say, "There is enough for us and our time. 'Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die.'" The call of the future should be ever in our ears: "That is our estate you are managing; our well—or ill—being is being fashioned by you; helpless in the womb of the coming years, we can but call to you. Do not fail us; our bodies and our souls are in your keeping."

Yes; we owe something to the state and nation which has given us what we have and made us what we are. We owe it service —of the best we can give, and in unselfish, sacrificing measure. Teach this to the child in the home, the pupil in the school, the Christian in the church, and the citizen everywhere. Service, service everywhere, always—self-sacrifice in this service if it is to be useful to the state or ennobling to the citizen. "This is what your country is; this is what it has done for you; this is what you must prepare to do for it," should ring in the citizen's ears from his earliest years.

Oh, the narrowing, blighting curse of the growing prevailing idea that one must be paid

for all he does, must not stir hand or foot till the dollar glistens in the uplifted hand! If our forefathers had so acted there would have been no nation, no rights, no freedom, no greatness in man or nation.

Service is the glory of a life—its only real glory. It is the sweetener of life—its only satisfying sweetness. To teach the child by example or precept always to look out for number one—that is, for himself—is criminal with regard to the child, and treasonable to society and the state. So let us teach service to the state, preach it everywhere, and practise it ourselves. Let us extol unselfish and sacrificing service, preach it and practise it.

To you young people comes the call of the state for service and sacrifice in citizenship. Once the call is recognized the succeeding questions will settle themselves. The duty of service, the sweetness of service, the glory of service, the rich, ripe fruits of service, and the broadening, culturing effects on the one who serves, all combine to enlist you to your country's call.

Again, we need to grasp and embody the

principle of conservation of our national resources. Hitherto development and exploitation have run a riotous course. The resources of your country and mine were so vast, so great in proportion to our populations, that no thought was given to economy. Natural resources were fallen foul of with avidity, with rapaciousness, even as it were with a vindictive desire to get rid of them as quickly as possible, if only they could be turned into personal wealth and current commercial exchanges. The idea that these were in trust for the nation as bases for the well-being and reasonable living of generations yet unborn and populations many fold more dense than then existed, had little lodging-place in the minds of the developers and exploiters.

The turn, though late in coming, has begun. To-day the call for conservation finds a wider response, and the idea of trusteeship of the public domain is growing. It is being recognized that forests and fisheries, metals and minerals, lands and water-powers are assets of the national estate meant for use and not for destruction, and that these should be

conserved for the future as well as used for the present.

But if this conception is correct—and who doubts it?—we need to broaden it to other national resources. Our human resources should be conserved. Millions of foreign adults enter for citizenship every year, and we view the increase of population with mixed feelings of approbation and dissent. For these are born to and have grown up with views and habits and tendencies often not congenial to our institutions. They bring with them much that is alien to our ideals, and years will be needed to assimilate the best of them.

Yet here in our midst is a child life, native and congenial, nurtured amid our own national environments, hundreds of thousands of whom every year are lost to the citizenship of the country through lack of sanitation, preventable diseases, and want of knowledge of the elementary laws of health. Warring against the physical existence of our growing citizens, native born, are the countless remediable vices and conditions susceptible of easy improvement if not of total removal.

We allow our most valuable human assets to be depleted at home, and try to fill the void by importation of the less desirable. What a wide, rich field for the service of enlightened citizenship lies at our doors on the line of the preservation and conservation of our invaluable human assets.

But good citizenship will not stop at the conservation of the physical in our human resources. We can and we ought to apply the same methods to our moral and intellectual assets. We need to conserve the old-fashioned virtues which to-day are being discounted if not decimated in our public life.

I am not one of those who is always praising the good old times and wishing we had them back. As a whole, I would not wish to substitute them for the present, but I do most earnestly covet for the present generation many of these old-time excellencies. The rugged fibre of strict integrity and high principle, of adherence to the pledged word even at personal loss, of square, honest dealing, man with man, of plain, simple, dignified living, of reverence for years and experience, and ready, cheerful obedience to parental

authority, these, if I could, I would summon from the olden time and, with them, flood out for ever the slickness and slimness, the dodging and ducking, the trickery and dishonesty, the pertness and sauciness, the gaudy and vulgar sinfulness of extravagance which to-day threaten to engulf the nation.

Let us conserve the old rugged virtues, the unselfish ideals, the dignified simplicity of our fathers, and reinforce our time with their sturdy, homely virtues.

The call of the nation comes to you. You would, if the foreign foe assailed its flag, fight and die for it. Less dramatic maybe, but calling for greater heroism, is the warfare constant and universal required to preserve the nation from the internal foes that menace it. You may, if you but open your eyes and ears, hear the drumbeats of their battalions, see the red flags of their contingents, catch the crack of their volleying forces, and mark the mutilated and dishonoured dead lying everywhere, and the poor wounded hiding their deadly hurts in every quarter.

Good regulations, good laws, honest administration, fearless and vigilant executive

action from the small municipality to the wide domain of national activity will check the warring evil hosts, will save the weak and the menaced, will, if persevered in with hope and wisdom, regenerate and save the nation's life.

These are yours to give if you measure up to your opportunities and your duties. They are yours to withhold if you remain indifferent and unresponsive. The call to you is the call of the future as well as of the present. You, of this generation, will pass away in thirty-three years. But there will then be one hundred million people or more in our two countries who will perforce succeed to the national estate with all its encumbrances.

To-day, and until you have finished your tenancy, these hundred millions are helpless for action. Unborn, or at the parent's knee, or playing in the schoolyards they are. You are fashioning the conditions under which they are to succeed to the estate. You are fixing their future morally, intellectually, socially, as well as materially. If you act well, their lot will be happier ; if you act ill,

or decline to act, woes innumerable await them as the result.

Out of their helplessness these hundred millions, now called or to be called into life, cry out to you. Will you heed it and act ?

NAVAL DEFENCE *

PARTY spirit in Great Britain has not generally intruded itself upon great questions of international interest, and in our country, though we have many subjects which produce keen contests between the parties, we all wish that those questions that concern national defence and imperial obligations may be kept as far outside of party politics and party contention as they are in Great Britain. It is in that spirit and with that intent that I approach this subject. For a good many years I have been more and more impressed with the necessity of our

* Speech delivered in the House of Commons, Ottawa, March 29, 1909, on the motion: "That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast-line and great seaports."

facing the question involved in this resolution. Nothing particular has been done with it so far in parliament. I do not think that we mitigate any difficulties by avoiding them, or get rid of any of our responsibilities by evading them, and it seems to me that the time has now come when the parliament and people of Canada should sit down together and take stock of the situation and come to some conclusion as to whether they have duties, and what these duties are, regarding the great question of the defence of our common heritage.

Now we have all sympathy with that class of good and estimable men who declare that war is horrible, that its burdens are almost intolerable, and that its effects are wide reaching and in the main injurious, and who, in our country as in others, declare that we want no armaments, no militarism, no defences, that ours is an era of peace, and that we should strive, as best we can, to make this good in principle and in action, without arbitrament of war. But whilst I have sympathy with this view, I have taken into account the history of the world and the

lesson it teaches. And whether I be right or wrong, I draw from the history and experience of the world this one great fact—that force, absolute physical force, lies at the foundation of all our progress and civilization.

In the primeval times physical force expressed itself and exposed itself in bare and brutal form. To-day it is surrounded with and disguised by the trappings and refinements of civilization; but in the last resort it is there. Just as underneath the varied soils, beautiful in varied growth, there yet lies the solid granite-base, the foundation and guarantee of permanence, so under all the civilization and refinement of to-day there is to be found, in the last analysis, the appeal to physical force. A man meets his neighbour as individual against individual. If he can persuade him by argument, if he can prevent and restrain him by quoting the law and the conventions of society, well and good; but if none of these prevail, it is his right and duty to defend himself by sheer physical force. In the family, the school, the city, the province, the country, the situation, in the last analysis, is similar. If there are mis-

chievous members of society, who are not amenable to Christian teachings or to moral ethics, then the force of the law has to deal with them, and the constable, the policeman, the militia, and the standing army, if need be, are resorted to as the personification of a physical force that is conclusive.

If this is true of society and the individual, it is equally true with reference to nations. From the earliest times to the present there have been mischievous, unscrupulous, and ambitious peoples who have compelled resort in the end to physical force. We deduce therefore this fact that to defend and to preserve is the right and the duty of the individual, of society, and of the nation, and that if it is necessary to do this by force, then force must be invoked. The right and duty of the individual is the right and duty of the aggregation of individuals, that is of the nation itself. As we find the selfish and the unscrupulous and the strong preying upon society, so among nations it has always been, so it is now, and so, as far as I can see, it will be for our own lives, and very probably for many generations thereafter. In fact, the

more inviting the situation that a country possesses, if it is combined with weakness and lack of preparation, the more that country becomes the prey and the mark of the ambitious, of the unscrupulous, of the strong.

There are considerations which act as restraints: the jealousies of surrounding nations, the *ententes cordiales*, the pacts, the agreements, the commercial ties, the world's conscience—all these restrain and retard and moderate. But some day all these become storm-swept, and the naked sword flashes out in defence of altar and hearth-fires. All history teaches the lesson of this insecurity and that the nation which is forewarned and forearmed, which makes its preparation with proper care, is the only nation that has reasonable security and guarantee of existence.

Consider the last fifty years of the greatest and most civilized century of the world, and what are the examples? The fire that was kindled on the Crimea, the blood-red streams that ran in India, the long struggle in the United States between the South and North, the Franco-Prussian war, the Spanish-

American battles, the British-Boer war, and the Japan-Russian war—all these are outstanding, large examples of the fact that all the restraints of Christian morals and of ethics are impotent to curb the ambitions and the passions of nations; examples of the sad disappointments of those who believed that the era of peace, and enduring peace, had been at last ushered into existence. To-day we must come to the conclusion that neither Christian teaching nor peace conventions, nor strong commercial liens, nor Hague conferences, nor Triple Alliances, nor Berlin Treaties, can guarantee peace. In a single night, within the last few weeks, a great nationality tore in tatters the Treaty of Berlin, and the lurid war-cloud hovered over the Balkans and shot its lightnings into every chancellory in Europe, and even to-day the unrest is not stilled.

Into this world of trouble, of uncertainty, amongst this world of nations, Canada has pushed forward to her place. She has taken a position which is important now, which will become more and more important as the years advance. Her ship of state is launched on

the world's waters, it is open to every storm, it is exposed to every danger. She cannot escape the common burden, she cannot neglect the common duty, she cannot ignore the common responsibility. I do not believe that she wishes to. Having entered the game, I believe that it is the disposition of the Canadian people to play it valiantly, to play it honourably, and to play it successfully. If her sons have the pride of manhood, as I believe they have, if they know what the stern joy of contest means, if they have proper faith in their high destiny, if they visualize any adequate picture of the future, it seems to me it is for the people of Canada and for the manhood of Canada to prove their faith and their worth by their works, to grasp the full meaning of their heritage and its responsibilities, and to prepare to defend it as well as to develop it.

And what has Canada to defend? Her vast national resources, ever unfolding, inestimable in quantity and of excellent quality, but more significant in one sense, in the particular time at which in God's good province she has commenced to enter into their

development, the time in the history of the world's advancement in which she has commenced to exploit, in this last great west, what is to be of such worth, of such value and of such resource to the whole world. She has her extended coast-line, her ports, her harbours, with coal supplies at the pit's mouth almost open to the bunkers of the vessels, her immense resources of food supply, her rivers and her lakes stretching through the centre of her vast country. East and west, across two mighty oceans, she is face to face with two immense masses of human activity —on one side, in the Orient, 350,000,000 people waking up into a new life, an activity the outcome of which no man at present living can define ; on the other side, the activities of the old and well-known nations of Europe. On the south she is face to face with the most compact and powerful people on the globe, and in the background, the wide cool reaches of the north, silent and mysterious. Was there ever a national stage set and equipped as this one ? The actor has taken her place on that stage ; the play must proceed. How shall she interpret her parts to this, the

greatest auditory of the greatest century the world has ever seen?

Observe her lines of communication and transport, built by her own people, aided with money from foreign countries, but mainly from Britain. Look at the development of her transportation system; whether directed by policy, whether by providence, or whether it was what we may call the compulsion of circumstances, there it lies. Mark all the great lines of railway transport east and west, moving from the central zones towards the ocean on the west, or to the ocean on the east; her rivers flowing east and west, and the great lakes which empty therein, river and lake passing close to the homes of the farmer and the marts of our people, stopping by the side of her wharfs and her docks, and saying: "Here I am ready to work; load me up with your treasures, and I will bear them to the sea." Along the lines of railway transport and the great lines of natural transport by lake or river we are everywhere seeking the seaport for embarkation, everywhere bound outward on the pathway of the sea to oversea ports and outside markets; and the one absolute

condition of prosperity and permanency is that the ports of embarkation and the sea-path to the ports of ultimate destination must be secure. That is the essential thing.

Suppose that to-day, whilst we are living in fancied peace and security—which is not real peace and security—a third-class cruiser should show her face in Victoria and Vancouver, or in Halifax and Sydney, or in St. John, or Quebec, or Montreal—would not a great deal of this fancied peace and security into which we have lulled ourselves, in which we expect an abiding and never-to-be-interrupted repose, quickly pass away, to be succeeded by deep anxiety? The question forces itself on us. Six and a half millions of people with their mighty heritage, and yet to-day no adequate defence in her great seaports from a third-class cruiser which might suddenly appear. We can excuse it, we can palliate it, we can laugh it off, we can say it is fanciful to put the question to ourselves just that way; but it ought to make us think, and ought to make our parliament think, and every good citizen of his country think.

I shall be told that this is fanciful. We have safe embarkation, and we have a safe convoy across the ocean east and west and south. Yes, but by whom is this safe embarkation and the safe convoy provided? Negatively it is not provided by Canada. Hitherto we have been busy in Canada in fighting the wilderness, in subduing the soil, in spending the vast resources of a virgin half-continent. We have not done it badly; in my opinion we have done it well, on the whole. We have laid at least the firm foundations of a nation in the present and the future prosperity of which we ourselves feel confident.

But development is not defence. Sometimes we hear it argued that it is a contribution to imperial defence. We have developed our country for whom? For ourselves, for the settlement of our immense lands. We have opened them for ourselves, and for the strangers whom we welcome and make part of our own people. We have built great lines of railway, we have built them for the transport of our own commodities, the opening up of our own country, and for the development of our own wealth

and our own resources. True, a great trans-continental railway affords a line of transport for Britain's troops, the Empire's troops, from ocean to ocean. But every soldier that traverses it pays his passage money, and the British Government finds the money with which to pay that passage. It is true that we have developed, and it is true that we have made this country great, and it is true that by doing so we have materially enhanced the might and power of the Empire in that sense ; but in the sense that we have made any contribution to the burden of the defence of the Empire, or of ourselves, I do not think it can be contended.

It is a fact that this development may be even a source of weakness, external and internal ! If we develop our great resources and make no provision for their defence, two effects follow. It weakens us in the outside world, because it displays our riches and shows them weakly held ; and it weakens us with ourselves, because in the peace, and enjoyments, and business of development we grow careless, and less inclined to make proper provision for reasonable defence.

It is true that we have developed a militia system, and a militia force.. It is not all it ought to be, it is not all we hope to make it. It has progressed, but it has a great deal of room in which still to progress and become better fitted to fulfil its work in the future. But we have developed a militia system, which personifies the physical force of the Dominion of Canada. That militia force has done excellent service for our country on several critical occasions, and some units of that militia have gained imperishable glory on a distant field. Yet, though we doubt not it will do what it can, and do its duty bravely, if the great peril of war descended upon us, whilst our militia would stand to their colours, and march to their orders, the eyes of all Canada would be turned in wistful longing for the regular troops of the British army to come and help their children and their brethren. Our ultimate dependence would be in British power.

As to naval defence, what have we done? I think we might just as well be frank with ourselves and say we have done nothing. From the earliest dawn of history, commerce

and the protection of commerce have gone hand in hand. They have sailed the seas together, and worked out their beneficent purpose of development and protection side by side. You cannot point in history to a single commercial people that neglected to provide a protection more or less adequate for their commerce. We are a people nearly a century old, with the mighty heritage of which I have spoken, a heritage which is not simply for our own enjoyment but which is to be transmitted to the generations—the far distant generations—that succeed us. We to-day, in parliament and in the country, have to acknowledge to each other, if we will be frank, that we have done no single effective thing in the way of naval defence.

I shall be reminded that we have taken over Esquimalt and Halifax. Yes, we have, and we have undertaken to relieve the British Government of a certain amount of expense. We have taken them over and we foot the bills for them, whatever they are; but we might as well say frankly that as to their effective force here and now they do not bulk largely. We have to judge these things

by the test of actual war, and if actual war broke out and a cruiser appeared at Esquimalt or at Halifax of what avail would these be? Have we the guns, have we the torpedoes, have we the mines, have we the machinery? Have we the trained men even if we had the machinery? Such statements serve to salve our conscience when it pricks us, they are nice to round out a sentence in a speech upon the hustings, but we must come down from all this, if we are frank with each other, and say that they cut a very pitiful figure in the line of actual, efficient naval defence. They are the bases around and upon which we may build, but, it seems to me, that is about the best that can be said of them.

"But," says someone, "we have bought and built fishery protection vessels." Yes, we have, and what are the fishery protection vessels? Constables of the coast sent out to guide harmless fishing-smacks in the line of duty, to keep them from coming within the magic boundary line and to control them in various and sundry ways according to national and international regulations. That is what they are, but as an offset against an attacking

fleet, an attacking cruiser, or an attacking vessel of any kind, they are simply children's toys, only that and nothing more. A third-class cruiser showing her nose to any one of these fishery protection cruisers would cause her to get within a harbour as quickly as her heels could carry her there, or, if she refused to go into harbour, would quickly put her under water. We cannot bank much on the fishery protection vessels as a naval defence against imminent or future danger. Whilst this is the case, and whilst we take off our hats and cheer as the magnificent first line of defence in Great Britain makes its procession in the North Sea, we have to admit that in comparison with other dependencies and overseas possessions Canada stands silent and shamed.

In the meantime, whilst we have been doing nothing, Cape Colony, a comparatively poor colony and sparsely populated, has made a contribution of £50,000 annually ; Natal, a small and comparatively poor colony and of sparse population, has made its contribution of £35,000 annually ; New Zealand has given £40,000 annually, now increased to £100,000,

and Australia £200,000, altogether a contribution of a million and three-quarters of dollars per year, whilst the British taxpayer goes down in his pocket for £34,000,000—$3.60 per unit—to maintain the naval defence of the Empire. When we read these names, Natal, Cape Colony, New Zealand, and Australia, the name of Canada does not appear, and as we look at that procession in the first line of defence we come to the conclusion, and it is not an exhilarating one, that not only have we not put a dollar into the naval defence of Canada for her own coasts, but that not a ship in the procession bears the name of Canada and that not a stiver or a sixpence of the mighty expense of that great battle line has been contributed out of the money of Canada. This grips our attention. It gives us at least, to press it no further, reason for thought. To some, and I confess to myself, it appears necessary for very shame's sake that we do something and do something adequate.

"But," says some objector, "Great Britain is bound to protect the Empire; her prestige demands it, her necessities demand it." That

argument is not the argument of the brave, or of the generous-hearted, or of the self-respecting, or of the properly independent man, and it is not the argument for a young and growing people which is a candidate for admission amongst the nations of the earth. The most sublime figure in all history, the one that grows upon one as he views it in the light of the history of 500 years, to go back no further, is the figure of the old Mother Empire, the great-hearted mother who has given birth to the young nations that circle the globe, the great-hearted mother who has gone outside of her own kith and kin and has mothered nation after nation, people after people, continent after continent, brought them out of darkness and slavery and set them upon the path of a better civilization. That grand old mother nation, endued with great heart and more than titanic force to sustain world burdens—behold her course! Watch her in India and see what she has done for its 300,000,000 people, follow her in Egypt and see what she has done for the physical, the moral, and the national betterment of that country. Everywhere we know that she has done more

in beneficent, scientific, humanitarian, uplifting action than any country in any age of history. What has she done in Africa, what has she done in America, from those early times when her armaments, her soldiers, and her navy began to carve out of this North American continent the great heritage which she once enjoyed upon this continent, a large portion of which she has given over to us?

To-day Great Britain has her armed guards on the Pamirs and in the passes of the Himalayas, her sentinels on every frontier line, her sailors and flag in every sea, her bodies of living scarlet and khaki here and there dispersed throughout the world; and though she has done all that and bears the immense burden to-day, she has yet to exact the first penny of tribute from any country that she has liberated or any people that she has made free. Every dollar of the money, every drop of the blood worth more than money, poured out so lavishly and so long in those great world efforts, has been contributed by the people of the British Isles. For five centuries the patient, toiling British taxpayer has paid the bill and paid it with a cheerful

countenance, and without grumbling. Can you find in the history of the world any more sublime figure and any more beneficent instrumentality for good worked in so unselfish a way and borne so cheerfully and unstintingly by the few millions of people that live in the islands in the North Sea? What rank ingratitude in us, of all people, to shield our selfish indifference to the sacrifices of such a mother behind such an argument.

Some may say: "We are safe in Canada, the Monroe doctrine will be all that we need, the United States will not allow any foreign country to plant its flag on the soil of the North American continent; we are immune, because of the Monroe doctrine." The Monroe doctrine and the United States of America might guarantee our safety from foreign invasion, but what would be the price that Canada would have to pay? The humiliation of it would be like the Cain's mark on the brow of every Canadian; the degradation of it would eat into the heart of every man until he grew servile and cringing. The price we should have to pay would be continual demand, continual concession, until at last absorption

finished the craven course, covered up our name and blotted out our hope of a national future. Bad enough for us to hang on to the apron strings of a loving, opulent mother, but when we have grown to manhood it is the negation of every principle of manhood and independence that we should live in our national home by the grace of the stranger, however well intentioned and kind he might be. I put away the Monroe doctrine as absolutely unthinkable for us as a shelter under which to grow up to national manhood. I come then to the conclusion, imperfectly argued out, I know: That protection is necessary, absolutely necessary; that we cannot as a people owe our protection to the United States of America, or to any other foreign power; that that protection must either be borne by ourselves or by ourselves in conjunction with Great Britain and in co-operation with the Mother Country.

I propose shortly to take up the question of how this protection is to be given. I wish to deal simply with a stated, regular, uniform, normal line of proceeding and policy. Let us argue that out first. It seems to me that

when you boil down all the propositions that are made you get down to two propositions, one or the other of which must in the end be adopted, and I desire to canvass these two propositions not as an advocate who has dogmatically made up his mind and who admits of no reason on the part of one who takes the opposite thought and might wish the opposite course. I want, as far as possible, to think around them and see what the two mean.

The first is the policy of a fixed annual contribution in money to the British Government or the British Admiralty. That divides itself apparently into two branches, but it is really the same thing. One man says: "Send $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 a year"; another man says: "Send a Dreadnought or two Dreadnoughts"; and so far as Canada is concerned these two are absolutely one. We are not in a position to build and equip and send over Dreadnoughts. When we translate our contribution into Dreadnoughts it comes down in the end to money which would be sufficient to build and equip a Dreadnought, and therefore I say

they are both parts of the one proposition, an annual fixed contribution of money to the British Government for the purpose of national and imperial defence; or, if you would rather have it, for the purpose of Canada's defence through imperial co-operation and imperial supreme command in war times.

The first difficulty in that is as to fixing the amount of the contribution. The very moment that you sit down in council and say: "Let us talk the matter over and fix the proportion that Canada ought to give," you face a pretty difficult question. The British taxpayer pays $3·60 per head, and that translated in equal proportions to the Canadian taxpayer would mean an amount of money which would be something appalling. Then again: how long will the sum which you fixed to-day remain the proper sum, and will it be subject to constant revision, constant negotiation, and maybe occasional disagreement and consequent troubles? That is one difficulty that arises when you discuss a proposition of a fixed annual money contribution.

Another objection raised is that it smacks

too much of tribute, that we are a free people, and we do not want to be paying a contribution to the old country for this or for any other purpose. I do not take much stock in that objection. Not one atom of our autonomy, not one atom of our independence, not one atom of our power as a parliament is taken away from us because we decide and by vote do place a certain sum of money into the hands of the British Government or the British Admiralty to be applied to the purpose of our, and the Empire's, defence. It is not demanded of us; there is no tribute unless there is force, and unless there is a specific demand which brings the tribute. A fixed sum may be a most willing gift of the most liberty-enjoying legislature in the world.

We pay, someone will object, but we do not control. That is true; but what are we paying for? We are paying for a portion of the defence of the Empire, including ourselves. If we believe that the British Government and the British Admiralty have the widest experience, the greatest knowledge, the plans of war more thorough, the expert skill, every appliance and every accompaniment of the

effective use of the money which we give, does it matter after all so very much whether we follow the course of the expenditure of that money or not? So that I do not take too great stock in that objection.

Another objection that is made is that Britain may use our contribution in unjustifiable wars, and that we should guard ourselves carefully lest we make a contribution for the equipment and strengthening of a fleet which may be used in wars that we do not approve of. That might be with some countries an objection; but if you take the history of Great Britain for the last fifty years or more you may pretty fairly come to the conclusion that, as she has not and is not now, so in the future Great Britain will not be liable to carry on unjustifiable wars of conquest. She has more territory than she needs. Her trouble now is to administer the wide territory which she has. Her business now is to defend the borders, already, if anything, too far enlarged, of her territory. The whole spirit of the old country and its history for the last half-century may make us pretty sure that wars of conquest, undertaken

for aggressive purposes and for mere lust of battle, are not likely to take place so far as Great Britain is concerned.

While these objections have some force, though as I think not a force that is irresistible, there are some reasons which appear to me to have deeper significance with reference to that method of taking our part in defence.

The first and greatest objection which I have to a fixed money contribution is that it bears the aspect of hiring somebody else to do what we ourselves ought to do ; as though a man, the father of a family, in lusty health and strength, should pay his neighbour something per month for looking after the welfare and safety of his home instead of doing that duty himself. That seems to me, when you work it out, to be a basic objection to this form of aid.

It goes still further than that. Suppose we contribute this year our sum, and next year our equal sum, and thereafter year after year. After ten or twelve or twenty or thirty years we shall have paid out an immense amount of money. We shall have been protected in the meantime ; but in Canada itself there will be

no roots struck, there will be no residue left, there will be no preparation of the soil, or beginning of the growth of the product of defence. Yet some time or other, no one can doubt that, with resources and with a population constantly increasing, we must and shall have in this country a naval force of our own for our coast and home defence.

The interest that we take in a contribution spent by another is not the interest that I desire for Canada. I want to see something implanted in the soil of Canada's nationhood, which will take root and grow and develop until it incites the spirit of defence in this country, leads to a participation in the defence, and to that quick interest in it, its glories, its duties, and its accomplished work, which is after all the one great thing that compensates a people for great expenditures either on land or on sea in the way of defence and of the maintenance of the rights of the country.

Again, it disjoins what has been joined together from the earliest days of the world's existence—commerce and the protection of commerce. After all, the basic idea of a

naval force is the protection of the commerce of a country. A commerce side by side with its protector, and its protector side by side with the growing commerce of a country, flourish best together, and are the surest helpers to each other. That is the idea which is in my mind—that when we make our contribution in the way of a fixed sum and it goes from us, and we are not responsible for it, we have none of the inspiration arising from the growth and development of a system of future defence in our own country. We are deprived of the larger benefit ourselves, and in the future we do no greater service to the Empire of which we form a part, in this matter of defence.

Then, again, I think this method ignores the necessities and the aspirations and the prospects of a great people such as the Canadian people are destined to become. We must have beginnings; these must at first be small; but some time or other, as I have said, our country will have its naval force for the defence of this country if for nothing else. The point with me is as to whether it is not the greater wisdom to sow the seed at

once and cultivate its growth as best we may, in our circumstances and with our resources, until at last we arrive at that stage of expansion which we have reached in other great lines of our country's progress. While I have tried to discuss the pros and cons in connection with this method, while I have stated reasons in favour of and others against it, my own mind tends rather towards the employment of another form than that of an out-and-out money contribution.

The second line to which I would refer is the assumption by ourselves of the defence of our own ports and coasts, in constant and free co-operation with the imperial forces of the Mother Country. Let us see what are the objections to and what may be urged in support of that policy. It has its advocates and its opponents. In the first place we begin with no plant, no expert skill, no trained cadets, no trained sailors. In those respects Canada is a blank sheet. Whatever may be necessary has to be collected and assembled and developed with such expedition and in such abundance as circumstances will allow. Under that system our first vessels

would be British built, British equipped, British manned, and British officered from stoker to captain. There is no other way in which we could proceed. We are absolutely bare of the skill, the experience, the training, and the machinery necessary to put one single war vessel on a proper footing ; but—and it is but the beginning of a circle—the first Canadian owned vessel, built and equipped in Britain, and sent out to defend our coasts, would become the nucleus and the training ground of Canadian stokers, Canadian sailors, and Canadian officers, and by and by, perhaps, of a Canadian admiral on the Canadian coast. How much time would be taken in completing that circle none of us can say, but if we begin the tracing of it and follow it fairly and faithfully, the time must come when we get a complete circle and have an imperial adjunct to the British navy for the defence of Canada and the defence of the Empire, in which Canada has some of her body, her bones, her blood, and her mental power, her national pride.

Then would come the dockyard, which would be of sufficient size to enable us to repair the

smaller vessels and in time build the smaller class of vessels that we need at first, to be supplemented by co-operation between Canada and Great Britain in the shape of a dockyard sufficient to dock any lame vessel of the British navy that might happen to limp to our coast and require refitting and repairs. And so, in that progressive, gradual way, we would work up to the fulfilment of this idea a defensive force in Canada which would be an auxiliary in the case of an outbreak of actual hostilities, which would be sufficient for the ordinary surveillance of our coasts, and which would be, in time of war, sufficient to work in conjunction with the main portion of the fleet that would be sent to any part of our country that was menaced.

I have spoken of commerce and the protection of commerce as marching side by side. I believe that Canada has, on the line of water development, as great a future as on the line of land development. We have fallen victims to our imaginations. Struck at once and forcibly by our vast landed estate, we suffer ourselves to think that the land is the sole theatre of the triumphs and

the development of Canada. But look at what nature has given us. View the immense oceans on our east and west and the waters that lie between. Note the conjunction of coal and iron and of limestone and all building material. Look at our ports and harbours, dotting every portion of our coast, the most of them yet unused and a large number of them serviceable to a degree. Look at the 40,000 or 60,000 fishermen and boatmen on our coasts, our rivers, and great lakes, born and bred within the sight of, and largely upon, the water, making themselves fit candidates for the career of commerce and all that pertains to it in the development and progress of this country. It seems to me that with the immense grain producing and meat producing resources of Canada, with our immense productive power in other respects, with our sea and water privileges, the imagination can scarcely grasp the commerce that waits for Canadian vessels, manned by Canadian crews, or realize this mighty instrument of expansion and wealth to be held almost completely in our own hands.

But to accomplish that purpose we must build steel vessels. Take Great Britain and go around its coasts where shipbuilding is carried on from Newcastle to the Clyde: what are the great forces at work? The building of warships is the strong encouragement of the steel and iron commercial shipbuilding in Great Britain to-day. The two are joined. The one works into and out from the other. I say that steel shipbuilding, inaugurated in this country, developed to the capacity of turning out war vessels, would not only benefit Canada, but Great Britain as well. For the old Empire has not passed its zenith.

Though it has had its course of so many hundred years, there is no reason to believe that a still longer course is not before it. I do not believe that irrevocable fate decrees the death of nations. I believe that, comparatively, they may have eternal life if they will seek for it in the right direction; and the old blood that some sneer at in the effete veins of the old country may easily be reinvigorated in the overseas possessions by the young flood of life and development and enterprise flowing back into the heart at home, rejuvenating and

revivifying the race. It needs no stretch of the imagination to believe that the Empire, with its component parts in full accord, may have at some time immense dockyards in the Dominion of Canada, on the Pacific coast and on the Atlantic coast, in which will be built not only our own vessels, distinctively Canadian, but a part of the navy of Great Britain itself. In Australia the foundations of such a course are laid. That country to-day has taken this line of policy: within seven years her programme calls for an expenditure of $11,000,000 on torpedo vessels and that kind of coast defence, and $2,000,000 annually thereafter to keep up an equal line of progression. After having tried the contributory method, Australia has adopted this policy with the best of concert between the Mother Country and herself, the coast defence in times of peace, the auxiliary body to the fleet in times of war, both carried on with the co-operation and good-will which perfect trust in each other engenders and keeps strong.

Cannot we trust the Mother Country? She has done enough for us in the past and

showed her good-will. Are we afraid of losing our autonomy? Every move of Great Britain has been to shift responsibility upon us rather than to take it from us. What has she denied to us? If she has erred in any way it has been in the sentiment now wholly extinct that the colonies had better go and fend for themselves; but to-day no man can point a finger to a policy or a solid weighty utterance of Great Britain in which there is the least shadow of a proof that she even harbours the faintest idea of depriving one of the overseas dominions of her perfect autonomy.

An objection to this method is found in its greater cost. I doubt if the cost would be greater. As I said, our first vessels would actually have to be built, equipped, and manned in Great Britain. The cost of these is no greater. It is said it would be ineffective. Certainly it would be ineffective as the last line of defence. If all the battleships of the Empire were swept from the sea, the torpedoes and coast defence that any of the colonies might have would make no headway against the combined fleets of the conquerors. But

we do not believe that that disaster will occur, and we do not believe it because we have faith that prevision and provision will be made sufficient to obviate any such calamity, the prevision and the provision made by the mutual component parts of the Empire trusting each other with a generous trust, believing that in every time of stress and difficulty the best councils will prevail and the best course will be taken.

It is said also that there are physical and mechanical difficulties to be overcome. I have mentioned these—they can be overcome. Time and the application of a reasonable amount of resource will overcome those difficulties and place us where we have had to place ourselves with reference to every other great line of development ; we must begin at the beginning and work up gradually until we gain the skill, the plant, the machinery and the power to make for ourselves what at first it was physically impossible for us to make.

I do not know which of these forms our aid will take after due care and consideration, but, whichever form is chosen, one thing is certain,

that something ought to be done—and done now. Our circumstances, our manhood, our sense of gratitude and our sense of right all demand that something should be done, something adequate, and something now. What boots it to drift from year to year? Are we proper stewards of this heritage if we allow it to go one moment longer without some proper care and provision for its defence? Are we doing our duty as men unless we put our own hand in our own pocket and share the burden of the defence of the heritage which is ours?

For what have we had from Great Britain? Our heritage—we are proud of it and we boast of it—has been conquered and held against all comers by Great Britain. Go back over a few centuries, watch the wars with European nations, the wars with the Indians, the first possessors of this continent, the struggles in 1776 and 1812 with the American Republic. Take your pencil and add up the treasure that Great Britain has expended during all that long series of years in order that this heritage might be free to those who now possess it; and the wonderful thing

about it, which stirs our hearts and which calls for our concurrent action of gratitude, is that after all that expenditure of treasure and of blood she handed it over to the Canadian people without encumbrance of any kind—no mortgage upon it, no balance to be paid. The patient British tax-payer footed all expenses and gave it to the colony that he loved and to the people for whom he had prepared it.

Thereafter by her army and navy she has guaranteed our security. Our eastern gateway stands open, our western gateways are unblocked, the ocean path is as secure as the streets of a city. Why? Because of the guarantee of Britain's navy and of Britain's prestige. For all of that she has not asked one penny of tribute from these people, she has placed no contribution upon them. Our borders have been preserved. When the Fenian Raids of 1866 took place, what was the power that stood upon our frontier? The British regulars joined with our own volunteers stood as the defence of Canada. The British Government paid all the bills; and the British Government afterwards paid the

indemnity for the damages which were caused by the invaders. When the Red River rebellion took place and our western heritage was in danger, it was Wolseley and the British regulars who, with our own volunteers, made the long and tedious journey to that distant section, and stood for the protection of our nascent nationality. Great Britain paid all the bills. In the Riel rebellion our volunteers and our resources were sufficient to quell the rising; but just outside the ring stood the might and power of Britain, ready to interfere if anyone had lifted hand against the nationality and the integrity of this country.

Our rights have been upheld, our rights of fishery and navigation in the Atlantic and on the Pacific. When the threat was made that if Canadian vessels were found within the prescribed sealing area they would be confiscated, and our men imprisoned, it was the might of Britain which intervened and saved Canadians from arrest and indignity. When Cleveland's message went out in 1888, it was Britain's prestige and power which robbed it of its sting, and which made us rest in peace because that power and that prestige were

behind us. Our liberties have been guarded. What have we asked that has not been given to us? Much that we have not asked has been freely bestowed. The rivals in long years of war, when once the war was ended, became equals in peace, guaranteed in their language, their creed, their rights and their privileges; and from that day to this we have lived together in peace, joined as Canadian citizens in common love for our common country, and a desire to develop it and to make it, if we can, the greatest in the world.

Our commerce has been protected. Wherever a Canadian vessel goes, wherever a Canadian trader travels, there he finds in every city, in every port, the ubiquitous protection of the fleet, and he finds there a representative of the best consular and diplomatic service in the world. All of these things cost money, all these are maintained there by Britain. The expense of every diplomatic establishment and of every consular agency is paid for by the British Government and is at our free service. When we go to Madrid or to Paris to negotiate a treaty, or to Tokio to have some difficulties arranged, we find the prestige and good-will of

Britain, and the embassy, the diplomatic service, all at the free use and for the free advantage of the people of Canada, all without money and without price to ourselves.

All these we have accepted, on all these we have relied, by all these we have profited, and the only thing we have given in return is now and then some cheap criticism, and more or less scant gratitude—not a very worthy return for the services that have been given to us. If we had been dependent on ourselves, what harassing, overshadowing fears would have been ours? To what perils should we have been exposed by sea and by land? What tremendous expenses should we have incurred with insufficient national insurance? What greater disaster might we not have suffered, extending even to loss of home, of name, of distinctive national existence? That for a century our farmers have tilled their acres in perfect peace; that in peace our fishermen have gathered their waterbred harvests, the merchant handled his wares, the doors of external commerce been kept continually open and the ocean passage-ways secured from molestation, is due to the fact

that we have been safely insured in the greatest guarantee company of the ages, John Bull and Company, who has charged us no annual premiums, who has given us an incontestable policy, and a security unquestionable, so far as anything can be unquestioned in this variable world of ours.

But Britain has also been our banker. Her money has built, or partly built, our great railways, our canals, many even of our public buildings. Her money has furnished the life-blood for our municipalities, for our great corporations, for our great industrial concerns and development companies. To what nation amongst all the nations could we have gone with such assets, and received such assurances of good-will, of ready resources and low rates of interest? If we were to wake up to-morrow and read that the British fleet had been swept from the ocean, that an irretrievable disaster had come upon her, what a feeling of insecurity, of absolute and utter loss, what a deprivation of power should we experience in this country! Is there any doubt? I do not believe it will take place, because, as I said before, my faith is strong that the good sense

and co-operation of the various component parts of the British Empire will make such reasonable provision that such a disaster will not come within the category of possibilities. But if it were to happen, can we picture to ourselves what would be the result?

Someone, perhaps, wearied by all this, will say: "Well, let Great Britain fight her own battles, she is able to do it." Certainly she is. But suppose her battles are our battles, how then should we look at it? Her battles have been our battles, her battles of the future will be battles for her defence and the defence of those that belong to her as dependent and overseas dominions. I cannot conceive, as I said before, of Britain fighting an aggressive war. To-day she is not an aggressor, she has not been for half a century. Her wars are our wars, her battles are our battles. One sees plainly, if a fleet were to invade this country and the British fleet were to range itself against our enemies off our own coasts, that it would be our battle waged in our defence. But suppose the battle be fought off the coasts of the threatening enemy; suppose, better yet, it be fought in the emergent pass-

ways when the vessels of the enemy are issuing from their ports one by one in straggling order before their full fighting power is possible and their full deployments made, is not that our battle just the same as if it were fought within sight of our own coasts? It seems to me that the best place to fight a battle for the defence of Canada, for the defence of Australia, is to fight it in the very ports and passage-ways of the enemy. That is the first, the primal, the effective line of defence. We must not think that because we are not within sound of the artillery, or in sight of the vessels that are engaged therein, it is therefore not our battle.

My suggestions, or thoughts, are the crude thoughts of a man who has no expert knowledge, but who reads, observes, and forms an opinion. They are worth what they are worth and no more. Their inadequacy does not militate against the spirit and principle of my proposition. They are the contributions, for what they are worth, of my own thought and my own ideas towards the discussion of this question. Let not opposition that may frame itself against my particular details consider

that it is necessary to frame itself as against the general policy, which is broad, comprehensive, and gives complete freedom of detail even to the slightest and most distinct particular.

So far I have been dealing with what may be called the stated, normal policy that I think Canada ought to adopt: home defence by a coast-line and harbour protection of torpedo vessels at first which would make the attack of the rambling, raiding cruiser a doubtful and a dangerous one, which would ward off the first attack until more sufficient aid could be brought if the invading force were superior to the defence. But when once we settle upon this policy—and I hope we shall soon settle upon it—there is another feature of the case, and it is this. Outside of any settled action, outside of the normal condition of things in society, in the world, in nationhood, special emergencies suddenly loom in view, great crises, great dangers arise. That is absolutely outside of the normal policy to be carried on year after year with settled purpose and upon a settled plan. Every one of these emergencies must be met

as it comes, and met according to the gravity and importance of the occurrence.

Even now we may be facing one of these emergencies. I am not so sure of my knowledge as to declare dogmatically that this is all an over-night panic and that there is nothing in it. When weighty men, the foremost statesmen in the British world and, may I say, in the world itself to-day, on both sides of party politics, utter their weighty warnings, which to me are a sign of graver thoughts yet unexpressed, that peril stands at the gateway, that an emergency of great gravity has arisen, then we are face to face with a condition which is only to be met outside of the normal rule.

When, in 1899, Kruger attempted to drive the British into the sea and take away the great outposts of South Africa from the British dominion, that was an emergency. That emergency impressed itself upon the people of Canada and aroused to white heat their loyalty and devotion, a devotion which was to Canada first, because an attack upon that outpost was an attack on Canada; and to Great Britain in the second place, because

of her sacrifices on behalf of Canada for centuries, a devotion which would not be denied, which sought for immediate action and followed it up heroically on the plains of South Africa, with glory to every participant, with honour to Canada and with a great addition of prestige and power to the old land herself. For every threatening rival nation, which, up to that time, had not been sure and was querying thus : " Will the colonies stand by the Mother Country ? "—queried no longer and knew that if they unjustifiedly made war against Great Britain they must count on the opposition of every colony and overseas possession that Great Britain cradled within her Empire. Had that no force, no weight with the councils of Europe and of the world ? I believe it had.

To-day peril stands at the gateway. It is not for me to say how great it is, but I cannot brush it aside. To-day it impresses itself upon the gravest statesmen of the old country ; to-day it appeals to Australia until public subscriptions are taken and the Government is being importuned to do even more than its settled policy to meet the emergency ; to-day

little New Zealand gives one Dreadnought and offers a second, and to-day Canada faces that position of peril, that imperial emergency. Let us not fall below their standard. Let us break down the barriers of party, and unite to meet this emergency adequately. Thus at the same time shall we help to strengthen the defence of the Empire, and vindicate the honour of Canada.

THE CALL OF CANADA *

I feel entirely at home in this gathering, although far away from the land of my birth. That feeling is partly induced by finding so many old friends near to me and about me; it almost seems as though this part of old London had become for the time being a section of the Dominion of Canada, and a section of that most favoured part of the whole Dominion known by the name of Toronto. However, this is not the time for me to indulge in homelike feelings. My task has been set, and my subject has been named, without, of course, any consultation with me. That is the last thing ever accorded to a speaker, and the subject is so vast and the time is so short that it makes it a very difficult matter for me to know just where to begin, and I shall find it just as difficult to know where to leave off, if I ever do.

* An address delivered at a City luncheon organized by the Royal Colonial Institute, June 12, 1913.

It is wonderful—and it forces itself upon us in that light—how much one must reiterate and reiterate in order to enforce the plainest truth and spread information upon the most elementary subjects. Now, I have no right at all to conclude that the gentlemen seated around this table do not know in the main what ought to be known with reference to so great a country as Canada, and so important a part of the Empire ; yet I am old enough to know that probably in the great rush and bustle of business there are very many things about Canada that you do not know, and many of them almost elementary in their nature and character. We in Canada ought to know a great deal about our Mother Country, and we do know a considerable amount about it. I think that the men of Canada know more about Great Britain than the men of the United Kingdom know about Canada, and it is only natural that this should be so.

However, I am going to ask you to-day to listen to me for a few moments whilst, in a very scrappy and very inadequate way, I attempt to lay before you some facts with

reference to Canada and her growth, and to the face that Canada turns towards the Empire, and the differences in that aspect arising out of a progress of some fifty years. If I were a painter, with a brush which was capable of doing it, I would paint and hang before you three pictures: one of Canada as she was fifty years ago, a second of Canada as she is in 1912, and, for a third, Canada as she will be in 1950 or thereabouts.

If I could picture these three great epochs in the growth of Canada I would be able to unfold a story which would call to mind the best spirit, the best adventure, the best enterprise, and the best and palmiest times in the history of this old Empire of ours, repeated in another clime and upon another scene. In 1867, or thereabouts, we were absolutely unknit; our limbs were *disjecta membra;* our organization amounted practically to nothing. Canada was a name upon the Statute Book, written upon paper, and scarcely anything more. And yet in that vast country which is now known under the name of Canada there were the possibilities of all that has arisen since and all that may arise in the future.

If one could have been gifted with prophetic insight he could have seen the splendid body of that Canada which was to be—latent, undeveloped, slumbering; for the impassioned kiss of the Empire-lover had not yet been placed upon her lips, and her slumbers remained unbroken. Then came the period of preparation. We went to work building railways without having anything in traffic for them to carry; building canals and peopling them with argosies evolved from the imagination. The Inter-Colonial Railway, involving millions, was built before there was anything for it to carry; the Canadian Pacific Railway was launched upon its 3,000 miles extension before there was a pound of freight or a passenger to be taken, practically speaking. So, too, we were laying out the bounds of provinces which encompassed no population; we were surveying millions of acres of land without a settler upon them, or even a settler in sight. We were, in fact, doing underground work—exploration, blasting, tunnelling, laying connecting pipes without anything at that time to be passed through them, and that kind of work consumed the

power and made its long draft upon the hopes of one generation of Canadians before results began to show.

Men said to us: "You are building the railways, but where are your freights and where are your settlers?" When we were beginning the system of protecting our industries they said: "Where are your factories and smoke-stacks, your clustering labourers?" and they had the laugh on us for a generation. That time, however, passed, and in 1912 there emerges above the level of the underwork—the groundwork—some outlines, in large and majestic proportions, of the superstructure to be raised upon it. Let no man be foolish enough to say in carping criticism that for a generation we did nothing in Canada. For a generation we were laying the groundwork; in the next generation we were building up the superstructure, and carving out the grand work of rich results.

To-day we have a yield of grain upon these Western lands amounting last year to 180,000,000 bushels of wheat in the three Prairie Provinces alone, enough to give four bushels of wheat to every man, woman, and

child in the United Kingdom, and a congestion for six or eight months, when all the facilities available were unequal to the task of moving the products that Canada's labour and Canada's production had assured.

About 1876-8 we found that our population, small as it was, was being drained from us. The land lure in the west of the United States —the lure of the factory, of the United States factory—called upon our young people, and after some years nearly 3,000,000 of Canadian-born were found upon the fields and in the factories of the United States of America.

We came to the conclusion this must be stopped, and, contrary to all the canons, that it must be stopped by devising some method by which, with the co-operation of legislation, capital and industry might be planted in our own country, and around them villages might be built and towns and cities spring up. We might have gone wrong, according to the theories of Cobden and of the early writers; but we have had the results.

Doctrinaires are welcome to their theories and their doctrines if we can reap the results, and we have reaped them, and richly reaped

them, in Canada. To-day the cry is: "Build, build, build!" Our railways are insufficient for the work which is being pressed upon them, and we are building railways just as rapidly as capital can be got. No; that is not quite right—it is as rapidly as men can be got to put the labour into the work. There is no lack of capital; there is a lack of labour in Canada to-day, and the productions of the country are chasing the transport facilities of the country, and overtaking them at every point.

To-day we have but one line of railway which, in the winter time, connects the Western prairies with the Eastern seaports. By the time December snows come we shall have a second line,* and within two or three years we shall have a third. Within two years the rails upon the Hudson Bay Railway will be up as far as the Hudson Bay waters, and a new route will thus be opened out, shorter by hundreds of miles to Great Britain and to Europe than any we now possess. Looking towards the West, there is one great

* This was completed on January 2, 1914, when Sir William Mackenzie, President of the Canadian Northern Railway, drove the last spike of the new line connecting the East and West of Canada.

railway—the Canadian Pacific—which carries its freight and passengers to the Pacific Ocean. Within two years there will be two more; then we shall have three great transcontinental lines.

I see the Canadian Pacific president has made the announcement that the Canadian Pacific Railway is going to double its track through the Rockies to the Pacific Ocean. Yet the cry is: "Build, build, build!" Although these avenues are opening, and capital is plentiful and labour will be got, ten years from now production will still be chasing transport facilities in the Dominion of Canada, just as it is at the present day. Our seaports have suddenly awakened to the fact that they are inadequate for the work put upon them. At Vancouver, Victoria, and Prince Rupert, at Port Arthur, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec, Halifax, Sydney, and St. John, millions upon millions of money are being spent in order to improve them for that great business which is to come out of the heart of the country, and is to seek foreign ports. Now I have given you, however inadequately, the picture of Canada of fifty years ago and to-day.

Optimism is on the highest deck in the Dominion.

On the boat I met an old salt who went out to Canada in 1867, and asked him where he was now located. His reply was that he was located on the far shores of Vancouver Island. He started in Ontario, and by successive movings reached the extreme west. He had, he said, never found a place where he could not find plenty to do, and earn plenty of money for doing it. He had at last struck a haven of rest, and he was going home to be a missionary for Canada. You cannot find a man in Canada who is not an optimist. The two exceptions to this, he told me, he met on the boat. He did not point them out to me, and did not describe them, but one was an Englishman who had gone down to the Niagara Peninsula. He complained that it was too isolated, although there was a railway within a rod of his farm, and had decided to come back to England. Another had gone as far as Regina, but did not care for the food, and had left for home. These were the two exceptions who were not optimistic about Canada, and who are now somewhere within the limits of England.

But this review is insufficient unless we ask the further question: "What will Canada be fifty years from now?" To-day we have 7,000,000 people. Last year 354,000 people came in as immigrants and settled in Canada. We took 138,000 from Great Britain, 132,000 from the United States of America, and nearly 80,000 from the rest of the world, making a grand total of 350,000. This year the number will at least be 400,000. You may lay down as a fairly reasonable estimate that for the next fifty years there will be an increase by immigration of at least 500,000 people per year into Canada. Add that to the natural increase, and in fifty years the population should be close on 50,000,000 people.

If the aspect of Canada, as evidenced between the periods of 1867 and 1912, is different, how much more different will be the aspect of Canada in relation to this Empire when her population has grown from 7,000,000 to 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 people. This thought impresses itself upon one. Ought we not to be thinking about it?—men in the United Kingdom, men in Canada, and men in the overseas dominions. If on a certain

day 33,000 Scotch people were to make a trek to the port of Glasgow and find a fleet to take them at once over to Canada—33,000 at a time —what a commotion it would raise in Great Britain! Yet this was the number which went out from Scotland in 1911-12. If 138,000 people in these islands were to trek to Liverpool upon a given day of the week and take fleet for Canada, it would make a great many people who do not think certainly do so; but they went all the same—and they are going every year. What does that mean to this Old Country?—138,000 vacant chairs, vacant rooms, vacant places in the United Kingdom, as compared with last year; 138,000 fewer toilers in this country to work upon its raw materials and to do its labour; 138,000 fewer people to pay its municipal taxes and its general taxes; 138,000 fewer people to build homes and replenish them in this country. Emigrants they are called. I wish somebody would bar that word and substitute another.

When a man from Nova Scotia goes to British Columbia he is not called an emigrant. He has simply moved. What reason is there

in the world, when a man goes from Scotland to Australia or to Canada, that he should not be put in the same class as the man who has simply moved and not emigrated? The head and centre of the Empire is poorer by 138,000 people, provided they have not moved to another portion of the Empire. Therein lies the whole question. There should be but one Empire. The citizen of one portion of it should be a citizen in every other portion of it; the man who goes from one to another has simply transferred his home, and not transferred his national characteristics. If these great, mighty outlying dominions continue to grow, as they will grow, and their populations increase, as they will increase, fifty years will put the heart of the Empire and the outlying portions of the Empire in a very different position the one to the other. Are we not going to think about these things? Shall it always be *laissez faire?*

Yonder are indications of fire, behind it the wind is driving the flames towards your home; here you are, in your own home, asking yourself how many rooms you shall have within your dwelling, what compart-

ments they shall be divided into, and what furniture shall be placed in each. You are warned of the danger. But, you say, let us settle this business first. Let us see how we are going to locate our own compartments and furnish our own rooms. "Do not be excited over the fire, you say. God is good, anyway—the wind may change." You can take that and translate it into a thought of Empire. From this day forward, "accursed be *laissez faire*." Call it laziness—incapacity if you like; call it cowardice if that be the best name; but in the name of Heaven, men who have done what the outside dominions have done, men who have done what the men of this great heart of Empire have done—shall we not come together and sit around one common table, put our wits to work, and join our hearts and brains, our wisdom and our experience, from every part of this Empire, and organize?

What would Canada have been to-day had she not organized? What would this Empire have been without organization? Within twenty-five years it has outgrown the old organization. Shall we lie down, or sit still,

and confess that we are not able to make the new and necessary organization which shall keep this Empire one, which will make those outside dominions synonymous with the growth of Empire as a whole? Shall we not take counsel together, plan together, work together, and so build up for the future an Empire which in the past has done so much for civilization, and which has so much left to do? Does any man here believe that the British Empire has fulfilled its mission—the mission to its own generations unborn, if you go no further—its mission to the world, for which it still has great things in trust? This work can only be carried on by the fullest co-operation, and by calling ultimately to the seats of council the best experience that the whole Empire grows beneath its wide skies and upon its broad fields.

RECIPROCITY WITH THE UNITED STATES *

GROWTH and expansion in the United States and Canada have operated to produce two exactly diverse trends in public opinion on the subject of reciprocity. Since 1892, in Canada, sentiment in its favour has steadily declined, until now it is at its lowest ebb; since that period it has grown in the United States and now is, in administrative circles and in the country generally, at the highest point yet reached.

I propose in this article to point out briefly the considerations which have prompted the change on the part of our neighbours and the reasons why Canada declines to be interested in their proposals.

The population of the United States is now 90,000,000 and is growing rapidly, both by natural increase and immigration. In fifty

* Written for the *North American Review*, December, 1910.

years it will probably be 200,000,000. They have had vast natural resources, and few people have been more wasteful of them. In some of these it already feels the pangs of hunger, and in all it is facing a not very remote period when the transition must be made from a condition of adequate supply to one of pressing want, in which it will have to scour the world for necessaries. The area of free lands is practically exhausted ; its virgin lands have declined in productiveness. It still possesses considerable areas to be reclaimed, or irrigated, but both operations are costly and tedious. In the meantime, mouths are added by millions each year, and extravagant living shows no signs of curbing its extravagances. Think what a call would be made on the resources of that country if to-morrow 100,000,000 people were suddenly set down within its borders. The call is intrinsically no less, though it be distributed over fifty years. And that it will come and must be met is inevitable.

If the United States had another virgin west equal in area and quality to the one now virtually filled, the problem would be easy of

solution, for a time at least. But it has not. North of the 49th parallel of latitude, however, is such a country, rich in virgin resources. There are vast stretches of fertile lands, still mostly unoccupied, and ready at slight cost for the farmer's hand, where 100,000,000 people can be comfortably maintained. There are vast resources of timber on both ocean slopes, and, stretching away towards the borders of the frigid zone, vast resources of coal and iron and copper and precious metals, vast expanses of lake, river, and ocean inlets stocked with the best food fishes, immense fur and game preserves, and withal a magnificently watered country, with water power everywhere and a climate that breeds a healthy and hardy race of people. Time was when it seemed not improbable that this great land might come to be included within the circle of the United States, and thus afford it the desired expansion. This dream has been dispelled. The passing of the illusion was accompanied by some bad temper, some open threats, and some general misgivings. But thanks to better acquaintance, and the rapid growth and consolidation of Canada and

the development of its national sentiment, the dream is now generally confessed, and the conviction as generally accepted, that henceforth there will be two distinct nationalities north of the borders of Mexico, living and developing in friendly contact and rivalry.

Now, the United States is disposed to reason in this way: Granted that there is now, and will long be, a national boundary along the great rivers and lakes and the 49th parallel north, much may still be accomplished by us, and any way something must be done. It is still possible for us virtually to exploit this great half-continent, and make it, if not a component part, yet a most valuable annex to our country. Give us access to its resources and its markets, and our propinquity, our capital, and our enterprise will guarantee that, though under another flag, its wells of prosperity will be for our drawing. Its rapidly increasing millions may be supplied in the main by our industries, its great natural resources may be drawn upon for our supplies of raw material; then the grist would be for our mills, the wages for our workmen, and the bulk of the profits for our

upbuilding. We may tap this great country at essential points and draw off, on short lines of railway, an inestimable and ever-increasing freight for our great transport systems, and immense business for our great seaports. The shadow of an Imperial British Preference which to-day looms ominously large and threatens the otherwise clear sky of our foreign trade may thus be dissipated, and a formidable menace removed from our commercial pathway. Then there are always contingencies. Give us twenty-five years of such intimate contact and intercourse, and we shall so lay our lines and strengthen our affiliations, commercial and otherwise, that it will be increasingly difficult for Canada to change her fiscal policy and cast loose from our influence. Thus shall we practically guarantee ourselves against the chances of British Imperialism, and hold in leash a mettlesome and potent rising nationality. In the chapter of incidents, if one comes this way, we stand to profit thereby. Now, from a United States point of view, we in Canada cannot object to such forecasting. It is neither hostile nor unfriendly. It is part of the

peaceful warfare of commerce and progress, waged on business plans, and directed with foresight and sagacity. And in it, diffused and all permeating, is the aggressive spirit of nationality, which often effects, by these peaceful methods, results not possible to brute force.

The question is : Do we in Canada welcome such a destiny or look we for another ? Our reply, it seems to me, is something like this: Thank you very much, Uncle Sam, but really we have other ideals and other plans, into neither of which would your proposed *modus operandi* very well fit. The root of the whole matter is that we are in character and temperament not *pro* United States nor yet cosmopolitan, but national and imperial. Sprung from British stock, nurtured in British traditions, protected by British power, and loyal to British institutions, we have simply grown that way, and see no reason for being remodelled to another national fashion, either with or without our co-operation. This is not materially altered by the fact that one of our large provinces is overwhelmingly French in extraction. Quebec is absolutely

loyal to Canada and true to the British Crown which guarantees her people the rights and liberties they prize. Then we have in a way pioneered our country out of its original vastness and wildness and unexplored conditions, into a great, wide, pleasant, well-known land, furnished its sea-line with ports and harbours, opened its interior vastnesses by an admirable system of land transport, built up a great industrial system whose wheels turn ceaselessly, converted millions of acres of its soil into richly producing fields, opened up its mines and forest reserves and dotted the whole country with hamlets, villages, towns, and cities. We possess now nearly 8,000,000 people, have a foreign commerce of $690,000,000, and an immense and rapidly growing interprovincial trade. We feel the pride of possession—this country is ours, the work of our hands, the product of our brains, the child of our sacrifices, our solicitudes, and our prayers. You will quite understand, Uncle Sam, why we are minded to stay with it, to guide its present and fashion its future course. We hate the idea of absorption as much as we do that of

extinction, for we have red blood in our veins and feel the impulses of a great life throbbing within us. Whilst we welcome all hardy and sane people to a share in our heritage and co-operation in our development—their capital, their brains, and their sturdy moral fibre—we want them to assimilate, not to work apart ; to coalesce, not to remain segregated ; to become one with us in aim and effort for the upbuilding of a Canadian nationality. And we want their effort as far as possible to begin, continue, and end in this country. In fine, we want citizens, not foreign partners, union, not division, a common and not a divided national aim. You can never make us over into states of the United States. British and Canadian we are, and such we are minded to remain.

We have planned our development on our own lines and have spent already many hundreds of millions of our substance thereon. We propose in the main to do our own transport and reap the economic and national results therefrom. So you will observe that our great sheltered Atlantic approach is buoyed and lighted with scrupulous care,

that we are equipping our seaports, deepening our St. Lawrence, building our canals, and thus extending our Gulf line of navigation into the very heart of our country. So far this has cost us some $200,000,000, and before it is finished we shall spend at least $200,000,000 more. We have by the co-operation of Government and private capital constructed and projected a vast east and west system of railway transport. The Intercolonial, with its branches, connects Charlottetown, St. John, and Halifax with Montreal, and comprises 1,720 miles of first-class road. It has cost us to date $100,000,000, and is owned and operated by the Government. The Grand Trunk, whilst it has a terminal at Portland and Chicago, is yet, with its seaport connections at Quebec and Montreal, mainly a system of east and west transport through Quebec and Ontario, comprising about 3,600 miles of road. The Canadian Pacific system operates 11,000 miles, joins the Atlantic ports of Halifax, St. John, Quebec, and Montreal with Vancouver and Victoria on the Pacific, crossing the Rockies by two passes, and paralleling its main line by numerous others

which make a network over the prairies from the United States boundary on the south to Edmonton on the north. To this system the Government has contributed $65,000,000 in cash and large subsidies in land and money. The Canadian Northern system operates 3,700 miles of road, distributed from Cape Breton to Edmonton, and is now pushing through the Rockies on its way to New Westminster, Vancouver, and the Western Pacific ports. The Grand Trunk Pacific, now under construction, is to run from New Brunswick tide water to Prince Rupert on the Pacific, a distance of 3,600 miles. The Government is spending $200,000,000 on this system, partly in cash subsidy, and partly in construction which it leases to the company. All these great systems run their mains east and west, most of their branches are long parallels to the mains, and these are connected by cross lines. In all these at least $1,000,000,000 have been invested, a generous portion of which has been provided by the Canadian Government. This year a long contemplated and much discussed route *via* Hudson's Bay has been begun, and involves the construction

of 450 miles of railway from the Central West to Nelson or Churchill, which will cost probably $20,000,000. This will be the most northerly line of transport in Canada, and reach, with steamship connections, the ports of Europe by the shortest sea voyage. Each of these systems of railway has its steamship connections with foreign ports in Asia, Australia, South Africa, the West Indies, and Europe. In yearly subsidies to these lines Canada pays about $2,000,000.

What think you all this enormous expenditure of capital and energy means? It simply emphasizes the Canadian idea and embodies the Canadian plan. These are east and west highways of commerce and intercourse. We have strained every nerve in this immense work, we have built them to carry east and west borne products, and we are now bound to secure the freight and passengers for which we built them, and to see that they are not diverted therefrom. Otherwise we should have been foolish builders. This is why your plan of tapping our country and drawing off trade to your east and west lines and to your seaports does not suit us. That is why we

prefer that our agricultural, forest, and mineral resources should be wrought up as much as possible in our country, and interchanged between our own provinces and people, and why we prefer that what we export and import shall follow our own lines of transport and enter at and depart from our own seaports. That is why we do not sympathize with the present attempts to rush reciprocity arrangements, behind which and out of which so many consequences may come to the birth. It appears very much like a twin sister of the Unrestricted Reciprocity propaganda of 1891, and we do not like the relationship.

Then, again, there is the industrial question. Canada began with a low tariff—15 to 17½ per cent. Under it her industries made little progress. The competition from the accumulated skill and capital of the United States industries, their great capacity, varied output, possibility of specialization, and their entrenched position in a highly protected and populous home market proved altogether too much for our young and poorly equipped industries. In 1878 we adopted the principle

of protection, and under the Conservative régime maintained it until 1896. In that year the Liberals gained power. Though for eighteen years the sworn enemies of protection and the fierce advocates of free trade, continental union, and unrestricted reciprocity, they failed to carry their theories into action. They found the sentiment of the country set, they straightway repudiated their election pledges, and have maintained the protective system ever since. Under this, Canadian industrialism has made great strides, and Canada great progress, though be it remembered that the degree of protection has been moderate, and the average rate on dutiable imports during the whole period has been only 28 per cent.

Aforetime Canadians set much store by reciprocity with the United States. The old treaty was, on the whole, beneficial to both countries. But the United States denounced it in 1866. Canada desired a renewal of the old or the negotiation of a new one. Year after year her ministers and agents sought diligently therefor, year after year their proposals were declined. The Dingley Bill

and the McKinley Bill were our answers, and they were sharp ones. The tariff-makers seemed adepts in scenting any ingress by Canadian products, and quick to bar it by high or prohibitive rates. Their tariff grew to an average of 45 per cent. on dutiable imports, whilst ours was but 28 to 30 per cent. The Payne-Aldrich measure gave little or no relief, and embodied some new and annoying provisions, singling out certain Canadian products for retaliatory duties, seemingly designed to punish Canada for desiring to conserve certain of her diminishing natural resources. In addition, it contained a penal clause, general, it is true, but which, considering Canada's comparative tariff treatment of the United States, seemed unjust and even brutal in its application to her. Let me state the case. Canada imposed an average duty of 28 per cent. on all dutiable articles coming from the United States, whilst the United States imposed an average of 42 per cent. on Canadian products. Canada gave, in 1909, the United States a free list of $91,000,000 and bought in all from her $180,000,000 worth. The United States gave Canada a

free list of but $33,000,000 and bought from her only $80,000,000 worth. Yet against so good a trade neighbour the United States imposed a penalty, in addition to the already high duty, of *one-quarter the value of every commodity* imported from Canada, if it appeared that Canada, as the result of a mutual treaty with any other country, allowed entrance to any goods therefrom at a less rate than from the United States. Nevertheless the United States has always contended that mutual treaties between herself and another country, in which each gives the other a *quid pro quo*, do not impose on her the necessity of compensating a third power. Now Canada made, in 1910, a limited treaty with France, in which a mutual *quid pro quo* was the consideration. Thereupon President Taft advised Canada that she must, before March 31st, 1910, compensate the United States for alleged discrimination, or on that date every Canadian product entering his country would be mulcted in one-quarter of its value in addition to the duty. France had purchased certain tariff reductions from Canada and paid for them. The United States demanded the benefit of

these from Canada without paying for them. They were few in number and insignificant in effect, yet compensation must be made or upon a dutiable export from Canada of $50,000,000 worth of products a fine of $12,500,000 would be exacted in addition to the regular duty. Canada thought this unjust, and so it was, yet to prevent the total disorganization of the large trade concerned, her ministers made concessions, submitted to a yearly loss of $250,000 revenue, and the forced entrance of a list of United States products at from 2½ to 5 per cent. below her general tariff. Thus has Canada fared fiscally at the hands of United States legislators.

But during all this time two influences have been at work. The growth of our own industries and the expansion of our trade have rendered reciprocity less and less desirable, and the curt, not to say unfriendly, treatment by the United States of all our advances has strengthened our purpose to go our own road and let reciprocity severely alone. We now doubt its benefits, and we rather suspect the late repentance of its old-time opponents across the border. Our tariff has

built up our industries. Capital has come in from Europe and America, and made large investments thereunder. Very many industries have been transferred bodily from the United States, and every day they are coming. Our skill and capacity are increasing steadily, our output is growing in variety and volume with our increase of population, subsidiary employments are grouping themselves about our industrial centres, transport is adjusting itself to the necessities of distribution, inter-provincial trade is growing by leaps and bounds, and a full tide of immigration is setting in, and notably from among some of the best agricultural classes of the United States itself.

The tariff has consolidated our nationality, and we are not oblivious of its influence in this respect, and of its necessity in such a country as ours and at this particular stage of its development. To unite provinces so widely separated and of such varying wants and capabilities, the blood of trade and intercommunication must be rich and flow freely and widely. The arteries and veins we have liberally provided, and now we must fill them

with the invigorating fluid of traffic and keep it circulating. To us it appears folly to do anything whereby one single ton less of products would be made in Canada or carried over our lines of transport, or one single pound less of our own natural resources be developed for the benefit of Canada and within our own borders. That is, we have adopted a moderate protection to build up and consolidate our country; it has fulfilled that mission so far, and we see no reason at present for taking any step that would weaken its influence. The argument of its advocates in the United States is that reciprocity with Canada would enlarge their markets for manufactured goods, provide them with enlarged grists for their mills, enlarged stores of raw material to be worked up by their capital and labour, and enlarged business for their transport systems and seaport centres. The profits and national upbuilding would be secured to the United States. But we are desirous of upbuilding Canada, and see no reason why Canadian factories and operatives should not do the manufacturing, Canadian mills the grinding, Canadian labour and capital work up our raw resources,

Canadian transport systems do the carrying, and Canadian seaports the business, and in this way retain and attract population and secure the profits. If the reciprocity be confined to natural products only, we say, first that we now find ready and remunerative markets for all we raise, both at home and in that great ultimate market for our and your supplies, Great Britain, and secondly, that such has been the depletion of your great national resources and such are the demands of your growing population, that you must come to us more and more for what you need. It therefore remains for yourselves to say whether you will buy them over a high tariff of your own creation, or will take down your own tariff walls and pay less. Either way it is all one to Canada, as it appears that you must have them and pay her reasonable price therefor.

There is a further consideration. Canada has awakened to the importance of conserving her virgin stores of natural resources. With a small population, these bulk large in comparison and seem inexhaustible. But the history of the United States has shown her

that reckless exploitation and growing population quickly turn the vast surplus into a rapidly vanishing asset. She is determined that, if possible, that story shall not be repeated in her future, that her timber and fisheries, her economic resources and franchises shall be husbanded for the future millions who are to dwell within her borders. Economically administered they will suffice therefor. True, if they were rapidly exploited for a time there would be a merry warfare of destruction, and some present profits would accrue to the exploiters, but the discount would be ruinous, and nationally we are pondering seriously over the pregnant question: "What would it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" A nation has just as much right, and surely an equal duty, to defend its resources from commercial rapine and plunder as to repel invaders of its soil. The resources of a country constitute a trust held by its present administrators as trustees for the future generations. They are justified in limiting the present generation to a reasonable usage of them, they are bound to retain the estate

as far as possible intact and to hand it over unimpaired. To this end they are justified also in refusing facilities to those not of the nation. The commercialism of our own country and the world-demands, even though tempered by restrictions, will be hard enough to control, and against these our natural resources will be difficult of defence. But the problem would be all the more difficult if we were to open them to the invited and treaty-favoured exploitation of your 90,000,000 of people. We shall no doubt soon have to place curbs on the export of some or all of these, as well as to apply rigid rules of user to our own people, and to supplement these by wise methods of re-invigoration, of re-stocking, and of afforestation. We can better enforce such measures untrammelled by treaty obligations and unmenaced by alternatives of treaty denunciation.

Finally, we are enamoured of the idea of British imperial trade connections. The idea is not new, but of late years has assumed more definite body and form. Nationhood, race ties, and loyalty to British institutions are its sources. The desire to consolidate and

preserve the Empire of which we form a part is strong with us. Without consolidation, preservation is problematical, and in the natural interests and links of inter-imperial trade and development we think we see the essential factors of imperial consolidation and permanence. The Empire embraces all climates, every variety of product, all races of people, and an enormous, unfilled, undeveloped but rich territory, pregnant with vast possibilities. It offers scope for the energy and enterprise of its most progressive partners, and unrivalled opportunities for the uplifting and improvement of its more backward ones. It is, of all empires, the most inclusive and self-sustaining, and is so distributed as to furnish the greatest incentives and opportunities for sea commerce as well as for land production. The past stirs us, its present is brimful of interest and action, and its future full of large promise. During the last twenty years the minds of its statesmen and business men, of its thinkers and dreamers, have been drawn towards this ideal. Practical realization has been begun, by various co-operative steps, on the lines of

ocean transport, postal and electric cable communication, and commerce and defence, wherein the Mother Country and the overseas dominions have joined in counsel and finance to further the inter-imperial projects undertaken, for the good of all. So we now have common steamship subsidies, guaranteed loans, cables built and operated in common, partial preference in trade, standardized army systems, and mutually co-operating units in the imperial navy. Already the idea is accepted by the overseas dominions. Gradually the masses of Great Britain are being imbued with it, and soon we believe it will become universal. Then, whilst each great division will be absolutely self-governed as to its local affairs, around all will be thrown the bonds of organized empire, and between all will subsist an intercourse, commercial and social, which will be more intimate and family-like than that between them and even friendly foreign powers. We in Canada are averse to involving ourselves in any trade obligations or entanglements which would in the slightest degree militate against the early and complete realization of this ideal. With

all friendliness to all others we wish to retain the imperial firesides for the family, and the imperial estate for their especial benefit. As citizens we welcome any of your people who are minded to cast in their lot with us; as guests you will always be sure of a warm hospitality, but as partners we are not at present anxious for a bargain.

Would you then veto all attempts to improve trade relations between Canada and the United States? By no means. My aim has been to make clear to readers the Canadian view as I hold it, and as I believe it is held by the majority of our people. If there are no illusions there will be fewer errors. Granted that you fully realize that we are bent on developing a nationality absolutely independent of you politically, on maintaining as a means thereto a fiscal system under which we may develop to the utmost our industries and our resources for our own strengthening and upbuilding, and that no scheme of reciprocity which interferes therewith is desirable; that understood, we welcome the fullest trade and intercourse consistent therewith. We owe you much, we admire your

enterprise and your wonderful growth, and sympathize with the efforts you are making to grow rightly and develop the best forces of a great democracy. We covet your virtues and try to avoid your faults, individual, municipal, and national. If we can make easier channels for trade between the two countries, consistently with the above conditions, we will be glad to co-operate. Meanwhile, as a neighbourly beginning, could you not give our products tariff entrance to your market at the same rates which we accord to yours in our markets? You are bigger, older, richer, more skilled, and more populous. What competition should you fear on a basis of equivalent tariffs? If you were to do this it would be an earnest of good feeling and might dispose us to further converse.

SOME PROBLEMS OF EMPIRE *

I DO not come before you with any paper or lecture. I come simply to have a brief talk, suggestive mainly. It will not be philosophy in tabloids or statistics in columns, but may perhaps serve to stir up your minds by way of remembrance and remind you that in other spheres and climes there are a very respectable number of people who subscribe to the principles of this Institute and are trying to work them out in practice. There are people living to-day who think that this great British Empire of ours has been a gigantic experiment—an experiment which had its origin not in design but rather in chance and circumstance and necessity. There may be a good many who think even now that the Empire is still somewhat of an experiment. With reference to that experiment there is one essential thing which, if it

* An address delivered before the Royal Colonial Institute, November 12, 1912.

be present, may make it a success in the future, and which has made it the success it has been in the years past, and that is the unswerving loyalty of all parts of the Empire one to the other, and wise direction in administration. It is fitting in this home of the United Empire that a few words should be said by way of encouragement, tracing a little the path already trodden, and suggesting, it may be, something for the path that remains to be traversed.

I belong to the somewhat large family of Imperialists. We have been defined in a hundred different ways, and sometimes defined pretty well out of existence. As I look at Imperialism, I should define an Imperialist to be a man who devoutly wishes that the Empire experiment be a success, and who works along the lines of loyalty and wise direction in order to make it a success. If that is to be an Imperialist that is what I am and what I think a great many people in this wide Empire of ours are. Sometimes we are defined as Jingoes, but the Imperialist is not by any means a Jingo. The Imperialist is an ardent believer in peace, and is firmly of

the opinion that for an enduring and secure peace there is no better guarantee than an Empire like ours—filled up, made strong, and kept loyal. Sometimes it is said the Imperialist is a dreamer and idealist. I do not wish to deny that suggestion. The world would not have made much progress if there had not been, in every age, dreamers and idealists; but the Imperialist, if a dreamer and idealist, is practical withal, and I think the practical dreamer and idealist is the hope of this or any other country. But they say: "You have been at it for many years, and what have you accomplished?" That is just the point I wish you to think over with me to-night.

Go back to the beginnings of our Empire and trace it towards the present time. You will find there have been two sets of forces at work, the first making for division—centrifugal, so to speak—the second making for unity, centripetal in tendency.

I would first indicate briefly some of the principal of those dividing forces which have operated in the past history of the Empire and which I maintain are constantly declining forces.

One of the first was the vast and wide

dispersion of what constituted the Empire. Every sea and clime possessed some portion, larger or smaller, of the disconnected Empire under Britain's flag. That dispersion had in itself elements of danger, of weakness, of division, and of unrest. How is it to-day? Do you not believe with me that instead of being any longer a force for division it is rapidly assuming the position of a tremendous force in favour of strength and union? And this for several reasons: first, because ultimately it is going to give you a united Empire, with its centre in these northern seas, but buttressed by strong parts of the Empire in every ocean of the world; secondly, the very fact of the dispersion of our territories in this Empire is working out in another and very different way from what was thought. By the dispersion of your Empire territory you get all climes and products. Put your Empire all in one zone, and you have but a modified and restricted range of products. Now the sun in every part of the world kisses British Empire lands, evokes British Empire products, gives place for every wish and desire for habitation. Therefore you have again,

in this very dispersion of our territory, an element of abiding and continuous strength.

Another of the disuniting forces may have been the lack and slowness of communication. Our forefathers, long years ago, if they saw a ship from the Mother Country once a year, had their hearts gladdened and their hopes strengthened. There was in that farness and distance an element of danger and disunion. But every century that has passed has reduced it. To-day communications are regular and frequent, whilst our great cities —Capetown, Sydney, Melbourne, Vancouver, Ottawa—sit down any hour of the day and talk with the centre of London. Communications therefore have improved to such an extent that I think I am correct in saying that, in this respect, there is a great decline in the possibility of consequent disruption for this cause.

Another element of weakness was the sparse British population. It was sparse at first. The few people flung into far-distant lands, right up against a rude and unconquered nature, against tribes of people who were unknown and hostile to them, had a constant

struggle for existence, and there would have been little wonder if, in case after case, they had succumbed. Has not that danger decreased? Population is flowing in, constantly increasing, and to-day 15,000,000 of people—white people—greet you from the overseas dominions alone—a sturdy British stock, but only the nucleus of millions more that are to be. Thus this also is a declining force.

There was also a lack of capital and labour. That has been, in the course of many long years, remedied in a large degree, and in the most developed of the overseas possessions capital is flowing in—capital is being manufactured, so to speak, in the progress and wealth-production of these countries; labour is going in, and so, to-day, your steamers for Australasia and Canada are taxed to carry not only men—more men offering than the steamers can accommodate—but capital as well, and skilled labour also from this great centre of capital and labour.

One other disuniting force was the lack of sympathy and interest in the Motherland itself. It is a harsh thing to say, but I take it as being absolutely the fact that, of all the

discouragements the early struggling settlers in these wide-flung parts of the Empire had to meet and suffer, the worst was that, in the midst of their struggles and sacrifices and deprivations, amidst the stern and rugged life they had to lead, they found sometimes but scant sympathy and interest in the Motherland itself. Now I take it that that was not a lack of sympathy and interest in the great heart of the Motherland itself. It was the doctrine of some politicians and some schools of thought, and did not at all represent the heart of the Empire. But what came to these outside strugglers? The note that sounded in their ears was: "We who have planted you and watched your struggles, if we have directed our eyes at all to you, think it better that the painter were cut and you were let go." This has entirely vanished. Show me to-day the public man on a public platform in this whole Empire that would offer a note so pessimistic and discouraging. Thus have I enumerated the chief great disuniting forces under the stress of which our Empire has struggled upward for hundreds of years. They have either altogether vanished, or

declined to a degree which robs them for the future of the force they had in the past.

Consider now the other set of forces—forces which in the past and to-day are making for union, and are joining in strong-set bonds the different parts of the Empire.

One of the primal and enduring bonds is blood and race. The descendants of British parents, in whatever part of these islands, were proud of their blood and of the stock from which they sprang. They kept and held to that, and that held them together in many a discouraging hour.

Then there are the ties of tradition and literature, both strong and never once loosening their hold. I wish I had time to speak of them and the part they have played in our development—the fine and subtle cement of thought and sentiment firmly linking people sundered in so many other respects. These ties have held from the earliest times. To-day they exercise as much power in the outward direction as in any previous time, and now, back from the far-off dominions, are coming return contributions with similar effect and power.

Then there is the tie of common institutions. It is not necessary for me to speak of them—how the British out-goer has held to them, how he has treasured them, how he has reproduced them in his own community and in his own nation. They have held against the assaults of ruder life, against the assaults of foreign example, and to-day, in all parts of the Empire, we are bound and welded together in a common love and practice of British institutions.

The army and the navy have always been a great binding force of the dispersed people of this Empire, a force which has been vital in keeping together its various outlying parts. It is so to-day, but in a greater and more intimate sense. The army and the navy to-day are composed not simply of the British soldier and the British sailor. They have in them representatives of every part of the British Empire working together. It is our navy and our army—we who come from the overseas dominions so claim it. We have not done all we should have done to support it, but we have always respected it, we have always relied upon it. Our sons have fought

in your army and your navy, and to-day the keels of overseas dominion ships float side by side in British waters with those of the old Mother Country, and as years go by their numbers will increase—our navy will be truly imperial. It will have in it representatives from every part of the British dominions. We have gone further than theory, and our soldiers have marched side by side with British soldiers, when the Empire was in peril and her fortunes were challenged. We know what took place in the Boer war; we know what would take place in any other war in which the stability and permanence of the Empire was threatened.

Another great bond of union has been the King and the Constitution. The King and Constitution are ours as well as yours—in both we have vital interest just as you have—and when you here, as the predominant partner, have anything to do with the King and the Constitution, remember that you hold a trust from the overseas dominions, for you are dealing with a priceless heritage shared by other parts of the Empire.

Something else has happened in a new way

to bind the Empire together. Gradually the spirit of holding on, linking hands and keeping together, grew up into an impulse that went further than the individual and the provincial, and not many years ago we saw the working out of that impulse in federations — or unions of contiguous parts of the Empire — into new and young nationalities, as we like to call them. That was an entirely new development and one of the most powerful up to that time.

I think that we in Canada have in one respect an advantage that you in Great Britain never had. You can never say that you were at the birth and participated in the early growth of a new nation. You are the heirs of an old and long-formed nation. But many of us in Canada have witnessed the birth and assisted in the early building of a new nation, a phenomenon of entrancing and tremendous interest. In 1864-5, when the federation of the different provinces of Canada was mooted, I was a boy just entering college. I was a New Brunswicker. Nova Scotia existed, Quebec existed, Ontario existed ; there was an indefinite notion that Britain

had territory west of Ontario, and some stray information came to us that there was such a province as British Columbia on the Pacific coast. All I knew about was New Brunswick, and all I cared about was New Brunswick. Others were cousins more or less removed, but national life for me there was none. I was limited to the boundary of my little province, and I could throw a stone almost from one side to the other. What was true in my case was absolutely true in the case of everyone in the scattered provinces. There was no soul, no national life, no national objective, no national ideal, no national impulse.

I pass over the intervening years, and present to you the Dominion of Canada of to-day, where a new nation has been born, and a new great force developed for the Empire of the world, instinct with national life and imperial spirit. Thereupon hope lights up the distant hills, and men's hearts burn within them ; doubt has vanished, confidence holds the helm, and the future gleams strong and bright in the distance. I have lived the life and felt its thrill and seen the

splendid transformation, and I shall never cease to be thankful therefor. Out of separation and weakness there has been evolved a mighty entity, vitalized with national spirit, national ideal, and national impulse. There you have an immense territory of contiguous separated portions of the British Empire of the former days, welded into one strong nationality, with a life of its own. Progress almost immeasurable has taken place, which never would and never could have taken place if there had not been a union of ideals, a fusion of effort, and an impulse that came from the new-growing national life. Similar unions have taken place also in Australia, and in South Africa, and those two parts of the Empire are working out on the same lines, and feeling the same impulse as Canada. When people tell you that you have been long at work and nothing much has happened, point out that, if nothing else. It is one of the most real and hopeful signs that the grand imperial experiment will be thoroughly successful.

At two periods in the history of this British Empire many prophets arose. The first

period coincided with the grant of responsible government to the provinces. Then the burden of their prophecy was: "Your Empire will break into pieces; your distant possessions will not remain true to you." That has been falsified. When later these provinces federated, the prophets again stood up and said: "Ah, what we told you is coming, but in a different way. They have not broken away previously, but now they are making nations out of themselves and they will assuredly sever their connection with the Old Country." Again the prophets prophesied without any basis: for if there is one thing more marked than another, it is the seeming paradox that, just as soon as, and in proportion as, we became nationalized in parts we became the more strongly imperialized as a whole. To-day in Canada we are taunted with being more loyal than subjects of the King in the British Islands. I am not saying whether we are or not—I am not making that claim; but this I am saying—that we are more imperial than we were before the federation of Canada and the establishment of our new national life.

Since those federation times the dominant feeling has been a spirit and sense of interdependence and mutual helpfulness between these overseas federated dominions with each other and with the Empire itself. Their attention was not monopolized by the new creation; they were not filled up with the idea that now they were young nationalities they must think only of themselves. But in proportion as they grew in nationhood they grew in the practical feeling of interdependence one upon the other, and dominion called to dominion, and each called to the Motherland: "Is there anything in which we may be helpful to each other? Anything in which we can co-operate and encourage each other?" And the history of Canada and the other dominions is a series of evolutions of helpful, co-operative, and co-ordinating work between these overseas dominions and the Motherland and with the other overseas dominions. To-day we have postal and cable and steamship communications, subsidized and supported by different parts of the Empire. We have the growing assimilation of our laws—commercial

and other—doing away with hindrances between the trade and communication of the Mother Country and the dominions.

To make a long story short, we have done many things ; not the least is that instead of jealously claiming all the trade we possibly could get, these overseas dominions have given to each other, and have given to the Motherland, preferential treatment. You may like it or not. You may say that it conflicts with your theories or not. We gave it to you. You accepted it with a fairly smiling countenance, and to-day it is operative. We gave to the Mother Country better commercial treatment than we give to any stranger country. We give to other of the dominions better treatment than we give to those who do not belong to our sisterhood. That is something in the way of binding and bringing together, and showing that because we have become young nations we have not become utterly selfish. And with nothing even a little like boasting, let me say that the Dominion of Canada, when the West India Islands fell upon hard times, held out the hand as best we could, and gave to those islands for fifteen years the advantage

of a 33⅓ per cent. preference in our markets, and we did not ask and did not expect any return. Seed sown on the waters sometimes brings forth bread, and after these fifteen years, under better and more favourable circumstances, we have just concluded, and in the course of a few weeks will put into operation, a mutual preference trade agreement between the main part of the West India Islands and the Dominion of Canada. We have also had frequent conferences to smooth away differences and secure mutual advantages.

Here to-day, sitting in this city, is a Royal Imperial Commission, which never could have been if we had not had these federations in the outside dominions; and this body is at work to-day, trying to find out what is inside all this great Empire, and how it may be best developed for the good and strength of the whole Empire. Again, there has developed in these later years the Imperial Conference, in which the premiers of the different dominions and of the Mother Country meet together every four years, take note of the situation, and discuss questions

of mutual interest, and pursue plans for mutual improvement. Over and above that, there has been this latest of all developments —the invitation from the Imperial Defence Committee to the premiers of the outside dominions to enter with them into the arcana of the Empire, and there to learn the conditions and circumstances of foreign policy and foreign defence. All this, it seems to me, may well be treasured up by the Imperialist of to-day, as irrevocable and irrefragable proof of the great advance that we have made towards a completely united Empire.

Nor has the forward movement been by any means stopped. It is absolutely impossible, to my mind, for this Empire movement to stop now that the course has been so well laid and the impetus given. It would require more force to stop the tendency towards complete union than it did at the first to give the impetus.

But we need still more, and one thing imperatively needed is the development of an imperial consciousness. Our national consciousness is well developed—that of the Irishman for his native Ireland, the Scotch-

man for the land of his birth, the Welshman and the Englishman for theirs. The imperial consciousness is not so keen and so strong and not so easily perfected. It is a more difficult process, and takes more time. The Scotchman is born and brought up in Scotland, and in the process he incorporates into his physical, his mental, and his spiritual being the subtle influences that make him a Scotchman till the day of his death. It is a great mistake to think that love of country is all spiritual. From the moment a boy commences to observe he assimilates the features and peculiarities of his environment. I do not know the process, but by some strange chemistry the boy, as he grows up and observes the outlines of landscape and the tints of the sky, listens to the songs of the brooks, sees Nature's changes of dress and colour season by season, and listens to the notes of native songsters, has all this photographed in his inner and spiritual being, and he is made his country's man by the very fact that this process goes on. Add to that literature, song, story, art, politics, social life—common joys and sorrows even—each adds its indelible

imprint to make the national man. But even the Scotchman cannot be born and brought up both in Scotland and Australia, consequently it is difficult for him to be so thoroughly Australian as Scotchman; and the same takes place all through.

What I want to point out is that the wide dispersion of this Empire of ours makes it more difficult to cultivate an imperial consciousness than it is to cultivate a national consciousness; but the imperial consciousness is just as necessary for the final success of the imperial state as the national consciousness is for the national state. And we are growing; the process is naturally and necessarily slower, but it is streaming into our minds, our constitution, our life. Science, in its later applications, has brought the Empire more close than Scotland used to be even to Scotchmen, and so we are being gradually enabled more and more to visualize the conditions and to feel the impulses of life throughout the whole Empire, to incorporate them into our constitution and growth, to spiritualize and idealize them. Any man who has lived and thought for the last twenty-five

years can see the growth of this imperial consciousness—almost its birth. In a word, the Empire must find its soul, and then organize to ensure its salvation. When we fully realize that this Empire is no longer an abstraction, but a real, splendid entity with living ideals and soulful purpose and tendency, then we shall organize, and then we shall save the Empire.

Do you not see the almost numberless and the absolutely invincible elements at work to-day to develop that imperial consciousness? Every man who travels from this country into one of the overseas dominions is contributing his share. Every telegram that flashes news of the outside parts to you and to us in the outside dominions from you is doing its share. Every man and woman who, at the fireside or in the school, in magazine or newspaper, on the platform or in the pulpit, teaches what is the breadth and greatness and significance of this Empire, is doing his part; and the multiplied societies and associations whose names are so many that I cannot enumerate them, the legislators in our halls, and the merchants in their offices, are

all helping towards a wide imperial consciousness and working towards an organized plan for the realization of the ideal which springs therefrom. As we gain that imperial consciousness we shall take an imperial view of certain things to which we have been rather directing ourselves from the smaller national or sectional side. We must reverse that operation—not to the abandonment of the latter, but to the inclusion of the imperial side as well.

One of the questions we ought to view from the imperial side is the movement of population. Within the Empire, containing 400,000,000 people, there are only 65,000,000 of the white race, 45,000,000 here and the rest in the outside dominions. If this Empire is to remain a British Empire and its civilization to remain British, the British stock must be increased rather than diminished, because other stock is flowing into the vacant spaces of the Empire. You have an idea that the United States, for example, is absorbing a lot of people from outside, and that to assimilate them is a great task. But the United States has 90,000,000 people. It receives for

assimilation 1,000,000 yearly. It has ninety people to mother and father each new-comer. Take Canada. This year Canada will perhaps find 500,000 people coming in from abroad. Our population is only 8,000,000. Canada therefore has only sixteen people to father and assimilate each new-comer. The problem, I say, is to keep the British stock dominant. You can do it only in two ways—by assimilation, or by actual injection of new British stock. I am not going to put theories before you ; but what is the condition in this country ? Until comparatively recently, nobody thought about emigration at all. The out-goer went, as and whither he pleased, and in the century that has just passed many, many millions of good British stock have filtered out from this country—not to the waste places and vacant spaces of British possessions, but to alien and foreign countries. If that blood had been directed into the veins of our overseas possessions, what a different aspect they would have presented to-day. The current is changing somewhat, but not because of united consultation and plan and scientific endeavour ; but while 40 per cent.

of British stock, leaving this country, fail to come into British dominions, things are not as they ought to be and might be. Great Britain may say: "Do not drain my people away from me," and the overseas dominions may say: "We want as many as we can get of the right kind." Thereby arises a possible clash. But there are some illuminating features.

You have in this Old Country small spaces and dense populations: we have large spaces and small populations. There is demand and supply. You have in this country a surplus of womanhood, amounting to 1,000,000 and more: we have in the overseas dominions a lack of womanhood—a lack which all deplore. Here, then, are millions of your population, taking year upon year, in regard to whom some adjustment might be made which would fill the great want for womanhood that we experience in the outside dominions, and would open a career and prospect for women who, in this country, do not seem to have such openings.

In this country you have children—orphan children, deserted children, children worse

than orphans, who have to be taken away from their surroundings for their salvation. These count up into thousands and tens of thousands. The overseas dominions cry for these children, and cannot get the number they want. There, again, is a ground upon which a desirable adjustment might take place.

You have in this country unemployed employables. In so far as you cannot find employment for them, let them go to the overseas dominions with your blessing, and, if necessary, with your help. Remember, a man is not lost because he migrates from London to Canada or Australia; he is still building up your Empire there, for which you give him no chance here. There is therefore a large margin for adjustment in this class.

Going further, there is a mass of people who are not fit for employment as they stand, but hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands of whom could be adapted by a little care and treatment, and translated to new conditions, where hope would enter their hearts and an outlook be given them. To my mind, here is a class of population in regard to which the

overseas dominions and the Mother Country might well join hands, and finances too. A man out of work is in absolute peril ; his fibre weakens as he knocks at every door and can find no work to do. Pick up the man before he loses heart, and if you have not a place for him here, help him to some place in the Empire.

Let me pay my tribute to the unselfish, untiring, and philanthropic efforts of many of your societies of men and women in this country, who give themselves infinite trouble and take the most sympathetic pains to save those who would otherwise be lost. They have challenged my admiration, in proportion as I have become more aware of the work they have done and are doing. I am not going to give advice to you, but I would remind you that men and women are not chattels. You cannot dispose of them as you would a shock of wheat, or a barrel of apples ; they will go if they want to go, and can get money to go. Britain has to revise something in this country, I think. She must pay a better wage for competent persons and open up conditions which will give hope of future

betterment to those who are now shut out, and if she does not do that she must expect to lose sons and daughters—but to lose them, if proper action is taken, thank Heaven! to other parts of the Empire where they will not be lost as elements of strength and permanence in our civilization.

I think also that we should take an imperial view of trade and production. I am not touching party policies. I am dealing simply with principles. I have not time to go into this argument, but I want to give you my thought in an illustration. Here is the British individual trader. Here is part of the British Empire—Canada—which we will personify as the national trader, and here is another personification of the imperial trader. We have grown to deify trade and commerce in abstract and concrete, and we set up these deities in the market place. Shall I startle you if I make the statement that trade and commerce never have and never will create one single atom of wealth? They are simply the middlemen who interchange products and grow rich on the tolls they take therefrom. That is not to say they are not

necessary and do not fit absolutely well into the economy of things. But what I want to call attention to is that trade and commerce are not the main things. Production is the main thing. Your British trader takes his British ship, he goes to the Argentine Republic, he buys a load of wheat, he takes that wheat to Germany, sells it and buys from Germany a load of manufactured goods, and takes that load back to the Argentine. He has had two good trades, and made his money. He does not care about the country of origin and production : he is in for interchange, and his position is perfectly logical.

Now take the Dominion of Canada as a national trader. She takes a cargo of her wheat, and sends it down to the United States, sells it there, buys a return cargo of fruit, brings it up into the North-West, and sells it there. Canada has thus the advantage and profit of one production, the United States has the other. But Canada does another thing. She takes a cargo of wheat and butter from the Middle North-West over to British Columbia, sells it there, buys in British Columbia fruit and lumber, brings it

back and sells it to the men of the Middle North-West. There Canada has the advantage of two productions. It means that the British Columbia fruit and lumber industry is vastly impelled and helped, and that the grain and butter-producing industries of the middle parts of the North-West are also helped in the same transaction. Canada, if she could, would like to conduct all her interchanges between parts of her own territory. But climate, soil, and geographical position make that impossible.

But the Empire, within its vast bounds, can raise nearly every product the Empire needs. She has every soil and climate, every kind of production; and, to the largest extent, Empire trade, if rightly organized, can find its own double production for nineteen-twentieths of all it will use. It is production and development that bring into relief the wonderful possibilities of Empire trade, as I believe coming years will see it. Can we not raise the foods the Empire needs within the bounds of the Empire? Last year £68,000,000 were paid to foreign countries for cotton imported into this country. Think

what that means. It means that £68,000,000 go into foreign countries, developing a vast industry, building homes, providing labour, capital, wealth, and everything that is necessary to build up that country. If it were possible to raise this cotton within the bounds of the British Empire, how far would that £68,000,000 go towards fertilizing and developing the waste places of this Empire? Last year £37,000,000 were paid for meat. Cannot the Empire furnish the means of supplying its own meat? Somewhere about £56,000,000 were paid for foods of the sort our Empire produces, and £58,000,000 for wheat and its flour. If it is possible, and in so far as it is possible, to have these and other needed products raised in our own Empire, to supply our own needs, it would revolutionize settlement and development and wealth-production, and consequent progress in civilization and advancement.

One last word. It is simply this—Organization. Organization is what has made Canada what she has become. It is what is making Australia what she is becoming. Organization —other things being equal—brings success, as

lack of it brings failure. Organization, from the Empire point of view, is, it seems to me, one of the essentials for our future success. I am not following out the argument in suggesting what can be done. When men really want to do a thing in business they come together, talk over the matter, put plans before one another, analyze and discuss, and by and by find a proper plan, and then go on to carry it out. It is the only way in which this Empire will ever be organized. It is when all parts get sufficiently interested, and come together in some capacity for consultation and for decision, that you will have a proper Empire organization.

I myself do not believe we shall ever have a perfect organization until we possess in this Empire some deliberative, directive body, which represents and typifies all parts of the dominions. Nor am I disappointed because it has not come yet, nor hopeless because it will not come to-morrow or the next day. Years in the life of a nation or empire count very little, but that it will come I am certain, and the sooner it comes, provided it be after proper consultation, the better for the Empire.

If it would be a gain to the people of the outside dominions—and who doubts it?—to have the counsel and work of your seasoned, able men in this part of the Empire, would it be altogether a disadvantage to you if you were to call in men from the overseas dominions, and mingle your counsels with theirs for the general good of the Empire? This Empire of ours—do you ever try to visualize it? Have you considered its vast area, its large population, its almost innumerable productions, its magnificent figures of interchange, and its equipment of forces as they stand to-day? Let memory work backwards. It was not always thus. There has been a splendid growth. Let imagination work forwards. Think what it may be fifty, a hundred, a thousand years from now; and as the splendid vision grows it unfolds an ideal such as no people, from the earliest dawn of time, have beheld—the ideal of a great, multiplied, and extended British civilization, which we, here, and men abroad may unite in declaring to be one of the most beneficent instrumentalities ever given to the world. What it is now, what it may be in a hundred

years and more from now, if we do our duty and rise to our responsibilities, the pen of no writer and the tongue of no speaker can avail to predict.

THE NAVAL POLICY OF THE BORDEN GOVERNMENT *

CANADIANS have, in their different legislatures and halls of debate, considered many important and grave questions. The questions of responsible government, of confederation, of industrial policy, and the great questions and problems of transportation have from time to time been under discussion in our Parliament. But I doubt if there has been any question during the whole history of legislation in what is now the Dominion of Canada which has been quite as important and freighted with quite as great consequences as the one we are now discussing. It is not wonderful that the question now being debated has not made its appearance earlier ; nor is it wonderful that, after it has made its appearance, it should increase in intensity and grow in volume, and become more urgent in its insistence upon an answer

* A speech delivered in the House of Commons, Ottawa, December 18, 1912.

that shall be adequate and complete. It is not wonderful, I say, for in the last hundred years peace has continuously blessed this country on its borders, and, with three exceptions, within its borders. Our people have been very busy carving out homes for themselves, exploring and connecting up the immense territory which is their heritage, finding out and trying to utilize the most evident of its great resources, and in different ways laying the foundations of a young and strong nationality. It is not wonderful, therefore, that, engaged, absorbed in these occupations, with peace during the whole period, and protected by the army and the fleet of the Mother Country almost unconsciously to themselves, the question did not sooner spring into life and activity.

But, although most Canadians felt little their obligations, and seemed to prize still less the blessings under which they were living and working, there were always some, and of late an increasing number, who were conscious of obligations that had not been fulfilled, and of the exceedingly precious privileges which they were enjoying by the

sacrifices of centuries, sacrifices which extended into the periods of their own lives, sacrifices made not by themselves, but by the founders and the fathers of this great country and of the overseas possessions. And those who were conscious of those obligations gradually gave voice to the feeling within them. They communicated their feeling to their friends, and so the circle gradually widened until at last it found its way into the halls of legislature and into our Parliament. Once having found its way there, the question remains there to be solved, and it will stay there until it is solved aright.

It has not only vexed and troubled Canada, but it has also had its mission and its course in the sister colonies. Colony after colony, a little in advance of us, has taken up the question and has carried it more or less to successful conclusions. But the matter has gone further. It has gone up from the halls of colonial legislatures into imperial conferences, and it has made its way, through the media of these imperial conferences, into the highest circles of political influence and political control in the course of its solution.

To-day it occupies the attention of the best statesmen in the Mother Country and of the best statesmen and the most thoughtful citizens in every one of the colonies in the great Empire to which we belong.

At the imperial conference in 1887 there was a hesitant beginning of things. In 1902 there was a further step taken, in 1907 a greater stride was made, but neither in 1887, nor in 1902, nor in 1907, was Canada in step or in stride with her sister colonies in the Empire. The session of 1909 brought the matter in an abstract form into our House of Commons, and, to a certain extent, in an abstract way, settled certain principles, and settled them, I think, for all time. That was succeeded by the imperial conference of 1909, in which still further progress was made. Then came the Bill which passed the House, known as the Canadian Naval Service Act. Then came the dissolution of the House, a change of parties, and a change, in some respects, in the policy in reference to defence.

It will not be out of place for me at this stage to make a very brief, and, I hope, a quite impartial survey of the past history of

the Empire defence problem in Canada, going back no farther than the 1902 conference. The result of this conference was a step forward by Cape Colony, which increased her contribution from £30,000 to £50,000 yearly; by Australia, which increased her contribution from £100,000 to £200,000 yearly; by Natal, which increased her contribution from £12,000 to £35,000 annually; by New Zealand from £20,000 to £40,000 annually, and by Newfoundland from £3,000 to £4,800 annually. But in that conference, Canada, never before having made a contribution, still persisted in her refusal. The position that she took was briefly this, that while she felt the obligation to do something for the defence of her own shores, she had hitherto done nothing except by way of perfecting, to a certain extent, her militia. At that conference she refused to go further in reference to the utilization of a portion of the militia for imperial purposes, but she promised, through the mouths of her representatives, that she would take up the question of naval defence in so far as respected the formation of Canadian naval cadets. 1902 passed on to 1907, but the promise that

was made in 1902 by Canada in reference to the Canadian cadet service was not fulfilled in any form.

Then came the conference of 1907. Sir Wilfrid Laurier remembers this, as also the preceding conference, for he was present at both. The representatives were met, as usual, by the statements of the Prime Minister and of the First Lord of the Admiralty. These were not begging for help, as they had not been in 1902. England never has, England never will beg either her colonies or others for help, but the fact that she has not done so and will not do so is not to be taken as an excuse for our not helping. It is, in fact, the strongest appeal that can be made to honest, loyal hearts for help. The delegates of that imperial conference were given a statement of the present position and were invited to consider the matter and, if they thought they would like to help, to state how far that help could go. What happened? The South African States continued their contribution at £85,000 per year; Australia continued hers at £200,000 per year and undertook home duties in addition; New Zealand continued her contribution,

raising it from £40,000 to £100,000 per year. When it came to Canada's turn to speak she spoke through the mouth of her Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and from his lips—I am not overstating it—there came not one sound, not one syllable of either grateful and appreciative estimate of what Great Britain had done for Canada or of promise as to what Canada would do in the future. There came only the words of apology and the note of misrepresentation; the words of apology—that Canada could do nothing because she was operating a fisheries protection service which was fairly burdensome; she was instituting wireless stations which cost money; she was watching with eagle eye the development of the United States fleet on the lakes, and feeling about as to what was necessary to protect Canada from menace and danger from that source. It was stated, which was not true, that she had made a beginning in instituting a naval cadet service. That was all Canada had to say at the conference of 1907, except that when near the close of the conference Mr. Smartt moved his resolution affirming a unanimous expression of opinion

that in whatever way the legislature of any overseas dominion or state should think it well to assist by contribution, or by local defence, or in any way it pleased, they should at least all do something on these lines. Canada, through the mouth of her Prime Minister, said: No, we will not pledge ourselves, we do not propose to be led away from the exercise of our proper autonomy and responsibilities at home; we do not intend to throw ourselves into the maelstrom of European conflict.

Then came the resolution of 1909, and the resolution of 1909 as it passed this Parliament affirmed certain principles. It affirmed that it was becoming more and more the duty of Canada, as she increased in population and wealth, to assume some of the duties of national defence; it affirmed that regular and periodical contributions were not, as a system, the most satisfactory solution of the problem of defence; it declared that the speedy organization of a Canadian service, in co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along lines suggested by the Admiralty, was the best method for strengthening

the naval supremacy of the Empire; it declared that whenever need should arise—and I would like to emphasize that word—Canada would make any sacrifice to co-operate with the imperial authorities in every movement to maintain the integrity and the honour of the Empire. But that was not the form in which the original resolution came before our Parliament; that was not the form of the amendment which Sir Wilfrid Laurier, then the leader of the Government, moved. That was a resolution which was the result of concessions on both sides for the laudable purpose, without giving away any principle, of presenting to the country, to the Empire, and to the world, a unanimous voice from this Parliament.

It has been suggested that those who voted for that resolution in 1909 are inconsistent now when they support the proposition of the Government as placed before the House, in that the resolution cut out temporary or occasional contributions, and in that it declared that the policy was to establish a Canadian naval service, and that the present policy of the Government contravenes both

sections of that resolution, and therefore that those who support the policy submitted to-day are inconsistent as compared with their action in 1909. The amendment which Sir Wilfrid Laurier moved had in it the words: "the payment of any stated contribution"; these words were excised and the words that were put in were "regular and periodical contributions," differentiating absolutely between the time of need, the period of emergency, and the settled and normal policy which should prevail. If that is borne in mind all alleged inconsistency disappears and the argument founded upon it falls to the ground. Is more proof needed? Sir Wilfrid Laurier voted for that resolution as it appears in our journals, but the other day he said: "If there were an emergency, and I believed in that emergency, I would vote $35,000,000, yes, four times $35,000,000, as an emergency contribution." How could he, and be consistent, if that resolution forbids the vote of money for urgent need?

Then came the imperial conference of 1909. At that imperial conference its delegates from the different overseas dominions were met as

before in exactly the same cordial, manly, British way. There was no suppliance, there was no plea for help; the circumstances of the Empire were laid before them, they were asked to consider these circumstances and to act as each thought best. But the Admiralty at that time, with the concurrence of the British Government, made a statement before the members of that imperial conference. They outlined different methods of aid. They said that, strategically considered, the most effective aid that could be given was contributions of money from the overseas dominions placed in the hands of the old, the experienced, Admiralty and naval authorities of Great Britain, with a thousand years of naval tradition behind them and hundreds of years' accumulation of the best experience and naval science that the world could produce. They said: If you will do that it will be the most effective way of rendering assistance to the imperial fleet; but we know there are objections in the overseas dominions to this, and, leaving that aside, the next most effective thing to do is to build naval units. And they insisted as an absolute condition,

with reference to the different naval units, that the various overseas dominions might build—because they felt that maybe insistence would be placed on local control—that there should be one single indivisible control when war and danger and peril came. The British Government made a most generous and most effective proposition. They said : If Australia would build a unit and if New Zealand would do her part as she promised to do, Great Britain would add what was necessary to make up New Zealand's unit and also assist in making up a unit for China and India. Then, if Canada would add her unit, these four units—comprising fifty-four vessels, headed by four great fighting machines—would be allotted to the unprotected Pacific coast and thus aid the imperial fleet to the greatest possible extent.

What happened ? Australia said : Yes, we will do that. And they pledged themselves, there and then, to build, and, after they had built, to maintain their unit, and during the time that that unit was building, to keep up their contribution of £200,000 per year. New Zealand said : Yes, we will give

a Dreadnought, and we agree to the conditions. Great Britain was an assenting party to the other unit. What did Canada say? Canada said: We cannot do any such thing; we will not do any such thing. To my mind the opportunity was lost then of doing the biggest, the grandest, the most effective thing that up to that period could have been done—perhaps such an opportunity may not recur for many years—for the aid of British supremacy by sea, and for the protection and security of the hundreds of millions of people who live within the Empire. Then, said the Admiralty, if you are bent on having your local fleet, and will not join the others in common action, please build nothing less than a unit, for nothing less than a unit would be effective. Canada refused to build a unit. She went to the Admiralty and said: We can expend only £400,000 per year, or maybe £600,000 per year; tell us what is most effective that can be got for that amount of money, and we will consider it. The Admiralty told them. They took a part of the advice, and came back and instituted the policy of building four cruisers and six torpedoes,

without a Dreadnought or leading vessel—and so short of the unit—and dividing that ineffective force between the east and west coasts of Canada, many thousands of miles separated from each other.

That was the result of the conference of 1909, and the Naval Service Bill embodied that result in legislation in 1910.

This Act of 1910 went into force, and we are all acquainted with what has been done under it. It is not necessary for me to recount that part of the history. Suffice it to say that two old vessels were bought, the *Rainbow* and the *Niobe*. They were filled with men who were not Canadians, paid by Canadian money. They have been on the coasts of Canada now for nearly two years. During that time not a Canadian has yet qualified to take full service in these vessels. The number was not then, and is not now, by any means the full complement of the two vessels. It is about the same now—after some 271 desertions in that time—as it was when they came over to Canada. Nineteen young men have been passed in one year through the naval college and are now being examined for midshipmen. Ten more are

in the college at this date, and it is hoped that ten additional, making twenty in all, will be in the college on the 1st of January, 1913. Meanwhile, we have paid one and a third millions of good Canadian dollars as capital expense, and we have paid out seven hundred and eighty-eight thousands for upkeep. We have paid the money; we have the result; and we have the right to ask what has this contributed to the defence of the Empire, and how long would it be, under such methods and circumstances, before twenty-six war ships could be manned by properly qualified Canadian seamen?

Following that policy, as carried out by the late Administration, came the change of Government. New men came in with some new ideas as to what should be the proper attitude for this country in the matter of naval defence. What is that policy? First, let me say this: Mr. Borden when in opposition was asked what he would do if he were in power, and he made a statement as to what he would do, dividing it into two parts.

First, he would find out as exactly as it was possible to do what were the present

conditions and needs; and he would go to headquarters to find that out. He would not lie on the broad of his back and cogitate what was necessary, depending for information either on his party bias or on his imagination; he would go to headquarters, where alone that information could be got. And if, after examination, he came to the conclusion that it was necessary that some quick and effective aid should be given, he would come down to the House and recommend a money vote for that purpose. There has been no variableness, neither shadow of turning in that respect, so far as the leader of the present Government is concerned.

His second course of action, as outlined, was this: that, in the meantime, as regards the permanent defence policy of this country —and I want our opponents to remember these two divisions and these two words, because they are inclined, in the ardour of debate, to thrust one entirely out of view and to exalt the other as the only part of our policy—he would take it into most careful consideration. And he said that he would link with it one other question, the importance of

which and the necessity of settling which no one of our opponents will deny, that is, if we are to embark upon a permanent policy of naval support for the supremacy of the Empire, some voice must be given to Canada as regards matters leading thereto, questions, that is, as to the foreign policy of the Empire. Does Sir Wilfrid Laurier disagree with that second condition? He has subscribed to it in the House and he is on record as subscribing to it. Mr. Borden outlined a policy one part of which might result in a temporary contribution, and another part in a permanent plan being agreed upon, mutually co-operative and most effective, because it would be the result of careful inquiry and of the intermingling of mutual wisdom and counsel.

The late Administration went out of office, and Mr. Borden formed a Government. When asked in the House what he proposed to do in reference to the policy of naval defence, he made exactly the same answer as he had made when leader of the Opposition. He said: I propose to go to Great Britain and ascertain, as nearly as I can, the exact state of affairs. If I find that there is a need or necessity, I

will come back and ask this House for a money vote to meet that need. Then I will take up the question of permanent policy and thoroughly look into it. I will formulate that policy; but before it is made effective I will not let it lie in the mouth of any man to say that it passed the House, but that the country was not in favour of it. I will not let it lie in the mouth of any outside the Empire to say we got a vote through Parliament, but the people were not in favour of it. I will take that mature and permanent policy; I will lay it before the people, and if it is carried it will be Canada's policy, without question and without doubt.

And has that been done? The answer is plainly written in the late history of Canada. Mr. Borden and members of his Cabinet went to Great Britain. They spent two months there, and they were not idle. They saw the officers and Lords of the Admiralty, the Premier and Cabinet of Britain, and the secret knowledge of the policy and condition of the Empire was laid before them. They not only had statistics and figures and expert advice, but, what is still more valuable, they breathed

in the atmosphere surrounding men whose whole lives and purpose were devoted to the grave problems of empire, its conditions and the conditions of other countries, which is more valuable than dry statements or tabulated figures. After going through this process, he came to the conclusion that there was a danger, that there was a need for immediate and effective help. He came back to our Parliament and laid before it all the proofs possible, and gave to the House his own conviction as leader of the Government. He could not lay more before the House, because it is not permitted ; but let no man run away with the idea that the statements contained in the memorandum of the Lords of the Admiralty which has been prepared for publication, was all, or even the most important part, of the information obtained. But from the memorandum of the British Government, and from these deeper and more intimate sources of information, he forms his own conclusions and says to this House and to the country : There is a need, and it is pressing. I recommend immediate and effective aid in the face of that need, and I do

this knowing well the trust that is committed to me. I hold a little more than Canada's welfare in that trust ; I hold some part of the welfare of the Empire. Whatever men may say or whatever men may do, the destinies of Canada are absolutely and irrevocably bound up with the destinies of the Empire. On my knowledge as given to you, on my knowledge as possessed but which cannot be disclosed, in pursuance of the sacred trust of a privy councillor and the leader of the Government of the country, I ask Parliament to pass this vote.

Has he been consistent ? Has he been courageous ? Has he been weighing small things in the balance, holding up the straw to see which way the wind is blowing ; waving a feather to find if there is the slightest ruffle of political breezes ? He marched straight to his object, he got the information, he hands the result to this Parliament and the country, and I have no doubt that this House and the country will accept his version and will pass this measure.

Such then has been the policy and action of the present Government. There is, however, a disposition upon which, whether designedly

or not, many individuals have already acted, to declare to the country that there is only one branch to the Government's defence policy, and that is the branch of contribution; that a permanent policy has been thrown to the winds, and there is to be no Canadian naval service. This is an absolute mis-statement of the Government policy.

When this measure is brought before the House, what do we find? We find the Opposition, as indeed is their absolute right, criticizing it. We would not bring it before the House if we did not expect and invite criticism. It is the absolute right, as well as the absolute duty, of any member of the House to criticize a policy brought down, and to amend it or to show wherein it can be amended, if this can be done in a fair and reasonable way. But it is also open to members on our side of the House and to the people of the country to sift and examine the objections which are made to this policy.

One effect is already apparent, a very grateful effect, and if it prove to be a permanent effect, one which is sufficient to justify the policy even though nothing else results

from it. It is the forced abandonment of false positions and wrong opinions hitherto held by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and those who follow him. It is the elimination by him and those behind him of errors which they have tenaciously held for the last fifty years. Let me enumerate some of them.

This policy has had the effect of eliciting from him an expression something like this: "We are British subjects, we do not want to be anything else; and that settles the whole question." The time was when I listened to other sentiments than that. I am glad they were only vagaries of a more youthful period, the wild oats sown by disappointed men wandering in opposition. But from this time forth the sentiment is not to be independence, or young nations in alliance with Britain. We are British subjects—that and always that. The whole question is settled for ever.

Another statement that this policy has elicited from him is: "When increased armaments are going on we cannot afford to be idle and rest upon our own security." He uttered a great truth in that pregnant statement, but from 1902 until 1912 he

neither uttered nor acted upon that sentiment. He said the other day that he knew every fact and figure that we know to-day—four years ago he knew them. During the last ten years a navy which, ten years ago, was absolutely negligible has become the second great navy of the world, and that navy is within twelve hours' steaming distance of Great Britain. He knew all those years of these increasing armaments and vast works, and launched Dreadnoughts, and all the scientific improvements which make a machine terrible in naval warfare. He knew it, he had the facts, he had the figures, but he gave no hint, he uttered no words, he did nothing. I am glad that the issuance of this new policy has brought him to his senses in that respect.

Then the other day, in this House and in the face of his ex-Minister of Militia and Defence, he denounced the Monroe doctrine, and declared that we could not lean upon it in self-respect or in security. Another mist has been cleared away.

He said also : " Any thought of separation from Britain would be a folly and a crime." Any thought of it ? Go back to the market

places of Boston and the New England States, and not many years ago you saw there a figure, picturesque, younger than as we now see it, standing up in the market places and declaring that things could not go on as they were, that independence was the goal of Canada, and that his only cherished hope was that when it came it might come without a pang of birth, it might fall as the ripe apple from the tree. Gone are those haunting nightmares for ever. Now any sort of separation would be a folly and a crime. Thank our policy for that conversion.

He absolutely refused one unit in 1909 when so advised by the Admiralty. In 1910, when it was not a proposition by the British Government or Admiralty, but was a matter for this House, he again refused it and substituted his four cruisers and his six torpedo boat destroyers. Now he is in favour of two units —*i.e.*, two Dreadnoughts and their complements, or twenty-six warships in all. Speculation is permissible as to why two units. Speculation is very soon satisfied when you think of his party prescience and wisdom. Two years ago he proposed four cruisers and six torpedo boat

destroyers, but the division of these between the two coasts would be such a small plateful that he was afraid neither would be grateful for the donation. Make it two units and give each a loaded basket. I am happy to think that at last, under the pressure of this Bill, he stands to a certain extent with us on this side of the House and has pledged every man of his on that side that something will be done and that the adequacy of that something is not to be measured by four cruisers and six torpedo boat destroyers, but by something far larger.

Giving him credit for all those renunciations, let me proceed now to what is not so grateful, a criticism of some points that he took up in objection. I am sure he does not object to criticism. He deals it out fully and unsparingly and he is willing to take it in the same fashion and measure.

In the objections that have been made by the opposition there have been many voices; but, after all, the utterances have been along comparatively few lines, and I think I can answer several who have spoken on the other side of the House, without mentioning names,

and without taking up time with each one.

I want to ask one thing. You use, and we use, the word "emergency." Where did we get it? It does not appear in the resolution passed by the House. The word is not "emergency," the word is "need." Whenever the need arises it is the duty of this House, and of Canada, to do whatever is possible to be done to maintain the integrity and honour of the Empire. We have narrowed, and wrongfully narrowed, the question by substituting the word "emergency," and arguing with reference to that. What is an emergency? An emergency may be the flash of lightning which precedes destruction and death by but a moment. It may be the sound of cannon which heralds a declaration of war made overnight and when the cannon are searching close for your positions. But it may mean something different. It may mean a condition which has developed because of the grouping of powers, the promulgation of new laws with reference to armies and navies. It may mean many things. But we are quit of all discussion on

that when we keep to the word in the resolution, the word "need," and whenever the need is demonstrated we have the right and the power to act. Who is to be the judge of the need? There you come up against a practical question.

The leader of the Opposition says there is no need, no emergency, no present or prospective danger. The Prime Minister says: There is a need, there is danger, there is apprehension; and to do Canada's part to relieve that I bring down this measure. Who has the right, *prima facie*, to be believed? Sitting with the members of the British Government, who are charged with the mighty possibilities of this great Empire, day after day counselling with them on the secret and intimate conditions that prevail, fortified by them in a memorandum which is one of the strongest that has ever been presented to any house of parliament, and backed by the conviction of duty inspired in one who for the time being is the responsible leader of this country, the Prime Minister reaches one conclusion.

Another gentleman who did not sit down

with those Ministers, who has not of late been in that intimate circle, who has not had the information and the means of knowledge of the Prime Minister, pronounces an opposite opinion. He states that four years ago he knew every fact and figure in that memorandum, but he must, I think, revise that statement when he remembers that in four years much has happened; and one thing that has happened has been the German fleet law of 1912, with its deep significance, its suggestions of perils, its terrible addition of striking force to a fleet already most formidable. So I say, *prima facie*, the people of this country will, I think, follow the judgment of the Prime Minister rather than the assertion of the leader of the Opposition.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier says further that this policy is a hybrid, bred of Tory Jingoism and Nationalism. They have been together, and this is the result. Suppose it was, does it much matter if the ripe fruit on the tree comes from one soil or another, is tended by one gardener or another, or by two, provided that the apple itself, in its flavour and quality, is all right? Had he not better savour

the apple instead of chemically, or otherwise, analyzing the soils out of which it has sprung?

He says besides that this is the result of an unholy alliance between the Tories and the Nationalists. He says that immediately the resolution of 1909 was passed dissension broke out in the Liberal-Conservative party. There were two sections: one section wanted a contribution only and no Canadian navy, the other section wanted neither contribution nor navy. If there was a choice at all, the latter was for the Canadian service, while it utterly abhorred the contribution. If then this policy is the result of an unholy alliance between the Nationalists and the Liberal-Conservatives, after which parent does the child take its traits? Here is a measure which enacts contribution; the Nationalist damns contribution, will have none of it. How then does Sir Wilfrid Laurier argue it out that Nationalism has been triumphant when the very thing that the Nationalist abhors is embedded in the Bill, and the only thing that he might look upon with favour—a Canadian service—is not included in this Bill? If that is so,

whatever the antecedents may have been, the Nationalist did not prevail. So much is certain.

He then goes on to say that the document shows that there is no emergency, that England is in no danger, immediate or prospective. Quoting from his own speech, he says the document shows that: "As a result of the armaments which are now going on in Europe, England has been obliged to increase the margin of security which she relies on for her own defence, by reducing her naval forces in the outlying seas. Such is the condition."

I take issue with him. I say that the document discloses more than that, that his is not a full statement of what the document does disclose. Let us analyze the document. Criticism was directed, if not by him, then by one of his supporters, to the first clause of the document: "The Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada had invited His Majesty's Government through the Board of Admiralty to prepare a statement of the present and immediately prospective requirements of the naval defence of the Empire for presentation

to the Canadian Parliament if the Dominion Cabinet deem it necessary."

That has been construed to mean that the Prime Minister went to the Government of Great Britain and asked them for a document to suit his purpose. There is what he asked for; and what else should he have asked for, and what else, if he were honest, could he have asked for? He asked for a statement of the present and immediately prospective requirements of the naval defence of the Empire. Without that how could he make up his mind? To whom should he have gone? He went to the only proper source and he asked them the one straight question that he should have asked them. Why should anyone cavil at that? Then: "The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are prepared to comply and to supplement, in a form which can be made public—(that implies that they did not give all the information which is at their disposal)—the confidential communications and conversations which have passed between the Admiralty and Ministers of the Dominion Parliament during the recent visit to the United Kingdom."

That gives force to what I stated a little while ago. The British Government could not put before this or any other House the whole information they gave to the Canadian Ministers. All they could do was to supplement, within the bounds of prudence and of statesmanship, the information which they had given by what might properly be made public. Now, what does the Admiralty say ? "The Admiralty set the greatest store by the important material, and still more important moral, assistance which it is within the power of Canada to give to maintaining British naval supremacy on the high seas."

Does the leader of the Opposition intimate at all, insinuate in the least, that that was made to order ? I know he would not. I know that he appraises too highly the character of a British Government to think that its leader or its members would, to the order of the overseas dominions, prepare information to suit their political policies. But if he would not do that I am not so sure that all who support him are as punctilious in that regard.

"The Admiralty therefore confine them-

selves in this statement exclusively to facts, and it is for the Dominion Government and Parliament to draw their own conclusions therefrom."

Is not that eminently just? It is the manly British way. We give you the facts, we make no plea, advance no argument; there are the facts, yours is the responsibility for acting or not upon these facts. The memorandum goes on to say: "The power of the British Empire to maintain the superiority on the sea, which is essential to its security, must obviously be measured from time to time by reference to the other naval forces of the world." And so, without unfriendly intention, they have to speak of other powers and other groups of powers. "From this point of view the development of the German fleet during the last fifteen years is the most striking feature of the naval situation to-day."

There was no provocation, says the British Government in this memorandum, to Germany to increase her fleet. On the other hand, there was an effort, continued for years, to retard construction, and, without an arrangement, Great Britain did retard con-

struction for four consecutive years. There was no response, but rather the German Government accelerated their building. That is an important point to be kept in view. This is what the British Admiralty say of the striking power brought into effect by the new German naval law passed, not four years ago, but this year: "4. In the spring of the present year the fifth German navy law was assented to by the Reichstag. The main feature of that law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

"A third squadron of eight battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended law, the active battle fleet consisted of seventeen battleships, four battle or large armoured cruisers, and twelve small cruisers, it will in the near future consist of twenty-five battleships, eight battle or large armoured cruisers, and eighteen small cruisers; and whereas at present, owing to the

system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. Ninety-nine torpedo boat destroyers, instead of sixty-six, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144; seventy-two new submarines will be built within the currency of the new law, and of these it is apparently proposed to maintain fifty-four with full permanent crews. Taking a general view, the effect of the law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war."

Is that not indicative of danger? Are submarines meant for far distant journeys across the ocean to foreign parts? Is the new machinery of torpedo boat destroyers meant to traverse the seas and to protect German commerce or German colonies? Read the whole of it from Dreadnoughts down, and what man can fail to be struck with the fact

that here—without any provocation on the part of the British Empire—it is provided, in the twinkling of an eye, that four-fifths of the complete naval power of Germany is to be in a position to strike at the sound of the bell. Yet Sir Wilfrid Laurier sees no danger, has no apprehensions, sees no emergency, and no need for any action. In the personnel of a navy, man-power counts, and the man-power of the German navy, which is now 66,000, will, when this law has had its course, be 101,500. By 1920 under this law and preceding laws the German fleet—and in this I make an unquestionable statement—will not be one whit inferior to what the British fleet is at this present moment. This is a significant fact.

Then take another point. Everyone knows the disabilities under which an old railway with stock of various ages labours in competition with a new railway lately built and furnished with stock up to date and new. The very same thing takes place in regard to fleets. To-day a portion of England's superiority in naval matters is due to the large number of pre-Dreadnoughts which she possesses and which have not yet passed beyond the age for

giving effectual service; but by 1920 many of these will have become obsolete and ineffective. Britain has much to do between the present date and 1920, to replace these by new material and thus bring the fleet up to the required standard of effectiveness and power.

I do not think I need dwell on that memorandum further, except to say that whereas in the present year Great Britain possesses eighteen battleships and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought class, against nineteen of that class possessed by the other powers of Europe, and will possess in 1913 twenty-four to twenty-one, the figures in 1914 will be thirty-one to thirty-three, and in the year 1915 only thirty-five to fifty-one. That introduces another element. The great European powers are building as well as Germany, and in the mutations of political power brought about by recurring influences and diplomatic alliances, who amongst the great powers knows whether his friend of to-day will not be the enemy of to-morrow; who knows to-day what possible combinations may be in store within the next five or six or seven years? To-day the statesman who stands by the helm of the

ship of state of this great and mighty Empire, and seeks to penetrate with what light he has the murky, distant sea, is never free from the fear that a possible combination could be made within a day which would wipe out his superiority and confront him with fatal odds in the last great struggle for the supremacy of the Empire. Anyone who appreciates the position in which such a man stands, any man who values this Empire and is not utterly careless, must feel that the margin of safety must be maintained, for it is our life. If at any one unhappy moment that superior combination prevails against us, all this mighty superstructure that a thousand years of blood and brawn and brain and soul have built up might be shattered, and the *disjecta membra* picked up by the looters of the world who have not yet left its pathways.

Another thing is said, and the leader of the Opposition is not alone in saying it. Others unite with him in declaring: "Yours is a money contribution, without body, blood, or brains. England wants, not the money, but the hearts, the brains, the brawn of her subjects all over the world." Noble

sentiment! They say we are giving three Dreadnoughts, paid for by Canada, but to be equipped, maintained, and manned by England. "Scotchmen, and descendants of Scotchmen, they ask, are you to be told that you are not to fight for the Empire? Frenchmen, and descendants of Frenchmen in Canada, will you stand it to be told that you are not fit to send your bodies as sacrifice for a cause to which you give your money? Irishmen, and descendants of Irishmen, Dutchmen, and descendants of Dutchmen, we appeal to you to rise in your might and put down this iniquitous Government that imputes to you the wish to hire others to do your work." And thus they cry from the house-tops.

But I ask them this: Suppose that, according to their belief to-day, an emergency, as they call it, existed, what would they do? The leader of the Opposition has said it: he would send $140,000,000 over to the British treasury. No blood, no bones, no brains. We think that there is a need, we think that need cannot be quickly and efficiently met in any degree without a contribution. But at least we put our

contribution in the form of fighting machines which represent Canada and which will be the finest in the Empire's fleet. Surely that is a little advance on the dollars without the machines. During ten years of power and great revenue returns they have sat in their seats and slept in their beds, and yet have sent neither money nor men. In 1899 they permitted, after sundry persuasions, Canadian "dreadnoughts" to go to South Africa. Did they give them rations? Did they supply them with ammunition? They sent the volunteers, our priceless Canadian "dreadnoughts," to the veldts of South Africa without a ration to put in their mouths, without a round of ammunition to put in their belts. And they would have been met by the Boers, and, in the picturesque language of Mr. Graham,* would have been "lugged off" by the Boers, unless the British taxpayer had filled their stomachs and their ammunition pouches and furnished their pay. To-day they propose a divided force in home waters. No matter what happens in the European waters, they will be absolutely unable within six years with their policy to add one single

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item to the force of the fleet that during that time may have to fight the supreme battle for the Empire.

Let us look at this, not in the heated atmosphere of party debate. Let us see it as it appears to us through other atmospheres. For how many years has the South African been sending his contribution to Great Britain—his money contribution? Has one ever heard it hinted anywhere that he was a coward and a do-nothing—that he saved his own precious body, but sent his money? For twenty years Australia has been sending her £100,000 and £200,000, until she has sent more than £2,200,000 to the British Admiralty. Yet we have never heard it said that the Australian was a cowardly man who desired to save his own skin. New Zealand sent her Dreadnought, without a man in it, or a ration in it; and in the whole course of the discussion of this theme of Empire defence we have never heard the assertion made that the New Zealander is cowardly. Nor will they say of us, when they read that $35,000,000 is, at long last, put to some purpose for the use of the Empire in providing

its defence, that these Canadians, though they give their money, refuse their blood. After all, such argument is proof of one thing, and one thing only—that the men who use it have not risen to the true conception of Empire. They tell us: It is England you are sending the money to, it is England, it is Downing Street, that is spending your money. That is not true. It is the best and most efficient machinery that the Empire has that is spending the money. And the Empire is all one family. Six children, grown-up men, we will say, from eighteen to thirty years old, compose one family. Two men are sent to the defence of their country; four remain at home. Do you say to the four who remain at home: You have no part or lot in this matter? One of those remaining at home provides a rifle, another a kit, another gives a Bible—or, perhaps, it is the mother that does that; another gives his prayers, his hopes, his good wishes. The whole family is in it—the whole family offers joint sacrifice for the country's safety.

The next assertion is that the Government's policy is one of contribution only; that we

have abandoned the idea of a Canadian navy. We may call this a temporary policy, they say, but that is not true. It is a permanent policy, they say; contribution will recur and recur and eventually become permanent. Mr. Borden before the election declared that his whole policy was in two parts, and he explained what they were. In introducing his Bill he repeated : " My policy is in two parts, and I have explained them. This Bill is to cover one ; the other part of my policy is to be matured and presented to the people."

In the face of all this, how can fair-minded men make the assertion, as though it were absolutely true, that the policy of the Government is nothing but a contribution policy ? Does Sir Wilfrid Laurier still insist on that ? Because if he does I must labour with him a little longer. Let me say that he is absolutely wrong when he conveys the impression that this contribution, made upon the existence of a pressing need, is the whole of the policy of the Government. He has argued that the fact that certain questions were to be negotiated before a permanent policy was introduced was to him a proof, owing to the

difficulty of coming to a settlement in that regard, that a permanent policy had been indefinitely postponed. It has not, and in the meantime we do everything that can be done to make the fleet of the Empire strong ; we do more than the Opposition under their policy could do, or could approach doing, within six, eight, ten, or more years. We do more than that ; we wipe off a long dark stain and redeem our good Canadian name. I am not uttering this simply for use of words. I have sat beside men from South Africa, from Australia, from New Zealand, from our overseas dominions, and from our Empire, and I have been asked why it was, when small and comparatively poor parts of the dominions of the Empire gave aid towards the imperial fleet, that rich and prosperous Canada did not do something as well, if for nothing else than to step side by side with the others and give encouragement. More than one wet blanket has been thrown on the hopes of the best friends of the British Empire in all parts of it by Canada's delay in this respect.

I venture to say that nothing has happened in past years which has so lightened and

strengthened and freshened the hearts and hopes and aspirations of Empire lovers as the announcement that at last Canada had decided to do something. I go further and say that the announcement which was flashed across the world that Canada was taking an equal stand with the other dominions in rendering assistance to the Empire was read with interest in the chancellery of every great power in the wide world. Now they see Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, and the Malayan States ranging themselves by the side of the Empire. What does each foreign Chancellor say as he reads that news? He says: "Here is a new departure. We are making fleets, forging our blood and brains into machinery for war. For what? To compete with a country which has no designs upon us, in the hope that we may catch her unawares and overpower her? Our man-power is as great as or a little more than hers. But look at this. South Africa with her 2,000,000, New Zealand with her 1,000,000, Australia with her 5,000,000, Canada with her 8,000,000, are ranging themselves alongside the Mother Country, and the time is

not far distant when those 15,000,000 will be 50,000,000, and the time not far from that when the 50,000,000 will be 100,000,000. This vast man-power will not be in one mass—would that it were!—but distributed in four great corners of the world, a tower of British imperial strength in every corner, to watch and guard and preserve their interests, and to present a firm, able, effective, and united front to all aggressors." Do you mean to say that this will not have an effect to discourage war and ensure peace? And this effect would have been greater if Sir Wilfrid Laurier could have fallen in line as in 1909 and given to this contribution his support, and then fought, as well he knows how to fight, for the addition of a Canadian naval service as well.

I have been reminded that in 1909 I said: "When we make our contribution in the way of a fixed sum and it goes from us and we are not responsible for it, we have none of the inspiration arising from the growth and development of a system of future defence in our own country."

I do not regret that anyone should remind me of that. I wish he would read my whole

speech. If he does so he will find that if ever there was a non-partisan, detached discussion of a subject in this House attempted by anyone I attempted it in that discussion. All through it I gave the objections that were raised. I gave the objections of others and I valued them, as I thought, at their worth. I disagreed with many. I agreed with others, but up to a few minutes of the conclusion of my speech I was discussing one thing and one thing only, the permanent, normal policy of defence; and I said then, as I say now, that I was not in favour of a permanent system involving yearly contributions. I stated so plainly and I stated the reasons why. But in the last part of my speech I took up the other part and I said that in view of what had taken place of late we were face to face with another phase of the question, other than the defence of our own shores, namely, a sudden danger and peril to the Empire itself. I said, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier knows it well, that if he would come down to this House and ask for a vote of millions of money for the emergency he would find every member on my side of the House at his back.

I must now take up the argument of Mr. Graham and Mr. Clark * in conjunction with those of the leader of the Opposition.

One of Mr. Graham's assertions was that our policy would reverse the constitutional relations between us and the Old Country and put them seventy years backward. He said that Downing Street would expend our money, that the Admiralty would construct our ships. He said : You bid young Canada, Stand back, you shall not build ships ; you shall not man them, you shall not equip them —stand back, this money is to be sent to the old land and they are to do it there. He said it interfered with responsible government. Now was he serious in making that statement ? Did he really fear that if this Bill went through, and the money were expended as the Bill directs, responsible government and constitutional relations would be reversed and put back seventy or fifty years ? I advise him to be cautious in his answer, because he will be judged by it. Was he really fearful of that or was it merely a stalking horse for the elections ? If it was

* Member for Red Deer.

not a stalking horse what about the proposal of his leader to send $140,000,000 over to Downing Street? Let us argue it out. If a $35,000,000 gift will put back constitutional relations seventy years, four times that gift will put it back 280 years.

Mr. Clark said in effect that this policy gives away self-government, gives away the power to spend our own money, gives up the control of expenditures. Why, he said, a king's head was cut off because he took money without the sanction of Parliament; thirteen colonies left the British Empire once because of similar action. He will not say that he did not use those expressions. He says the contribution is to be spent by the Admiralty. He also says that it is hazardous and dangerous to have Downing Street or people from Great Britain running the public works of Canada or the works of naval defence. Yet for a hundred years and more Downing Street and the Admiralty have been running works of defence for this Dominion of Canada and doing it at their own cost and charges.

But did he ever study the Bill? He was asked by Mr. Borden if he had read the Bill.

It was pointed out to him that he could hardly found his argument or assertions on the Bill as it was, but when he was cornered he said: Oh well, I do not think that is much of a point. But I think it is a very great point. Let us see whether it is or not. Under this Bill, which the House is asked to pass, the authorizing is done by a Canadian Act, enacted by a Canadian Parliament. The vote is passed through its three stages and made law by the Canadian Parliament. The money that is voted is expended by the Governor in Council by order of the Canadian Parliament. The construction of the battleships is carried out and the purpose for which they are required is indicated by the Canadian Parliament. The ships are to be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty by order of the Canadian Parliament, and they are to be put there for the common defence of the Empire by Act of the Canadian Parliament. And the terms and conditions are entrusted to the Government of this country in concurrence with the Government of Great Britain. Where are constitutional relations impinged upon by that enactment? Where is responsible

government outraged by that enactment? But Mr. Clark says: You are sending money over to Great Britain, Canadian money, to be spent there, and the contractors will take a slice of $3,500,000 a year out of our money. I do not place much store by that argument, and I do not think he would have used it if he had thought about it a little longer. Wherever ships are built, companies build them and make their profit. If they did not there would be no ships at all in the world.

I think I have caught Mr. Clark napping. Is he not a free trader, a disciple of Cobden, and is not the innermost principle of free trade to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest? Yet he denies to Canadians the right to spend their money in Britain. But he knows that if we spend it over yonder we will get an effective fighting force for $12,000,000 less of Canadian money than if we spent it here. Is he a protectionist? That is the costliest kind of protection, the bounty. Shades of Cobden! A free trader comes out in our House of Parliament in the twentieth century and pleads to pay the twelve millions more, give the work to the people of our own

country, give them a bonus and give them a bounty; he will be protectionist enough for that.

There are some things that we can do so as to help political and industrial conditions, but when it comes to the life of an Empire, and to the provision to be made for the vital defence of that Empire at a critical moment, it is next to criminal to divert any of the money, which is devoted ostensibly for that sacred purpose, into channels for the sake of industrial or other preference that you think would aid certain interests and thereby diminish the effective aid. Now if that is true generally it is absolutely true in an emergency of this kind. Every cent of the money which is to be expended is to go to meet a pressing need, which, if not met, may end in disaster and destruction.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to introduce two other arguments of Mr. Clark. I shall mention them, however. He says that this contribution is unnecessary financially. Great Britain is a rich country. She has $2,000,000,000 invested in Canada, and we are sending her $80,000,000 of money each

year as interest on that. Now, he says, is that not enough money to be sending her? Why should we be sending her $35,000,000 in addition? She is rich; and lo! we are sending her money.

I did not know before that when one party paid the interest on his mortgage the other was under a special obligation to him, and, therefore, ought to protect him, build his fleets for him and maintain his navies for him. It seems to me that each tub must stand on its own bottom. Great Britain, he says, is a rich country, she does not need your money. But who is it that keeps up the fleet and the army in Great Britain at tremendous cost to keep safe the Empire and to secure peace within the Empire? It is the British taxpayer, rich and poor. It does not come out of the moneys of the banks or of the rich man specially. Everything is paid out of revenue according to men's incomes, and according to their consumption of dutiable and excise goods. Well, the incomes of some of the richest men are smaller than the incomes of many of the only fairly well-to-do people. Anyway, it is the British taxpayer through and through,

and I invite Mr. Clark to visit Great Britain and go through its crowded centres, its country and its cities, its broad streets and its purlieus, and then come back here and justify to his Canadian brother any shirking of a fair part of the defence of the Empire by throwing it on to the British taxpayer.

Again, he says that this contribution is a badge of inferiority, financially. I will not stand it, he says, neither will my constituents, nor this country. You put a tag on me and you degrade me financially. You say I am worth only $4.50, whilst the British taxpayer is worth $5. He is taxed $5 in Great Britain, you only tax me $4.50, and only occasionally at that. I am as good and as able a man as he ; it is a badge of inferiority and I will not stand it.

But he has been standing worse than that for some time. For all the term of his life in this Dominion of Canada he has been badged in another way. Nil. His brother whom he left on the other side has been worth $5 yearly to the upkeep of the fleet ; his constituents have been worth nothing, he has been worth nothing.

Then he says that it is a badge of inferiority

morally not to consecrate our money with our blood. I refuse, he says ; I must have at least a little sprinkling of blood on that money, or else I am badged with inferiority.

I do not think I need labour that argument. Nor, although there are others that I might mention, am I going to pursue this side of the question any further. I want to come to something which I think is more important. I want to know whether I, as a citizen of Canada and of this Empire, fully size up the situation, and whether I am acting under full knowledge and comprehension of the great interests which are involved. I cannot do that unless I inquire and examine and think and reflect.

What is the situation ? Britain is not an aggressive nation. I say that without fear of contradiction. Her hostages are such that she dare not be aggressive. Her possessions are so great that there is no will or wish to be aggressive. Her great problem is to organize, develop, and maintain what she has got. She is a defensive, peaceful nation and must so remain. That weighs with me and I feel that it counts for much. More than that ; let us

not be misled by a play on the word "emergency." It is the condition of things that we want to understand. If the conditions imply danger, present or prospective, and if the danger is one that we, as part of the Empire, are called upon to face and to make provision for, the emergency can go to one side. It is the fact that I am after, it is the condition that I want to insure myself and the country against and that I would like to see the Empire insured against.

What is the condition? There you have Britain, the heart of the Empire, geographically placed in the North Sea, and you cannot take the heart of the Empire out of that place. You cannot change the geographical position. Great Britain to-day is the heart of the Empire. What does that mean? Stand at her ports and watch for a single month, a single year. Britain herself has only 121,000 square miles in an Empire which owns one quarter of the territory of the wide earth, 11,900,000 square miles. Britain has 45,000,000 people in an Empire which has 400,000,000 people of every diversity of race, creed, and class. Britain is diffused

over the whole earth, and the various parts of that Empire are thousands of miles distant from each other and from her. Dispersion adds to the difficulty of government, though it has advantages in some other respects.

Now, watch at these ports. Everything that is eaten, that is consumed, beyond a certain amount, everything that is necessary for her great manufacturing industries, takes ship somewhere in distant lands, traverses the long line of the ocean waterways and finds its way into her ports to feed her industries, employ her people, and add to her wealth and help to make material for distribution again to the wide world. More than that; watch what goes out. More than 3,500 million pounds' worth comes in every year; more than 2,000 million pounds' worth goes out every year. What goes out? Stuff that has been made, products that are necessary to the subsistence of every quarter of the world. If, for one month, the cotton trade between India and Great Britain were interrupted, Lancashire would go bankrupt. If, for a single season, the wools that come from abroad were to be kept from coming, what

would become of the great woollen industries of Great Britain? If, for ten weeks, the food that comes in for her people were to be kept out, what would become of the 45,000,000 people of Great Britain? More than material things go out. Watch those coursing steamers, watch these channels of communication and you will see that something else is going out. The civilization of Britain, uplifting and making better those that need to be uplifted, the governmental policies, the law and justice, the moral, social, and religious influences of Great Britain, everything that tends to uplift, in the far distant regions of the world where her wards live, is carried far and wide on these lines of communication and, to and fro, the intercourse goes on. Suppose that for one single instant something happened. Rome had her great roads. The great roads of the British Empire are the pathless seas. If the roads to Rome had been cut off, that moment Rome would have fallen. If the waterways of the Empire are blocked, that moment intercourse ceases, the arteries grow flaccid, the veins grow limp, the heart beats weaker until at last it stops.

When we come to think of all that is involved in the maintenance of those little islands in the North Sea for the Empire, and, measurably, for the whole world, we must see how imperative it is that we realize the gravity of this question. If, to-morrow morning, the news were to be flashed around the world that Britain's fleet had been wiped off the sea and that Britain's communications had been absolutely blocked, that moment confusion and disintegration would set in and the distant parts of the Empire and Canada would have no security, no confidence, and no absolute lease of life. When I look at that it makes me feel that this is an awfully grave and important matter. When I look at it in that way I say: Put aside, for Heaven's sake, these huckstering objections. Banish the baseless fear from your heart about responsible government going to pieces or about constitutional relations being put back. Britain's ideas do not run in that line at all. If they did, ours do not, and would not admit of it. Let us feel that on the one great matter of imperial defence we are not a federation, we are not mere allies, but that

we are all members of the same body. Does the hand quarrel with the foot because it fears that the foot will endanger its autonomy? The eye and the ear have different functions. The one strains to focalize the lines of light, the other to group the lines of sound and get the interpretation therefrom. All are members of the same body, each does its own work, and the whole entity glorifies and ennobles God's greatest work in the universe. We need not fear anyone if we are able to say: There are our forces standing side by side with those of the Empire. Do not cavil whether your battleship be in St. John harbour or on the Pacific coast when the Empire's interests are in danger. Remember that where the enemy's ships are, there will the great battle be fought and there the fateful decision made.

Away with this idea too long held and still held in some quarters, that Canada must do nothing, lest thereby she enter into the maelstrom of European strife. Analyze that idea for a moment. From what quarter is England menaced? From Asia? No. From Africa? No. From America? No.

Whence is her menace to-day? It is in Europe, and if combinations of powers, or if any one power in Europe aim a spear at her heart, that is where my shield and helm should be to ward off the pointed dart and to prevent the death-dealing thrust. Britain is powerful to-day because of her European affiliations and her European influence; she could not be as powerful anywhere else.

I saw when I was in London what was to me a most significant spectacle. It was in the fury and flame of the Balkan-Turkish war. There was a Guildhall banquet at which the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, spoke. It was at a most critical time. The French Prime Minister had taken a leading part in peace negotiations; he had done all that his country could urge him to do and all that a man could do, but, after all, there were cross-currents. Mr. Asquith rose in that Guildhall; he spoke as Mr. Asquith, but he spoke for Britain; he spoke for the Empire; he spoke as the representative of a great power. What he said was calm and measured, counselling holding special questions until general questions had been settled, suggesting to the

chancelleries of Europe coolness and wise repression of minor differences. The next day in every European country and all over the world the advice of Mr. Asquith was lauded, and more, it was taken, and a crisis was averted. Why had Mr. Asquith's words such power? It was because he was the head of a nation whose fleet was invincible as compared with any other.

Great Britain's fleet could not make much headway against the interior of Germany or the interior of Austria, or the Himalayas; where a fleet gives a nation power is where it touches a nation which has maritime possessions and maritime commerce. There is the power of Britain's fleet, and to-day Britain is powerful there and through the world because of her fleet and because of that alone. But even her fleet is not sufficiently powerful to allow her to isolate herself from Europe; she must have friends in Europe, she must have allies and she must work to keep these allies so that in all combinations of power she shall not be left to herself and to her own resources alone. And so, to the man who, I think inadvisedly, says to Canada: Don't give your money,

because it may tend to drag you into the vortex of European militarism and contest—to him I say: It is in Europe that the strength of Britain lies, it is there at the present outlook where she floats or sinks, lives or dies, and where our fortunes as a nation within the Empire float or sink, live or die with her. And there in the centre of the conflict is the place where we ought to put at this particular time every dollar that we can, and put it in so concrete a form as to be effective.

We have at the present moment two policies before the House; and I think I have pretty well outlined the policy of the Government and what it means. What is the policy which the Liberal party in the House place against it, and to which I wish to call the attention of the leader of the Opposition? There is no difference in principle between us on what we would do in case of emergency. In that he would go as far, yes, four times as far as we are going now. We offer $35,000,000 in concrete fighting machines. He would give $140,000,000 if necessary in cash without a ship or a man. He fore-

shadowed two policies, one policy in his speech and another in his resolution as to permanent aid. In his speech, after declaring that certain things were disclosed by the Admiralty memorandum, he asked: What is the remedy? and he detailed it as follows: That every vessel withdrawn from outside seas to concentrate for defence in home waters, the overseas dominions should replace by another vessel, equally as strong or stronger. He has not included that in his resolution. Does he mean that that was mere verbiage and that the resolution really includes what he meant by that, namely, the two units? That opens up a number of queries. If each younger nation is to replace that which is being drawn away or is to be drawn away for concentration purposes, Canada will have nothing to replace, because we have not had on the coasts of Canada for a long period of years a protective part of the British navy. Or does he think that all of the outside dominions should pool their interests and divide the cost *pro rata* for filling up these outside vacancies made by withdrawing ships to the home centre? If he does

that he will find that within a few years eighty vessels and more have been withdrawn, and that Canada's share of this would be about eight-fifteenths, according to population, and that would oblige us to provide forty-six vessels of war somewhere around these seas. I think that he saw how untenable that was and so in the resolution he substitutes the two units.

We come now to his amendment, which declares that any measure of Canadian aid to imperial naval defence must be by ships owned, manned, maintained by Canada, to be constructed in Canada as soon as possible (that is somewhat indefinite), to be worked under the Naval Service Act of 1910 (that is divided control) to the extent of two fleet units, one on the Atlantic and one on the Pacific, and thus shall greater mobility be restored to British squadrons.

Now, this is the question I ask—and it is not meant to be an impertinent question: Is this a genuine policy? If so, St. Paul's conversion on his way down to Damascus was not a circumstance compared with Sir Wilfrid's conversion on his way from his home to

the Grit caucus. He refused any approach to aid in 1902 and in 1907. He turned down the one-unit proposal in 1909. He did not even award the contracts for the four cruisers and six torpedo boats. Yet he knew every fact and figure we now know, according to his own assertion. He knew the increase in armaments in his time, in which Germany grew to be the great naval power she is to-day. And all these years he had full power and an overflowing treasury, but did nothing. Is this a death-bed repentance? Or is it a platform to get in on? He will forgive the average man if he sees in this a device to stop indefinitely all help to the imperial treasury for the defence of the Empire. There is no doubt at all that if he attempted to carry out his policy of two fleet units to be constructed, manned, and equipped by Canada, many, many years would pass over his head and ours before one single item of aid could be given to imperial defence. Was it for that purpose, to hinder any effective co-operation and, if possible, to make a platform upon which he could overthrow the present Government? I do not want to be uncharitable, but this has all the

ear-marks of a rather clumsily constructed platform to check the other fellow, and, if possible, make it appear to the country to be something better than the other had offered. Was it an emergency—a political emergency —policy? He must, I think, take this as a not uncharitable deduction. It is when one is in power and with full control that he feels responsibility. But when a man is in the wide, roomy spaces of the Opposition he can make platforms which he never intends to stand on, and he can formulate policies that he never expects to carry out.

A Canadian navy first, and then "all the ships will be built in Canada," says the Opposition. What does that mean? Does it mean that the boy is to learn to swim before we will allow him to touch the water? Or must we have a Canadian navy first and afterwards have a complete plant in which to build war vessels? If that is it, where are we going to build our first Canadian navy? In the Old Country? Built by Downing Street and paid for with our money? This the Opposition will not have. But, if there is to be no Canadian navy until we can build

it in this country, man and equip it in this country, then, I say, that millennium is far off. Why, it is not possible; and no business man will say that it is possible for effective aid within any reasonable time.

Even if it were possible, how about its adequacy and effectiveness? We should have one fleet unit on the Pacific to protect the western sea routes and ports. Against whom would it protect us? The Sandwich Islanders are not going to invade Canada. New Zealand and Australia will certainly not attack us. If anyone attacks us on that side it will be one of the great naval powers. Will our one fleet unit be an effectual protection against such a power? Why, our fleet unit would be as brown paper against the impact of a rifle ball. We should have another fleet unit on the Atlantic to protect trade routes and ports on that side. Against whom? The West Indies would not attack us, neither would any of the South American states. If anyone interferes with us there it will be one of the great naval powers. It will be impossible for us by this means to protect ourselves against such an attack. If it is

not this, what is it that is meant? Are these two units, one on the Pacific and the other on the Atlantic, to go to the British fleet and fight at the central point of that fleet's operations as soon as the Order in Council issues? If that is the idea, let me call attention to this point. Consider what a difference there is between wars by land and wars by sea. War by land is impossible without long advertising the commencement of it. But war by sea may be so secretly engineered, may be so completely masked, that battle and the order for battle come within ten or twelve hours of each other. Suppose, for example, that Germany with her mighty fleet, masked and protected as it is from aggression, backed by one of the greatest army organizations of the world, a fleet ready for instant action—should such a fleet attack Great Britain, with a coast-line of 2,000 miles, and in twelve hours be at the point against which she directs its operations, where will our one Atlantic squadron be? What aid will our six-weeks-distant Pacific squadron give?

Brought down to the final analysis we must

do one thing or the other. Either we must do what is absolutely necessary to make our ports defensible against any power ; or, if we are going to help the British navy and save the British Empire, we must put our force where the British Admiralty want it. They are the judges ; they are the men whose views should guide us.

There is one other consideration, this : If the Opposition block this measure, what will happen ? They cannot make their policy prevail short of a general election, and a reversal of the opinion of the people expressed on the 21st of September, 1911. That seems impossible. They may have powers which will enable them to do that, but much time will pass before anything definite will be accomplished. If that is done, and they come back with a majority in their party—which is not quite possible—then, the matter having been blocked for, say, two years, must begin anew. They make their fleet construction, tediously and lengthily, extending certainly, over a period of six or seven years, finding it impossible sooner to obtain Canadian seamen to man it, because they will have to train men

as well as get them. In the event of such a contingency, and if the day of Armageddon came and caught us napping, I would like to have the consciousness that I am free from the remorse which would lie heavily upon me if I had contributed or been party to that fatal delay.

THE END

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